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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Epistemic Justice and Epistemic Participation
by
Kathryn C.S. Schmidt
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, May 2019
Professor Julia Driver, Chair
I advance a new theory of epistemic injustice, with important implications for pursuing
epistemic justice. This project develops a positive account of epistemic justice, broadens the
scope of the phenomenon, and motivates new interventions. This dissertations works towards
a better understanding of what it means to be an epistemic subject and to be treated as
such.
I argue that epistemic injustice can be understood through a lens of participation in inquiry,
rather than using the received view that focuses on testimony. On my account, victims
are marginalized when disrespected and devalued as potential participants in inquiry due
to prejudice. This account broadens the domain of epistemic injustice, incorporating dif-
ferent instances of epistemic exclusion that do not involve testimony. This participatory
account can better explain the core features of epistemic injustice and identifies mechanisms
in subtypes of epistemic injustice. Preventing and remedying epistemic injustice requires
creating inclusive communities that respect and foster participation in inquiry. I argue that
the virtuous elements of inclusion are embodied in groups rather than individuals, and can
vi
successfully address the wrong of epistemic injustice. Successfully fostering inclusion will
require an intersectional approach in order to address varied forms of epistemic injustice.
My dissertation is a collection of five inter-related articles expanding the notion of epistemic
injustice. In the first chapter, the article “What’s unjust about testimonial injustice?” ex-
plores underlying notions of “justice” within the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. I argue
that different philosophers rely upon different notions of justice (specifically David Coady
and Miranda Fricker). In contrast to both of their views, I argue that epistemic injustice
should be understood as a form of oppression. Next, I argue that there are at least two dif-
ferent ways to disrespect victims of epistemic injustice: by denying them recognition respect
(their epistemic standing) or appraisal respect (their credibility). The article “Credibility
and Recognition: Two Failures of Respect in Epistemic Injustice” makes up the second
chapter. Chapter three, “Knowledge and Participation: Giving a Participatory Account of
Epistemic Injustice” argues that epistemic subjects are wronged when de-valued as potential
participants (by denying access, recognition, or appraisal).
This participatory framework is better able to analyze the category of epistemic injustice
compared to other approaches. I propose cultivating the virtue of inclusion (as a virtue of
social groups) in the next chapter: “Inclusion: Addressing Epistemic Injustice with a Group
Virtue”. Inclusion (rather than open-mindedness, testimonial injustice, or trust) is the virtue
that is best able to prevent and remedy instances of epistemic injustice. Using a case study
of patients with fibromyalgia, I show that different types of epistemic injustice impact and
reinforce one another. Those who experience epistemic injustice encounter it while also ex-
periencing other overlapping oppressions. As a result, I argue we must pursue intersectional
vii
epistemic justice. The fifth and final chapter addresses this topic, in: “The Pain of Being
Overlooked: A Case Study on Fibromyalgia and Intersectional Epistemic Justice”.
The existing literature on epistemic injustice has been overly narrow in focus, missing signif-
icant instances of epistemic wrongs. My project can help both ethicists and epistemologists
formulate solutions to epistemic oppression by providing a more fully developed account of
epistemic ideals. Methodologically, I draw from varied approaches including virtue ethics,
social epistemology, feminist philosophy, and social psychology. This approach has direct
implications not only for ethics research but also for teaching pedagogy and provides new
avenues for preventing the epistemic marginalization of vulnerable individuals.
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Preface
Epistemic injustice is an important moral and social wrong, perpetuating oppression in
subtle ways in our everyday lives. In this dissertation I analyze this wrong; clarifying the
mechanisms of epistemic injustice, broadening the range of cases considered, and pointing
towards new interventions.
Epistemic injustice is a significant problem not only because of the wrong that it does
to an individual but also because of the societal harms that it generates. Increasingly, it
is becoming apparent that prejudice can negatively influence society’s knowledge-seeking
processes. Epistemic mistreatment has become the focus of popular philosophers as well as
political activists and journalists. Many people know the term “gaslighting” or can complain
about “mansplaining”. It is more important than ever to attend to the role of prejudice in
shaping public discourse. Race and gender can restrict one’s ability to receive appropriate
help, as in the case of individuals who are mistreated in medical or educational institutions.
Individuals who are not taken seriously cannot share their knowledge and experiences with
the world. Such epistemic marginalization results in large caches of information that may
never make it to public consideration. Sometimes the information builds up to eventually be
considered, as with the “metoo” movement. All of a sudden, a wealth of testimony becomes
socially visible at once.
The forces of social identity upon one’s ability to function in society, including as a way
of rendering one invisible, has previously been discussed in a wide variety of feminist work.
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There is a long history of examining the ways that racism and sexism can undermine one’s
perceived credibility and reliability within a wider society. Black feminist work has empha-
sized the ethical and epistemic importance of listening to the experiences of black women.
Anna Julia Cooper wrote that it is a “woman’s strongest vindication for speaking that the
world needs to hear her voice”(Cooper, 1988, p.121). Without using the same terms as cur-
rent analytic tradition, the feminist literature has long emphasized the topic of testimonial
oppression.1
I use the term “epistemic injustice” in this project, consistent with most currant usage in the
profession, as a way to identify the central phenomenon at the heart of a variety of epistemic
and moral wrongs. The term “epistemic injustice” was first used by Miranda Fricker in her
2007 book on the topic(Fricker, 2007).
Philosophic work on the topic of implicit prejudice is buoyed by work in psychology in the
problem of implicit bias. More is being done to measure and understand how subconscious
mechanisms or environmental forces can function to promote prejudicial actions despite
one’s conscious good intentions. Because this wrong is subconsious, and easily missed, it
is critically important to take the time to highlight its harms and think creatively about
possible interventions.
Examining the topic of epistemic injustice also raises bigger questions about the nature of
epistemic agency and the relationship between the domains of ethics and epistemology.
1Some other examples of early feminist work include the work of Audre Lorde and Chandra
Mohanty(Lorde, 1984)(Mohanty, 1984)(Dotson, 2011). This is merely a few representative examples, but
does not begin to encompass the previous work on this topic.
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Chapter 1
What’s Unjust about “Testimonial
Injustice”?
1.0.1 Introduction
In the book To Kill a Mockingbird Tom Robinson is a black man who is wrongly convicted
of a crime after an all-white jury dismisses his testimony. Tom is a victim of a testimonial
injustice; his words are unfairly discredited due to racial prejudice (Fricker, 2007).
In a more recent example, a person in need of medical assistance was initially neglected after
a flight attendant refused help from a black female doctor. Dr. Tamika Cross raised her hand
when flight attendants called for any available doctors, but was then told “Oh no sweetie,
put your hand down, we are looking for actual physicians or nurses...”(Wible, 2016). In this
case, the flight attendant dismissed Dr. Cross’s claim to be a medical expert and ignored
Dr. Cross’s expertise.2 This phenomenon of dismissal is all too common and represents a
significant moral wrong.
2Luckily, in this case the person in need did not suffer from any medical harms as a result.
1
When someone’s words are not taken seriously due to prejudice (as in the cases above) it is
not only morally problematic but also epistemically problematic. Dr. Cross is mistreated as
an expert, and as a knowledge seeker. Philosophers refer to these wrongs against a person
“qua epistemic subject” as epistemic injustices(Kidd, Medina, & Pohlhaus, 2017). Ade-
quately understanding and addressing this aspect of our moral and epistemic lives requires a
closer analysis into the notion of (in)justice within epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker has
argued that these wrongs are best understood as discriminatory epistemic injustices(Fricker,
2013). Recently, David Coady has argued that this is incorrect, and they should be modeled
according to a framework of distributive injustice(Coady, 2017). Fricker and Coady disagree
on the nature of the injustice, and on whether distributive wrongs are fundamentally dis-
tinct or similar to the prejudicial dismissal that the term was initially designed to capture.
This disagreement reveals a flaw in the current literature; when different philosophers rely
upon different notions of injustice, they risk talking past one another when theorizing about
epistemic injustice.
In this paper, I present a clarified notion of epistemic injustice as epistemic oppression.
This can preserve the distinction between discriminatory and distributive wrongs and show
that Coady is wrong to claim that testimonial injustice is best described and understood
as a case of distributive injustice. Epistemic injustice is best characterized using a frame-
work of oppression, where oppression represents a systemic network of wrongs that restrict
the victim’s epistemic capacities. More specifically, I outline my own account of epistemic
marginalization to make sense of the central cases of “testimonial injustice”. Using a model
of oppression most clearly highlights what is at stake when deciding which epistemic wrongs
do or do not constitute “injustices”.
2
1.0.2 Criteria
There are many things that need to go into a successful account of epistemic injustice.
While Fricker and Coady disagree, both are engaged in the same project of trying to clearly
articulate the nature of epistemic injustice and its ethical features as a category. Both
Fricker and Coady can label what happened to Tom a moral wrong and an injustice, but
their different approaches suggest importantly different perspectives. Here I briefly propose
four broad criteria for assessing accounts of the systematic wrongdoing characteristic of
“testimonial injustice”. A successful framework will facilitate accurate moral analysis and
effective intervention. Frameworks for epistemic injustice will be more successful according
to the extent that they meet the following four criteria (insight, categorization, application,
and intervention).
First, a good account needs to facilitate moral insight. To facilitate insight an account must
give a clearly defined notion of what is wrong with failing to take someone seriously due to
prejudice. A strong account should provide ethical analysis, rather than just gesturing at
the intuitive wrongness of the phenomenon. A better framework will be more successful at
highlighting and explaining relevant moral features.
Second, a good account can explain the phenomenon of epistemic injustice as a distinctive
category. Both Fricker and Coady are working to define a category or type of wrong that
can be distinguished in a meaningful way from other forms of injustice. This categorization
includes explaining the epistemic element of this wrong, how moral concerns are specifically
applied to the epistemic domain. What is needed is a notion of wrongdoing that can also be
understood in a distinctly epistemic way.3
3Jeremy Wanderer has articulated this requirement as a “categorical connection” between injustice and
social practice(Wanderer, 2017).
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Understanding what goes wrong in testimonial injustice must include a close tie with our
epistemic practices. It is also important to be able to distinguish testimonial injustice from
mere testimonial mistakes or other forms of mistreatment that do not constitute an injustice.
Consider the following case:
TIRED COLLEAGUE: Sue is exhausted at work when she meets with her colleague
Kirsten. Sue discounts all the ideas she hears when she is tired, and so discounts Kirsten’s
testimony during their meeting.
In this case, the victim suffers due to a credibility deficit, but it also seems to be a different
kind of wrong than the ones suffered by Tom. A good framework should help identify the
key features that distinguish this case from the others. Sue commits an epistemic wrong,
but she does not seem to be enacting or perpetuating epistemic injustice.
Third, a good account has useful application to new and different cases of testimonial injus-
tice. A successful framework not only highlights what is morally salient about the central
cases of Marge and Tom, but can also address new cases. New cases may or may not be
considered central to the category of epistemic injustice, but a framework should be able to
address them clearly. Part of what is at stake in the disagreement between Coady and Fricker
is how to separate different categories of epistemic wrongs. While Fricker wants to delineate
distributive wrongs as a separate category, Coady would include all new distributive cases
within his definition.
The fourth and final criterion is that a successful account of testimonial injustice should
suggest meaningful interventions. Work on epistemic injustice is meaningful to the extent
that it can guide meaningful interventions, and promote more just epistemic interactions. I
agree with Fricker that: “Ultimately, the point is to see how our epistemic conduct might
4
become at once more rational and more just.”(Fricker, 2007, p.4). The best accounts of
epistemic injustice will be practically helpful. Analysis and understanding are critical because
they guide improvement.4
These basic criteria are broad considerations that line up with the expressed interests of
both Coady and Fricker. I will refer back to them to assess the relative merits of different
approaches.
1.1 The Phenomenon of Interest
1.1.1 The Cases
The literature on testimonial injustice is still primarily focused on two intuitive cases from
Fricker(Fricker, 2007). Anyone seeking to understand this phenomenon must make sense
of these cases which present clear central examples of testimonial injustice. Testimonial
injustice and hermeneutical injustice are Fricker’s main subtypes of discriminatory epistemic
injustice. In this paper, I focus exclusively on testimonial injustice, as the most theoretically
central example. Fricker has argued that testimonial injustice is the prototypical case of
epistemic injustice.5 Consider the following two cases:
4In Fricker’s 2007 book she proposes the virtue of “testimonial justice” as a solution to the problem of
testimonial injustice. Someone who possesses this virtue “neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility
judgments”(Fricker, 2007, p.92). An agent who possesses testimonial justice is thus able to perform credibility
assessments without allowing prejudice to influence her improperly.
5Fricker says that when understanding epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice is “the most basic of
all”(Fricker, 2010, p.174). Hermeneutical Injustice occurs when “a gap in collective interpretive resources
puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences.”(Fricker,
2007, p.1)
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TOM: Tom Robinson is a black man on trial in the south in 1935, and his words are
constrained by the stereotypes of the time. Specifically, the jury believes the words of
Mayella Ewell, a white woman, over his own honest account in spite of evidence indicating
Tom’s innocence(Fricker, 2007)(Lee, 1960).6
MARGE: When her fiance´ Dickie goes missing, Marge Sherwood becomes increasingly
suspicious that Tom Ripley has killed him. However, her suspicions are discounted and
then outright ignored by Dickie’s father, Herbert Greenleaf, who suggests that women’s
intuition cannot be trusted. Marge is correct, but her views are unfairly discounted by
Herbert, causing Ripley to get away with the murder. Herbert dismisses Marge, saying
“Marge, there’s female intuition and then there are facts”(Fricker, 2007, p.9)(Minghella et
al., 1999)(Highsmith, 1955).
Both of the cases above demonstrate upsetting examples where an individual is treated badly
and not taken seriously. I agree with Fricker that “Any claim of injustice must rely on shared
ethical intuition”, and these are intuitively cases of wrongdoing(Fricker, 2007, p.5). Both
cases are intuitive examples of injustice and what remains to be done is to articulate a clear
framework for understanding this phenomenon as a coherent category rather than a set of
similar cases. A clear notion of epistemic injustice is needed in order to identify this category
of cases as a morally distinct category.
1.1.2 The Disagreement
Fricker and Coady rely upon different notions of injustice to categorize epistemic injustice.
Fricker characterizes the cases of Tom and Marge as instances of testimonial injustice, which
6Specifically, Fricker highlights that his act of showing pity for a white woman, a taboo sentiment at the
time, is what activates racial prejudices that hurt his ability to be truly heard by the jury.
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wrongs someone “specifically in their capacity as a knower” because of an “identity preju-
dicial credibility deficit”(Fricker, 2007, p.1,4). The term “testimonial injustice” is a phrase
from Fricker although many other writers have focused on the same phenomenon both before
and after her book was published. See Kristie Dotson’s paper for a helpful starting point
on the previous literature(Dotson, 2011). On Fricker’s account, testimonial injustice is a
paradigmatic case of epistemic injustice because it shows disrespect for an agent in a central
epistemic role: offering testimony.
Fricker acknowledges the existence of distributive epistemic injustices - such as unequal
distribution of epistemic goods like education - but argues that these injustices are impor-
tantly different from discriminatory epistemic injustices such as the examples above(Fricker,
2017). The category of discriminatory epistemic injustice is supposed to be more “dis-
tinct”; it highlights a wrong that causes an agent to be “disadvantaged in respect of their
status as an epistemic subject” while being “fundamentally a form of (direct or indirect)
discrimination”(Fricker, 2017, p.53). The wrong is fundamentally about the impact of prej-
udice upon an epistemic interaction, such that the speaker receives a lowered credibility
assessment. Fricker wants to clearly identify a distinct kind of epistemic wrong, and the case
of testimonial injustice as an “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit” is most central(Fricker,
2007, p.4). Individuals are treated epistemically fairly when credibility assessments match
up with the available evidence, unimpeded by prejudice. As a result, she explicitly rejects
a distributive notion of injustice as an explanation of testimonial injustice(Fricker, 2007,
p.19)(Fricker, 2017).
Coady criticizes Fricker for being imprecise in her notion of justice, and argues in favor of a
distributive analysis of epistemic injustice, saying that a distributive account can best make
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sense of the phenomenon. He rejects Fricker’s proposed separation between the discrimi-
natory and the distributive.7 As a result of this analysis, it becomes clear that previously
ignored phenomenon (such as unequal access to education) can be considered types of epis-
temic injustice.
He has previously argued that uneven distributions in epistemic goods are a form of epistemic
injustice(Coady, 2010). Individuals are wronged when a distribution of epistemic goods is
unjust, and the epistemic goods might include things like interesting true beliefs(Coady,
2010, p.106). He argues that the cases of Marge and Tom should be understood according
to the same framework, as distributive epistemic injustices, where the wrong is unfairly
distributed credibility.8 He has also highlighted inadequacies in Fricker’s account, arguing
that it fails to give a complete analysis of testimonial injustice. Treating these examples as
cases of distributive injustice prompts a different approach than Fricker’s, one he argues will
be more philosophically rewarding.
1.2 Epistemic Injustice as Distributive Injustice
Coady argues that all instances of epistemic injustice can be understood as types of distribu-
tive injustice. More specifically:
“...each of the forms of epistemic injustice that Fricker describes is a form of
distributive injustice (or at any rate can be fruitfully treated as such) and that
7Specifically, he says: “I will challenge Fricker’s distinction between discriminatory and distributive epis-
temic injustice”(Coady, 2017, p.61).
8In this case, we can treat credibility “as a good (like wealth, healthcare, education or
information)”(Coady, 2017).
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considerable insight into the nature of these injustices, and into the interrelations
between them, can be gained from recognizing this fact.”(Coady, 2017, p.61).9
Using a distributive framework focuses on the way various goods can be allocated fairly or
unfairly. A distributive injustice wrongs its victim because they do not receive an appropriate
portion of some object or good. To explain testimonial injustice, this framework must
be applied to distinctly epistemic goods. Coady clarifies: “If we think of credibility as a
good (like wealth, health care, education or information), then it is natural to think that
testimonial injustice consists in an unjust (or unfair) distribution of this good”(Coady, 2017,
p.61). This treats credibility as a finite resource. Agents suffer from this injustice when they
are denied the credibility that they deserve.
Coady argues that this framework is the most “fruitful”, in the sense that it grants insight
into the phenomenon. This framework helps to get at the relevant philosophic question,
which for Coady means asking about what makes for a fair distribution of epistemic goods.
This question is highlighted on a distributive framework but obscured on Fricker’s.
His argumentation relies upon the criteria explicated earlier: he says that his framework
will better provide insight, clear categorization, and the ability to make sense of new cases.
Specifically, Coady argues that a significant advantage of his framework is that it is better
able to make sense of credibility excesses.
An example will help to demonstrate the significance of his account for credibility excesses.
Imagine the following example:
9Coady is here referring not only to testimonial injustice but also to hermeneutical injustice. Coady
argues that hermeneutical injustice can be understood as a failure to properly distribute “hermeneutical
power”(Coady, 2017).
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TALL LAWYER: Adam is a mediocre lawyer who is tall, white, and conventionally at-
tractive. As a result, people find him highly credible beyond what is justified based on his
arguments and expertise.
This is a case of a credibility excess - Adam is misjudged due to prejudice, but his credibility
is increased rather than decreased. Fricker says very little about cases of credibility excess.
Ultimately, they are not epistemic injustices on her account, because no individual instance
“wrongs him sufficiently in itself”(Fricker, 2007, p.21). While this is intuitively not a case of
testimonial injustice like that of Tom and Marge, it might also seem more closely related than
Fricker suggests. Jose´ Medina has criticized Fricker for being unable to properly account for
cases of credibility excesses like this one(Medina, 2011).
Coady argues that his distributive account can plausibly make sense of credibility excesses
(such as the TALL LAWYER case). On a distributive framework, it is emphasized that
competition exists over a limited supply of credibility. As such, decreased credibility for
one agent is linked to increased credibility for another agent.10 Coady emphasizes that
this relationship can hold true for instances of testimonial injustice, where “...some have
less than they deserve of the good in question because others have more of it than they
deserve”(Coady, 2017, p.63). Even though there may be a great deal of credibility available
in general, there is still a sort of competition for credibility relative to others. Credibility is
limited or scarce because in social contexts individual credibility is assessed relative to those
nearby, or relative to those who make competing claims. Specifically, Coady argues that the
cases of Marge and Tom show this, where part of the injustice done is that the wrong people
(Tom Ripley, Mayella Ewell) are given too much credibility relative to the victims(Coady,
2017, p.62).
10Medina has also made the argument that the two types of credibility assessments should be understood
as closely related, although without endorsing a distributive framework(Medina, 2011).
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Treating credibility as a distributed good has an advantage over Fricker’s framework because
it can more clearly make sense of credibility excesses. On a distributive account, credibility
excesses are wrong because they are necessarily linked with corresponding credibility deficits.
However, on Fricker’s account, it is difficult to see how credibility excesses can be problematic
since the core notion of injustice is focused on prejudicial decreases in credibility (and the
epistemic disrespect and harms that co-occur).
1.2.1 Assessing a Distributive Account
I agree with Coady’s criticisms of Fricker’s underlying notion of injustice; the existing account
is not clear enough about the notion of justice at work. Looking specifically at my four
criteria (insight, categorization, application, and intervention), Coady’s distributive account
has significant strengths.
Regarding categorization, his account has advantages over Fricker. His framework can better
make sense of the case of credibility excesses. The clarity of his account makes it easier to
apply to new cases, meeting the application criterion.
However, there are reasons to worry that a distributive framework does not accurately por-
tray the ethical mechanisms at work. Specifically, that it is misleading to portray credibility
as an object or good that is distributed (and so can be understood on a distributive frame-
work). Misrepresenting credibility in this way makes the account weak on the insight and
intervention dimensions. A distributive account fails in these criteria because it mistakenly
treats credibility as an object and oversimplifies the phenomenon.
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1.2.2 Misrepresenting Credibility
Fricker and Coady disagree about whether credibility is scarce. Coady considers and rejects
one objection to treating credibility as a good: the thought that credibility is not finite and
scarce in the right ways to be subject to distributive concerns (as opposed to something like
wealth). He argues that our usual epistemic practices show that credibility is finite. There
is something incoherent about picturing a world where everyone has limitless credibility. He
concludes “There is no disanalogy between credibility and wealth here”(Coady, 2017, p.63).
Using a distributive framework misrepresents credibility as an object-like good, and as a re-
sult it fails to accurately portray central elements of the phenomenon of testimonial injustice.
For the sake of clarity, it is possible to draw a distinction between objective credibility and
attributed credibility. Objective credibility refers to an agent’s actual trustworthiness, while
attributed credibility refers to how credible the agent is seen to be by others. To understand
Coady’s claims, it must be attributed credibility that is being unfairly distributed. In the
central cases, the victims are not receiving enough credit from others for their actual epis-
temic successes. Talking about distributions of agent’s attributions as if they were concrete
goods makes for a warped account of credibility.
Understanding credibility as an object obscures rather than illuminates how credibility func-
tions in our epistemic practices. Iris Marion Young has argued that all distributive frame-
works face problems when treating non-object goods as objects, even metaphorically(Young,
1990)(Forst, 2007). She argues it obscures important elements of institutional context and
misrepresents the non-object goods. More specifically “Applying a logic of distribution to
such goods produces a misleading conception of the issues of justice involved”(Young, 1990,
p.25). This critique highlights the problems with Coady’s framework.
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First, a representation of credibility as an object suggests that credibility is something stable,
and an item that can be held or possessed by an agent. This is mistaken, as attributed
credibility in our epistemic practices is often unstable. Credibility will vary across different
contexts, topics, and relationships. When giving a talk, I am likely to be seen as possessing
different amounts of credibility by the different members of my audience. If you fail to give
me money that you owe me, you can always pay me back later. Credibility importantly
does not function this way - I cannot boost my credibility judgment of you tomorrow to
make up for ignoring you today. Credibility cannot be averaged out across different domains
and interactions (the way we might with wealth). Credibility is a positional good, and its
value shifts with differing time and context - giving credibility at a later date may not have
the same epistemic or moral significance. In this way, credibility does not function as a
possession, and it is overly simplistic to treat credibility as a mere object to be possessed (or
not) by an agent.
Understanding credibility on this framework obscures important elements of credibility judg-
ments, such as the way the judgments are context-dependent. They occur as part of an
ongoing process between situated knowers. Distributive approaches are often pre-disposed
to focus on end-state arrangements, rather than dynamic, ongoing processes(Young, 1990).
Focusing on a more static distribution obscures the actual mechanisms of conversation.
A similar worry about Coady’s distributive account is that it fails to properly highlight
the historical factors that play into a given injustice and the way current interactions are
linked to factors from the past. In the case of Tom, the injustice he experiences is closely
related to many similar injustices against black men stretching back in time to when black
men were not permitted to testify in court at all. Medina makes this point when he argues
that we must look at instances of epistemic injustice as “temporally extended” and “socially
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extended” phenomena(Medina, 2011, p.15). The unfairness that occurs when Tom cannot
influence his own court proceeding is importantly connected to a historic social practice.11 A
distributive approach that emphasizes only the credibility that Tom is owed at the moment
misses this important historic element.
Rather than being fruitful, this framework presents a warped perception of credibility. A
distributive approach is still partially correct, as credibility is judged and metaphorically
distributed during testimony. However, a distributive account of testimonial injustice risks
flattening a complex interpersonal interaction into merely a transaction of objects. This
framework fails to correctly model the relevant ethical and epistemic issues at hand, leaving
out key features of the interactions. A better account of credibility is needed. Young ar-
gues that the distributive paradigm fails politically especially for goods that are relational,
context-dependent, or emerge during ongoing processes(Young, 1990). Credibility is a good
of this type, and the epistemic impact of misjudged credibility cannot be properly modeled
on a distributive framework.
Returning to the criteria for a successful account of testimonial injustice, it is clearer that
a distributive account has significant weaknesses. When examining the central cases, the
distributive framework fails to properly represent the significance of what is happening. For
Marge’s situation, it would be inaccurate to sum up the interaction merely as one where she
ends up possessing less credibility than she ought to be given. This wrong cannot be fully
understood by examining Marge, and how much credibility she does or does not possess in
Herbert’s eyes. The wrong functions to portray her inaccurately in a way that goes beyond
Herbert’s isolated assessment, and her ability to function as an inquirer is more broadly
limited by her gender. Her testimony is not merely undercut in a single instance, but in fact,
11This may be part of what Fricker is trying to emphasize when she insists that the wrong is discriminatory.
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Ripley repeatedly acts in ways to undermine her. The wrong is not just Herbert’s disbelief in
her assertion, but the way her epistemic standing is more broadly undermined. The wrong
occurs within a social context, drawing on socially shared prejudices.
In addition to failing to clearly represent the significant moral features at play, a distributive
account also struggles with peripheral cases. If the core wrong is best analyzed as misal-
located credibility, then it looks like the case of TIRED COLLEAGUE may be identical
to the cases of Marge and Tom. In both cases, the appropriate credibility is unfairly with-
held. However, this analysis goes against intuitions that these cases are importantly distinct.
Using a distributive framework does not fully capture the intuition that the social factors
at work in Marge’s case make it morally different in an important way from the case of
workplace fatigue. These weaknesses in analysis show that Coady’s account fails to provide
adequate insight, and it raises worries for whether the framework can be fruitfully applied
to new cases.
The account also had weaknesses when being used as a framework for intervention. Solutions
on a distributive account will likely revolve around ways to re-distribute credibility. This
might include interventions designed to artificially boost one’s credibility perceptions when
interacting with others who might be victims of prejudice. Benjamin Sherman has argued
that due to what we know about unconscious biases, it is unlikely that individuals will be able
to notice their own mistakes and cultivate an effective virtue of testimonial justice(Sherman,
2016). As a result, interventions that emphasize individuals re-setting their own perceptions
of credibility may be unsuccessful. Viewing attributed credibility as an object perpetuates
a misunderstanding of its nature that makes it difficult to propose realistic solutions.
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1.3 Epistemic Oppression as Restricted Epistemic Ca-
pacity
Rather than defending Fricker or Coady against the concerns I have raised, I will use a
different notion to elucidate what is unjust about epistemic injustice. I use a framework
of epistemic oppression to understand what takes place in the cases of Marge and Tom.
The terms ‘oppression’ and ‘injustice’ can be used in overlapping ways, but here I mean to
illustrate a contrast between the two. ‘Oppression’ picks out a specific and narrower notion
than the usual term ‘injustice’, and I highlight this focus by using the term ‘oppression’.
(Oppression is a specific type of injustice, the type at work in testimonial injustice; all
oppressions are injustices, but not all injustices are instances of oppression). By using this
strategy to define injustice, I can more clearly articulate the mechanisms at work in old and
new cases of testimonial injustice, while also preserving a distinction between testimonial
injustice and other distributive epistemic wrongs. This view is an alteration of Fricker’s
although it is one that she may be motivated to support since it accomplishes her key goals.
The category of interest, testimonial injustice, is unjust because it is an instance of epistemic
oppression.
Oppression occurs when there is “repeated, widespread, systemic injustice”(Deutsch, 2006,
p.10). Marilyn Frye has likened oppression to a birdcage, made up of a number of intersecting
barriers. Examining any one wire in the cage (a single wrong) is not enough to see the overall
picture of oppression(Frye, 2000). Instead, oppression is often characterized by double-
bind situations where a person faces constrained agency in a number of ways. Young has
proposed five different “faces” or expressions of oppression: exploitation, marginalization,
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence(Young, 1990). Any one face is sufficient
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for a group to be oppressed, and different groups may suffer different combinations of these
types of cultural and political oppression. In this paper I focus solely on Young’s account
of marginalization, setting aside the other four faces. While Young’s account emphasizes
political and economic oppression, my account describes oppression within the epistemic
domain (by which I mean: directly pertaining to knowledge and inquiry).
A single instantiation of oppression will necessarily also be an instance of injustice, but the
phenomenon of oppression cannot merely be characterized as the phenomenon of injustice.
Understanding the cases of Marge and Tom as mere injustices fails to serve as a sufficient
analysis. Instead, a different vantage point is needed in order to fully and accurately under-
stand what goes wrong. Marge and Tom are victims of epistemic oppression.
Starting from a viewpoint of oppression rather than injustice shifts the focus from the indi-
vidual onto social groups: “Oppression is injustice that, first and foremost, concerns groups;
individuals are oppressed just in case they are subjected to injustice because of their group
membership”(Haslanger, Tuana, & O’Connor, 2017). Shifting to talk of oppression requires
that we make sense of this phenomenon as it pertains not only to individuals but also to
social groups. Marge and Tom are not only wronged as individuals but also suffer specifically
because they belong to oppressed social groups.
1.3.1 Epistemic Oppression
The notion of oppression can be usefully applied within the epistemic domain. Oppression is
constituted by systems of interacting injustices, and characterized by the way it restricts an
agent’s capacities. Applying the notion of oppression within the epistemic domain focuses on
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the ways in which epistemic capacities can be constrained.12 Epistemic oppression functions
as a restriction on an agent’s capacities and successes within the epistemic domain. This
might restrict an agent’s ability to develop key epistemic skills, or to express them in pursuit
of her goals within an epistemic community.
One way that agents are epistemically oppressed is when they are excluded from critical
social epistemic practices.13 Epistemic agents rely upon their social community to develop
and enact their basic epistemic capacities(Grasswick, 2004). Many important epistemic
practices are essentially social, for example, pooling shared knowledge, monitoring members
of the community for epistemic errors, and cooperating during inquiry.14 This list is not
exhaustive but demonstrates the ways that individuals who are marginalized are cut off from
important and fundamental epistemic activities. It is important to note that this exclusion
and failure of recognition, with the exclusion from shared social processes, is central to my
definition of marginalization.15
Oppression is multi-faceted, and the same oppression can be expressed in a number of ways.
A variety of different wrongs might all represent varied elements of the same oppression. For
example, Dotson has shown that in the case of “self-smothering” a speaker might restrict
her own testimony when she knows she will be dismissed by her audience(Dotson, 2011).
12This is not to say that oppression need be fully characterized through a restriction of agency or capacity:
just that it is always a central element, and a significant one for identifying and addressing intersecting
epistemic injustices.
13Dotson has used similar language, saying epistemic oppression, is a “persistent epistemic exclusion that
hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production”(Dotson, 2014, p.115). I disagree with her focus on
knowledge production. On my understanding of epistemic oppression, it is defined by any limitation on
epistemic capacities, not merely on limitations that impact whether knowledge is produced.
14Edward Craig has argued that pooling shared information is one of the foundational epistemic activities
and that the concept of knowledge emerged as a way to track reliable informants who could contribute to
this shared goal(Craig, 1990). Others have argued that the notion of inquiry is more central to the notion
of knowledge(Kelp, 2011).
15Young places more of an emphasis on the material deprivation that results from economic marginaliza-
tion, in addition to the misrecognition(Young, 1990).
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This is still an element of an epistemically oppressive system. The speaker silences herself
because she knows the ways her words will be received. Using a framework of oppression
means shifting away from a singular type of injustice, and instead looking for a phenomenon
“through which groups of persons are systematically and unfairly or unjustly constrained,
burdened, or reduced by any of several forces”(Cudd, 2006, p.23). A framework of epistemic
oppression lets us draw connections between these different forces acting upon the same
epistemic subjects.
1.3.2 Epistemic Marginalization
An agent is epistemically marginalized when he or she is excluded from social epistemic
practices in light of group membership. Young describes marginalization as when “A whole
category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life”(Young, 1990, p.53).
On my epistemic account, we should think of this “useful participation” in terms of central
epistemic practices, rather than in terms of employment. Epistemic marginalization is a
form of oppression that blocks participation within the epistemic economy. Marginalized
agents are denied appropriate recognition and communal space to participate in inquiry.
Young emphasizes the way that marginalization can restrict an agent’s ability to develop
key capacities. This need not be the case with epistemic marginalization, as oppressed
individuals are often able to thrive within alternative epistemic environments where they
are not marginalized. Instead, the wrong is more primarily about blocked participation and
societal neglect and misrecognition.
Epistemic marginalization pushes agents to the periphery which directly impacts one’s in-
dividual epistemic agency. Heidi Grasswick has argued that any model of epistemic agency
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must understand actors as “individuals-in-communities”(Grasswick, 2004). Agents who are
denied consideration by their peers, or the ability to develop and express their epistemic
capacities, have constrained epistemic agency.
This model can better analyze the two central cases of testimonial injustice. Marge and Tom
both experience epistemic marginalization when they are treated wrongly. Marge is epistem-
ically marginalized when Herbert, because of her gender, blocks her ability to participate in
the process of discovering what happened to her fiance´. Her words are dismissed, without
even receiving full consideration. She is not treated as a potential source of epistemic co-
operation for Herbert as he seeks answers about his son. Marge’s own epistemic goals are
thwarted, and she is denied the potential ability to contribute towards communal goals.
In the case of Tom, his experience is dismissed even in the midst of a legal procedure that
purports to focus on the truth. Tom is not treated as an active player, as someone who
can contribute to the shared social activity of pooling information. Instead, his words are
doubted. Tom is not given a full chance to explain himself, or to be understood. In this way,
his epistemic capacities are limited by the treatment of the townspeople. In both the cases
of Tom and Marge, their epistemic marginalization is occurring because of their membership
in specific social groups.
It is important to be clear about how this notion of marginalization is grounded in a frame-
work of oppression. Coady uses the term “marginalization” when discussing hermeneutical
injustice, and he says: “To be marginalized with respect to a certain good is just to have less
than an equal share of it”(Coady, 2017, p.65). This is a mistaken characterization and does
not count as marginalization on my view. Marginalization is an instantiation of oppression:
where an agent’s capacities are restricted in systematic or structured ways because of group
membership. This system of exclusion cannot be accurately characterized as merely lacking
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a share of some good. As discussed earlier, the distributive approach misrepresents and
oversimplifies the mechanisms at play.
Like Young, I want to emphasize that epistemic marginalization is designed to capture a
more complex and process-based concern(Young, 1990). Young says: “While marginaliza-
tion definitely entails serious issues of distributive justice, it also involves the deprivation of
cultural, practical, and institutionalized conditions for exercising capacities in a context of
recognition and interaction”(Young, 1990, p.55). While she is speaking of political marginal-
ization, the same holds true for epistemic marginalization. Treating this wrong as a mere
absence of some good misrepresents the nature of the claim being made by the marginalized.
1.3.3 Fricker’s Framework and Epistemic Marginalization
Understanding testimonial injustice as primarily a wrong of epistemic marginalization is
a departure from Fricker’s analysis. Fricker analyzes the wrong as a prejudicially driven
credibility deficit. As such, she emphasizes the role of prejudice in one’s testimonial sen-
sitivity when listening to testimony. My position differs from Frickers’ however ultimately
it better serves her goals to take up my framework. By focusing on epistemic oppression,
my framework explicitly focuses on shared social identities, and on the restriction of agency
that occurs when multiple forms of injustice intersect. Fricker’s account does not have these
restrictions: she emphasizes prejudice, but without a framework that explicitly considers
historical or contextual factors regarding which social groups are oppressed. She also does
not require multiple forms of injustice or specific impacts on one’s agency.
The account of epistemic marginalization differs from Fricker’s in three significant ways.
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First, epistemic marginalization emphasizes one’s social role rather than an individual role:
victims are wronged as members of a marginalized social group. Understanding the phe-
nomenon requires considering group social and historical factors, not just whether or not
there is implicit prejudice in the mind of the hearer. Rather than emphasizing the role of
prejudice in causing a decreased credibility assessment, this account emphasizes the way indi-
viduals are treated within a social context where they are seen as a member of a marginalized
group.
Second, this account differs in the identification of the core wrong at the heart of testimonial
injustice. Fricker analyzes the primary wrong as one of objectification, where one is treated
as a mere source of information, rather than as an informant(Fricker, 2007). In contrast, epis-
temic marginalization is wrong because of the way it acts to constrain an agent’s free actions
within the epistemic realm. Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. calls this “constrained subjectivity”, and this
restriction (characteristic of oppression), is the central wrong that takes place(Pohlhaus Jr,
2014).
Finally, this account more clearly highlights how some epistemic mistreatment will not qual-
ify as a testimonial injustice, or (in the language of my account) that some injustices are not
instances of oppression. Misjudging a speaker because of an inappropriate influence on my
judgment may treat them unfairly, but it will not be an instance of epistemic marginaliza-
tion unless the victim is mistreated as a member of a socially marginalized group. This also
explains why in the tired colleague case there is epistemic mistreatment, but not testimonial
injustice (epistemic marginalization).
This account may be a welcome adaptation to Fricker’s account, rather than a competing
viewpoint. It can successfully address Coady’s criticisms and explain the relevance of cases
that deal with increased credibility. One of Fricker’s primary goals is for an account that
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intuitively captures a notion of “discrimination” as distinct from other notions (such as
distributive injustices, or one-off epistemic wrongs). I have shown that the best way to draw
this distinction is by highlighting the way social status is used to epistemically marginalize
individuals. As such, my account best suits her goals.
1.3.4 Assessing this Approach
Returning to the criteria from the start of the paper, this framework of epistemic marginal-
ization has advantages over both Coady’s and Fricker’s approach. (Although Fricker may be
willing to adjust her framing to incorporate these strengths).
In terms of insight, the framework of epistemic marginalization can better help us to under-
stand what happens morally in cases of testimonial injustice. There is a rich background
of philosophic literature in which to ground the account of epistemic oppression. In par-
ticular, Young has worked to develop a grounding account of the moral mechanisms that
are constitutive of oppression. Her work lays out the function of oppression as an “insti-
tutional constraint on self-development”(Young, 1990, p.37).16 The notion of oppression
can also apply within the epistemic domain, serving to restrict the epistemic capacities of
individuals who belong to oppressed groups. Looking at testimonial injustice as an instance
of epistemic marginalization highlights the significance of socio-political context, and draws
attention to group status as ethically relevant. It also emphasizes the significance of freedom
(or unconstrained subjectivity) within an epistemic context.
On this account, the main focus is most aptly applied to members of certain social groups.
This better explains the significance of social identity to the phenomenon at hand. This
16See Nancy Fraser for a helpful analysis of Young’s work(Fraser, 1995).
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account correctly highlights how epistemic relationships are revealed through ongoing pro-
cesses, social context, and historical location. Culture and context impact and illuminate
the problem. Examining a testimonial injustice from a framework of epistemic oppression
highlights these critical elements and illuminates why the central cases are wrong. Marge
and Tom are not being permitted to fully participate in activities that are epistemically
important. This exclusion leaves them unable to pursue their own epistemic goals or act
as full epistemic agents. In Young’s terms: “... Marginalization is unjust because it blocks
the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized ways”(Young, 1990,
p.54).
On the second criteria, categorization, this account can differentiate between epistemic
wrongs that should not qualify as testimonial injustices, because they do not meet the
criteria for being instances of epistemic marginalization. This account emphasizes uncon-
strained knowledge-seeking, highlighting how this phenomenon is distinctively epistemic.
Importantly, it can preserve Fricker’s categorization of testimonial injustice as fundamen-
tally discriminatory.
On the third criteria, application, this approach can better account for new cases; it can
successfully illuminate features of central cases, and be applied to peripheral cases. This
account is better able to differentiate between central and peripheral cases in ways that
are consistent with moral intuitions. Talk of oppression rather than injustice shifts the
central focus from a single individual onto the wider social group. Whenever an individual
experiences oppression, it is necessary to also consider the way his or her social group is
oppressed.
For example: imagine dismissing someone’s testimony because of their favorite baseball team.
While baseball preferences could result in decreased credibility, this does not result from a
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wider limitation on the epistemic agency of that group of baseball fans. A framework of
oppression highlights the significance of social groups.
This also explains why the case of TIRED COLLEAGUE is different from the case of Marge.
The case of the tired colleague is a single instance of epistemic injustice, but it is not a case of
epistemic oppression. One isolated wrong does not set up the necessary pattern of hindrances
that is characteristic of epistemic oppression. It also lacks the characteristic element that
the victim of oppression is harmed in light of a social identity. The background historical
and social contexts illuminate how these cases are significantly different.
Consider another puzzling case:
FEMINIST CLUB: Josh joins the campus feminist club during a discussion on sexual
harassment. He offers testimony, but his words are discredited because of his gender.
Here it seems as though Josh is suffering testimonial harms due to a social identity, but
this case is intuitively not the same as central instances of testimonial injustice. There
would be something vaguely misleading about characterizing Josh’s dismissal using the same
framework as Marge’s. Josh is treated unfairly in this case, but not in the same way that
Marge suffers, even though both are singled out based on their gender. Using a notion of
distributive injustice, this case does look the same as Marge and Tom - individuals who are
not given the credibility that they fairly ought to receive. However, intuitively this case is
not the same type of case as the earlier examples. That is because this is not a case of
epistemic marginalization.
The oppression framework (but not the distributive) can make sense of why the FEMINIST
CLUB case is importantly dissimilar from the other scenarios. While Josh is dismissed
because of his gender, it is not something that happens to his social group more broadly, or
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that functions as a restriction on his epistemic capacities more generally. In contrast, when
Marge is dismissed, it is one instance of many that serve to restrict her epistemic agency
because she is a woman.
In this case, historic and social factors mean that even while Josh suffers from an epistemic
wrong, he does not suffer from epistemic oppression. In contrast, Marge is subject to epis-
temic oppression in the form of marginalization. Throughout the literature, it seems clear
that the concerns surrounding testimonial injustice are closely linked to concerns about ex-
isting discrimination in our society, such as sexism, racism, and other oppressions. Using a
framework of oppression highlights this important element.
In terms of the fourth criteria, intervention, this approach suggests new methods of solving
the problem of testimonial injustice (epistemic marginalization). A broader range of inter-
ventions are appropriate in light of the shifted focus to social group status, and background
context.
1.3.5 Pursuing Justice
Frameworks of injustice shape the ways that we pursue justice. This account is better able to
suggest meaningful interventions and solutions to the problem of testimonial “injustice”. On
a distributive account, interventions ought to somehow redistribute credibility. It’s unclear
how this works because credibility is not an object. Individuals may seek to redistribute
credibility in their own interactions, but these types of solutions may be ineffective. The
distributive framework also might suggest that the best solution is to prevent offending
agents from acting wrongly. Similarly, Fricker suggests a virtue of “testimonial justice” where
each individual is responsible for reducing their own internalized prejudice(Fricker, 2007).
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Shifting to a language of oppression opens up new conceptual space to discuss resistance,
transformation, and liberation in our epistemic practices. So, we might begin to think about
how to structure society so that all epistemic agents have secure access to critical epistemic
practices. Reducing oppression includes dismantling and disrupting existing social systems,
in addition to challenging essentialist notions of social identity. This could include both
individual and structural interventions that promote the agents’ epistemic capacities.
Resisting epistemic oppression will involve a variety of intersecting approaches, depending
upon the specific context. There is no single overarching solution to the problem - just
as there is no single intervention to dissolve oppression. However, on this lens solutions
need not be narrowly focused on the actions of the offending agent (as is the case on other
frameworks). Importantly, individuals who are not perpetrators or victims are still able to
take actions that resist oppressive social norms and structures. Understanding oppression
as tied to restricted agency means that solutions can include working to change structures
of society to better support each person’s epistemic agency.
Unlike distributive wrongs, instances of testimonial injustice cannot be undone with a redis-
tribution of credibility. Atoning for epistemic marginalization is not possible until societal
forces shift to better accommodate fair and equal participation. Part of the wrong that occurs
is reducing one’s agency and possible modes of inquiry based upon his or her social identity.
Promoting justice requires more than simply believing (or viewing as credible) members of
marginalized groups; it requires promoting their ability to act as individual inquirers instead
of facing restrictions due to identity prejudices.
27
1.3.6 New Insights
On this framework, new aspects of the central cases are highlighted. An account of op-
pression shows the ways that varied social roles can combine in order to wrong the victim.
This account draws attention to the complexities of the phenomenon, for example, agents
with intersecting identities. Epistemic expectations and norms vary among social groups
and agents with intersecting identities will experience oppression in different ways. Addi-
tionally, experiences of epistemic oppression may be constituted by a variety of intersecting
wrongs, only some of which arise during testimony. These complexities are highlighted on
this framework but erased on a purely distributive framework.
This account can also highlight the ways in which other agents are impacted (morally and
epistemically) through exposure to epistemic marginalization even if they are not directly
involved. Shifting focus to group status illuminates the way that oppression generates harms
beyond merely the two agents interacting. Claudia Card has highlighted how social institu-
tions share this hallmark: that people who seem uninvolved may still benefit or suffer(Card,
1991). When discussing rape as a social institution, she argues that all men can benefit
from the fear that is generated by rape, even if they never commit a crime. All women have
reasons to change their behavior (not going out alone at night) even if they have never been
a victim. Similarly, the social practices that facilitate epistemic marginalization generate
third-party harms. Imagine that another woman witnessed the exchange between Marge
and Herbert. She might, like Marge, recognize that her gender left her at a disadvantage
for making knowledge claims within their shared social context. She might be less likely to
express her beliefs in the future. If it was a young girl, experiences of this kind might stunt
the development of important epistemic capacities. Those who witness but do not directly
experience being dismissed may still suffer epistemically and morally. Using a framework of
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oppression makes it clear how this can occur - the woman is wronged in virtue of her shared
social identity with Marge.
1.4 Conclusion
The testimonial injustice literature is currently lacking an adequate framework of justice
to discuss the central phenomenon of interest in the cases of Tom and Marge. Treating
this wrong as merely a distributive injustice means ignoring elements of the central cases.
Coady’s distributive framework fails to fully explain the phenomenon at hand or to most
fruitfully direct philosophical analysis. Instead, we ought to take a different approach and
look through a framework of oppression. An account of testimonial injustice as epistemic
marginalization does the best job focusing on key elements of the central cases and providing
new avenues for solutions.
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Chapter 2
Credibility and Epistemic Standing:
Two Failures of Respect in Epistemic
Injustice
This paper illuminates two different types of disrespect at work in epistemic injustice, defining
a notion of epistemic standing as distinct from credibility. Victims of epistemic injustice are
treated badly, and not respected as epistemic subjects. While much has already been written
about respecting the credibility of others, this paper discusses a different kind of respect that
recognizes an agent’s epistemic standing. There are at least two conceptually separate types
of disrespect that constitute epistemic injustice.
Distinguishing between the two notions of disrespect clarifies the target of epistemic disre-
spect. Individuals can be disrespected in a variety of ways, including but not limited to their
capacity for knowledge. This reveals that epistemic respect and epistemic justice requires
more than only respecting one’s “capacity for knowledge” as Miranda Fricker argues(Fricker,
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2007). Treating other agents epistemically justly requires recognizing an agent’s social stand-
ing as a participant in an epistemic community. Accurately appraising epistemic skills may
extend beyond the act of testimony, to include other socially significant actions such as
questioning and criticizing.
Clearly articulating the nature of two types of epistemic disrespect provides an important
way to better understand and prevent against epistemic injustices.17 While some cases of
epistemic injustice will include both kinds of disrespect, the cases that do not will require
different types of interventions corresponding to the different types of disrespect. Demon-
strating the separation of these types of disrespect helps to more clearly identify the inner
mechanisms of epistemic injustice. Treating other agents epistemically justly requires that
we recognize and respect other epistemic agents as such.
2.1 Epistemic Injustice and Disrespect
Epistemic injustice represents a widespread, everyday sort of injustice; victims of epistemic
injustice are wronged both morally and epistemically(Fricker, 2007).18 Fricker argues that
the paradigmatic case of any sort of epistemic injustice is that of testimonial injustice: when
the victim has her words discredited because of prejudice(Fricker, 2007). I will focus on two
central cases of testimonial injustice widely discussed in the literature, setting aside work on
hermeneutical injustice.19
17There may be more than two, the claim of this paper is that there are at least two distinct types.
18The term was first coined by Miranda Fricker, although others have written about the phenomenon
both before and after(Fricker, 2007). Agents can be mistreated epistemically in a variety of ways; such
mistreatment can be called epistemic oppression, epistemic injustice, or just systematic epistemic wrongs.
Different philosophers have their own preferred language, but in this paper, I am seeking to address the
broader phenomenon without taking a stance on appropriate language.
19Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks important epistemic tools and is unable to make
sense of her own experiences because of prejudice. It does not seem to be as clear a case of disrespect.
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Marge: When her fiance´ Dickie goes missing, Marge Sherwood becomes increasingly sus-
picious that Tom Ripley has killed him. However, her suspicions are discounted and then
outright ignored by Dickie’s father, Herbert Greenleaf, who suggests that women’s intuition
cannot be trusted. Marge is correct, but her views are unfairly discounted by Herbert, caus-
ing Ripley to get away with the murder. At one point Herbert explicitly dismisses Marge
to her face, saying “Marge, there’s female intuition and then there are facts”(Fricker, 2007,
p.9).
Tom: Tom Robinson is a black man on trial in the south in 1935, and his words are
constrained by the stereotypes of the time. Specifically, the jury believes the words of
Mayella Ewell, a white woman, over his own honest account in spite of evidence indicating
Tom’s innocence(Fricker, 2007)(Lee, 1960).
In both cases, the victim is treated badly and disrespected on Fricker’s view in light of their
“capacity for knowledge”(Fricker, 2007, p.20). This type of dismissal is a sort of disrespect
where the speaker is not treated as she actually is - an epistemic agent with knowledge
to contribute. The core wrong of testimonial injustice is that it wrongs someone in their
capacity as a knower, which represents a core human capacity.20
Fricker argues that this testimonial dismissal thus carries a social meaning that the victim is
symbolically dismissed as a person. The wrong consists in an intrinsic injustice, in addition
to often triggering harmful secondary effects.
More specifically, Fricker describes this wrong as a form of objectification(Fricker, 2007,
p.133). Allowing prejudice to impact one’s credibility judgment does not treat the testifier
20Testimonial injustice occurs when a victim “receives a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in
the hearer”(Fricker, 2007, p.28).
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fully as a person. Individuals are wronged because they are epistemically objectified, de-
moted “from informant to source of information”(Fricker, 2007, p.133). Treating individuals
as merely an epistemic object undermines or denies the victim’s actual epistemic agency.
Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. has criticized this assessment, noting that sexism and racism usually func-
tion to restrict and typecast individuals, rather than to treat them as objects(Pohlhaus Jr,
2014). For example, treating people as less trustworthy (because of race) portrays them not
as objects but as deceptive testifiers. Instead of stripping a victims subjectivity (in objec-
tification), Pohlhaus argues that subjectivity is warped and constrained during testimonial
injustice. Victims have their subjectivity misrepresented, but are not treated as objects.
In either analysis, the central cases of testimonial injustice can be understood as a kind
of epistemic disrespect. Victims are not treated as they deserve to be treated, and are
wronged. Their full subjectivity and status as an epistemic agent is disrespected through
wrongful treatment. They are not seen as epistemically valuable and are disregarded due
to prejudice. This mistreatment might also be described as a failure of trust(Marsh, 2011).
However, individuals could suffer a testimonial injustice when speaking to a strangers in
which case it might not seem appropriate for there to be much trust between individuals.
For this paper I’ll use the term respect, but accounts of thin trust and robust respect will
overlap.
In the next three sections, I will outline a distinction between two different kinds of epistemic
disrespect, give an explanation of epistemic standing as the basis of epistemic recognition
respect, and show how this distinction reveals weaknesses in Fricker’s view. This also illu-
minates two different mechanisms by which epistemic injustice functions.
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2.2 Two Kinds of Respect
There are two different ways that agents can be denied respect qua epistemic subjects.
Individuals can be denied epistemic appraisal respect and epistemic recognition respect.
This distinction parallels one drawn by Stephan Darwall about the nature of moral re-
spect; in this way resources from the ethics literature can help to illuminate this epistemic
phenomenon(Darwall, 1977).
Darwall argues that moral and philosophical talk of respect actually includes two different
notions: appraisal respect and recognition respect(Darwall, 1977). He explains recognition
respect as “giving appropriate consideration or recognition to some feature of its object
in deliberating about what to do”(Darwall, 1977, p.38). This notion of respect recognizes
some essential feature of a person and connects that feature to normatively appropriate
behavior. Appraisal respect is “an attitude of positive appraisal of that person either as
a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit”(Darwall, 1977, p.38). This notion can
be used to compare differences between people. It might also apply only within a narrow
domain. Importantly, appraisal respect might not have bearing on appropriate interpersonal
interaction and can be felt “without having any particular conception of just what behavior
from oneself would be required or made appropriate”(Darwall, 1977, p.39). In contrast,
recognition respect ought to bear on one’s actions.
Epistemic respect also comes in two forms. Epistemic recognition respect is appropriate
recognition or consideration of an agent’s standing within an epistemic community. As with
Darwall’s notion of recognition respect, epistemic recognition respect ought to impact an
agent’s practical decision-making and impact which actions are appropriate. In the epistemic
context, individuals ought to recognize epistemic standing when considering how to interact
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with those around them during inquiry. A failure to consider an agent’s situatedness is
a kind of misrecognition; in the cases of epistemic recognition disrespect, the perpetrators
have failed to appropriately see the epistemic status of the victim. Epistemic appraisal
respect is a sort of comparative respect and positive appraisal that results from assessing
the relevant epistemic skills or accomplishments of an individual (such as their credibility).
These two kinds of disrespect are conceptually distinct, and likely function through different
mechanisms. These two different kinds of epistemic disrespect (appraisal and recognition)
can also pull apart from one another in practice: It’s possible for agents to be denied only
one or the other.
While the two types of respect are conceptual separable, and can occur in isolation, they
may often co-occur. For example, the Tom and Marge cases seem to represent cases that are
mixed, or ambiguous regarding the type of disrespect at work.
In the central cases, such as Tom, he is certainly suffering appraisal disrespect. The white
jurors assess him subjectively as possessing very little credibility, likely due to stereotypes
that portray black men as untrustworthy. As a result, they do not take his words seriously.
However, his is also experiencing recognition disrespect, to the extent that the jurors do not
see him as a responsible epistemic agent at all.
Marge more clearly suffers from a lack of recognition respect. When Herbert dismisses her
outright, he treats her as something other than an inquiring agent, someone who is not
relevant to the domain of inquiry. She is also seen as an unreliable observer, which is a
failure of appraisal respect.
In all cases of epistemic injustice, prejudice is the driving force behind the epistemic wrong.
It seems that if prejudice leads to one type of disrespect, it is also likely to influence the
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other type of respect, and so overlapping cases will be common. However, not all cases will
overlap, and the two types of disrespect function in different ways.
2.2.1 Credibility and Epistemic Appraisal
The literature on epistemic injustice remains primarily focused on notions of credibility. It is
intuitive that treating an epistemic agent with respect requires acknowledging their credibil-
ity. Unfairly discounting credibility is at the heart of the wrong of testimonial injustice. In
a typical scenario of testimonial injustice, agent A will be assessing the credibility of agent
B. So, if B asserts that “p”, agent A will use a credibility assessment to inform her own
degree of credence that “p”. In a broad sense, credibility is whether an agent can be taken
at her word.21 There are two different elements to credibility that need to be distinguished:
credibility as it is actually possessed by the speaker (objective credibility) and credibility as
it is perceived by the listener (appraised credibility, which is subjective). Any misalignment
between objective and appraised credibility represents an epistemic misperception. In cases
of testimonial injustice, this misperception not only exists but is caused by prejudice and
results in a lowered credibility appraisal(Fricker, 2007, p.1).
Fricker’s work emphasizes credibility deficits, showing how dismissal during testimony can
restrict an agent’s ability to act as an informant. However, there may also be cases where
prejudice accidentally causes an accurate appraisal (accurate for other reasons). If this
credibility assessment is driven by prejudice, it still represents a testimonial injustice. Ad-
ditionally, other writers have argued that credibility excesses can be instances of epistemic
injustice(Medina, 2011)(Davis, 2016). In the case of a credibility excess, the individual is
still missapraised due to prejudice.
21In everyday language, synonyms for credibility often include reliability or trustworthiness.
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Credibility concerns epistemic appraisal respect. Appraising an epistemic subject includes
trying to determine the likelihood that they will act in epistemically advantageous ways.
When I assess you as highly credible, I am respecting the epistemic skills (perhaps com-
petence and sincerity) that I think you have.22 Individuals who are seen as more credible
are receiving a higher epistemic appraisal respect.23 The problem of being denied epistemic
appraisal respect is well-articulated by discussing denied credibility.
The two kinds of respect highlight distinct elements that may be dismissed during an inter-
personal epistemic interaction. Relying upon only a notion of credibility (epistemic appraisal
respect) cannot fully capture the disrespect that takes place in instances of epistemic injus-
tice: some victims are not merely misappraised but dismissed as epistemic subjects outright.
They are not recognized or acknowledged for their actual status and epistemic capacity.
This second kind of respect (epistemic recognition respect) is better understood as focusing
on epistemic standing. In the next section, I present an account of epistemic standing, to
further explain the notion of epistemic recognition respect.
2.3 Epistemic Standing
It is important to be clearer about what is being recognized in instances of epistemic recog-
nition respect, in order to see how it goes wrong in cases of epistemic injustice. Specifically,
22Fricker has argued that credibility is fundamentally composed of two elements: competence and
sincerity(Fricker, 2007).
23In rare cases, the term “credible” may be used to refer not to epistemic appraisal respect, but to epistemic
recognition respect. If I ignore someone unfairly, you might come to her defense by saying “She’s credible”.
In this sense credibility refers to an agent’s standing and what actions are appropriate, rather than referring
to a specific type of positive appraisal; so it is an instance of epistemic recognition respect. However, in
general credibility seems to refer to epistemic appraisal respect.
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epistemic recognition respect is an attitude that is appropriate in light of an agent’s pos-
sessing epistemic standing. This standing consists of an agent’s situated position within an
epistemic community, including roles and relationships to other epistemic agents. Victims
denied recognition of this standing are mistreated in light of their status as participants in
the epistemic community.
In order to better explain I will draw a parallel with the case of moral standing, distinguishing
between broad standing and more specific standing.
Within the moral community, there is a broad sort of moral standing: everyone who is a
moral agent possesses moral standing.24 Every person with certain rational (and emotional)
capacities counts as a moral agent, and this status can only be lost due to death or severe
brain damage. However, there are also more specific contexts that generate additional special
moral standing. My good friends have the moral standing to make certain claims on me that
other moral agents do not - perhaps to request or demand my help. Similarly, my spouse
has the moral standing to demand certain sacrifices of me that would be unreasonable if
requested by anyone else. This special (and more specific) type of standing can change or
be lost, unlike the broader sense. If I no longer consider someone a friend, or if a marriage
ends in divorce, those individuals no longer have additional moral standing to make some
claims on me (but they do not cease to be moral agents).
Within an epistemic community, there will also be both broad and more specific notions of
epistemic standing. In specific contexts, individuals may have special epistemic obligations.
In a broad sense, everyone with certain rational capabilities has standing in the broadest
sense of the epistemic community. This standing makes certain behavior appropriate: it
is unfair to summarily discount the words of a speaker as unreliable without good reason.
24I’m limiting my discussion to moral agents for this article, but some non-agents also have moral standing.
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Agents can also have standing within a specific epistemic community, such as a school,
or a study group. In this a more specific sense, there will be contexts that have varied
requirements for judging special standing, and this type of epistemic standing can be gained
or lost. For example, a stranger who wanders into a classroom does not have the standing
to participate in the discussion, regardless of her epistemic skills. However, the stranger still
has rational capacities, and ought to be regarded as an inquirer more generally. In both
types of standing, individuals who are denied recognition because of prejudice are victims
of an epistemic wrong. Individuals ought to be treated well with respect to their actual
epistemic status.25
Part of what seems required for the broad sense of epistemic standing is a capacity for
justified belief, as this means that one can be contributor and participant during inquiry. In
other words, this could be considered a capacity for inquiry. Some additional skills might
also be needed to ensure that the agent has a capacity for understanding. (Right now I would
like to remain neutral about whether knowledge, understanding, or both are the ultimate
goal of community inquiry.) There are some rational requirements that an individual might
fail to meet, and so he or she would fail to possess even a broad epistemic standing. For
example, very young children may lack even a general epistemic standing. Smaller epistemic
communities may have a variety of context-dependent reasons to deny a specific sense of
epistemic standing to someone.
Heidi Grasswick has argued that epistemic agency is best understood as an “individual-in-
community” rather than according to the older atomistic model of agency(Grasswick, 2004).
Individuals on their own cannot be considered full agents or subjects. A notion of epistemic
25This does not mean a blanket requirement to believe everyone you speak with. However, it means that
without a good reason, people should be presumed to have some sort of minimal epistemic standing.
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standing fits closely with Grasswicks’ approach, recognizing the ways that individuals are
socially embedded, giving a more accurate model of epistemic agency(Grasswick, 2004).
2.3.1 Epistemic Standing and Recognition Respect
Recognizing an individual as having epistemic standing (granting epistemic recognition re-
spect) means that several actions are apt. This recognition properly acknowledges a person’s
status or role in the epistemic community. This makes a variety of actions appropriate, such
as: allowing access to epistemic resources, permitting the agent to speak, and granting a
standing to criticize. Agents who are disrespected are not treated as epistemic subjects
within a given context. This epistemically wrongs them and impedes their ability to act.
Recognizing epistemic standing (epistemic recognition respect) comes apart from the issue of
credibility (epistemic appraisal respect). Consider the following case, that of the implicitly
sexist manager.
Sexist Boss A female employee always generates valuable contributions to her work team
but never gets acknowledged for them. Instead, her male boss takes her ideas to later use
and present as his own. He does this in part because of sexist beliefs that men need to move
up the business ladder, but women do not need to advance in business.
This case is interesting because it seems like a clear case of an epistemic wrong, but it is a
different sort of wrong than that of testimonial injustice. The sexist boss is not misjudging
his employee’s credibility; in fact, he very accurately sees that she is capable of producing
good ideas. However, the case is intuitively an instance of epistemic injustice: the female
employee is wronged because of an identity prejudice.
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Relying upon notions of credibility would result in missing cases of epistemic injustice like
this one. Decreased credibility does not occur in this case, and so cannot explain why it is
wrong. (Although, over time his mistreatment is likely to have the consequence that others
in the company will be more likely to view her with inaccurate decreased credibility). By
separating out the two notions of respect I have reviewed, it is possible to see how this is
still an epistemic injustice.
The boss does demonstrate appraisal respect: he sees that she has the capacity to produce
valuable work (and his assessment matches the objective truth in this case). When asked,
he can accurately report her actual epistemic accomplishments. What he fails to do is to
give recognition respect - to see his employee as a fellow epistemic agent, a peer in some
sense, who deserves credit for her ideas. Instead, he treats her as a mere source for his
own epistemic goals.26 Misrecognition need not always result in dismissal; individuals can
misrecognize one another by failing to accurately see one’s social epistemic standing. In the
case of the sexist boss, the misrecognition led to exploitation rather than marginalization.
In addition to being denied social recognition, individuals can be wronged through misrecog-
nition if they are perceived to occupy the wrong social role. For example, imagine the only
woman in a meeting is asked to take notes(Rogers, 2019)(Quast, 2017). She is receiving
acknowledgement for an important epistemic role, but it is still an instance of misrecog-
nition if that is not her actual role within the organization. She may suffer no ill effects
to her perceived credibility, but is treated as though she occupies a different role than the
one she does. This restricts her agency to act within her actual epistemic role (perhaps by
making proposals, or challenging the ideas of her peers). In this way her epistemic standing
is misrecognized, while her epistemic skill need not be misappraised. (Although, this may
26Because this occurs frequently, it probably also counts as a case of epistemic exploitation.
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sometimes be a case of credibiliy excess where a woman is assumed to be naturally gifted at
administrative work.)
This distinction reveals that existing accounts are overly simplistic, by lumping together
the two concepts I have identified (or incomplete by not considering recognition respect).
Specifically, Fricker’s framework cannot explain examples like the sexist manager above,
because Fricker defines testimonial injustice using the notion of decreased credibility. Her
account emphasizes epistemic appraisal respect. She can analyze recognition disrespect as a
disregard for one’s capacity for knowledge, but this cannot fully capture the nature of the
disrespect.
2.4 The Target of Disrespect
Drawing a distinction between two types of disrespect also illuminates various targets for
that disrespect. Individuals may be subject to disrespect through either misappraisal or mis-
recognition. In the case of appraisal, the target is usually one’s epistemic skills. Specifically,
Fricker argues that the disrespect at the core of epistemic injustice is addressing one’s capac-
ity for knowledge(Fricker, 2007). A capacity for knowledge is a central human capacity, so
the disrespect to an agent as a knower also symbolically disrespects her as a person(Fricker,
2007). However, misrecognition could target a number of epistemic factors, beyond one’s
capacity for knowledge.
Current accounts of epistemic injustice are incomplete because there are examples that in-
tuitively seem to be cases of epistemic disrespect (or epistemic injustice), but which do not
involve disrespecting one’s capacity for knowledge. Christopher Hookway gives an example
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of epistemic participation that is non-testimonial, that I refer to as Bad Teacher(Hookway,
2010).
Bad Teacher: A bad teacher ignores or misconstrues questions from a student over the
course of a discussion as a result of prejudice. In Hookway’s words: “When the student
raises a question which is not a request for information, and is apparently intended as
a contribution to continuing debate or discussion, then the teacher makes a presumption
of irrelevance and ignores the question or takes things over and construes the question as a
request for information that is loosely related to the question asked”(Hookway, 2010, p.155).
Hookway argues, highly intuitively, that the student has suffered a wrong as an epistemic
agent. When the bad teacher acts, she “fails to take the student’s questions seriously”(Hookway,
2010, p.155). Hookway concludes that: “In this case, the student is not treated as a potential
participant in discussion but just as someone who can ask for and provide information”(Hookway,
2010, p.155).
It is clear that the student who has her questions ignored is disrespected as an epistemic
agent in some way. As with the case of the sexist manager, it seems the victim is primarily
suffering from a lack of epistemic recognition respect. However, it is not her capacity to
know that is disrespected, so the case cannot be understood on Fricker’s framework. The
student may be seen as a capable knower but is not treated as a person who can appropriately
contribute to discussion, and not seen as a participant in the community.
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2.5 Implications
Drawing a distinction between two kinds of epistemic disrespect has further implications
for understanding epistemic injustice more broadly. The account I’ve given clarifies details
about the mechanisms of disrespect as they function in instances of epistemic injustice.
Successful participation in the process of inquiry involves more than just asserting knowledge.
Agents who are wronged during this process are disrespected as participants, even when their
knowledge is not directly called into question.
2.5.1 Feeling Out of the Loop
Distinguishing different types of disrespect can help to make sense of new instances of epis-
temic injustice. Individuals may face recognition disrespect in a wider variety of ways.
Being “out of the loop” is a form of exclusion that psychologists have explored while re-
searching ostracism, but has not been discussed among philosophers examining epistemic
injustice(Jones, Carter-Sowell, Kelly, & Williams, 2009). People are out of the loop when
they “perceive being uninformed of information mutually known by others”(Jones et al.,
2009, p.157). If one is out of the loop because of implicit prejudice, this seems like an in-
stance of epistemic injustice. Individuals are disrespected epistemically when they are not
seen as appropriate recipients of knowledge or information that has otherwise been shared
widely.
This case again serves to illustrate why it’s important to understand the sub-mechanisms of
epistemic injustice. An individual left out of the loop is not necessarily being misappraised:
they might not be seen as lacking any skill. Instead, individuals who are left out of the
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loop are lacking appropriate epistemic recognition respect. They are not seen as appropriate
recipients of information, despite their epistemic standing.
2.5.2 The Scope of Epistemic Injustice
Rather than understanding epistemic injustice as a disrespect towards one’s capacity for
knowledge, it can be understood as a broader failure to recognize epistemic standing.
General accounts of epistemic injustice must be able to account for both types of disrespect.
Matthew Congdon has argued for four different possible interpretations of epistemic injustice:
harm, vice, objectification, and misrecognition(Congdon, 2017). Epistemic injustice could
also be understood as a distributive injustice, a form of oppression, or a rights violation
(although I don’t know of anyone who defends the latter)(Coady, 2010)(Dotson, 2014).27
However one understands the phenomenon, an account needs to be able to accommodate
both varieties of disrespect, or else risk excluding intuitive instances of epistemic injustice.
As such, this distinction between types of disrespect may lend greater support to some
accounts of epistemic injustice over others.
2.6 Conclusion
Victims of epistemic injustice face two sorts of disrespect: epistemic recognition disrespect
and epistemic appraisal disrespect. I have shown how to understand epistemic recognition
disrespect as a failure to recognize epistemic standing. I have also argued that epistemic
27There is also a literature on whether justice can be understood as an individual virtue(Slote, 2002).
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recognition must extend beyond (although it will still include) recognizing an agent’s capacity
for knowledge. Ultimately, a better understanding of epistemic respect should help agents
to improve their epistemic behavior toward one another. When agents are granted the




Knowledge and Participation: Giving
a Participatory Account of Epistemic
Injustice
When individuals are not taken seriously due to prejudice, they suffer from a distinctively
epistemic kind of injustice. While there are varied cases discussed in the literature, in all
instances individuals in different contexts are treated unjustly because of prejudice (usually
gender or race). Christopher Hookway is concerned about a teacher dismissing a student’s
question, Gerald Marsh imagines a woman whose husband receives more attention in a
hardware store, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. considers the wrong that occurs when a privileged
knower rejects the epistemic insights of her marginalized conversational partners(Hookway,
2010).(Marsh, 2011)(Pohlhaus Jr, 2012). These examples all differ from the original cases
defended by Miranda Fricker, where a testifier is denied appropriate credibility(Fricker, 2007).
The cases are all intuitively instances of epistemic injustice – where an individual is wronged
qua epistemic subject(Kidd et al., 2017). This reveals a problem: as philosophers continue
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to propose new examples, it becomes less clear what is centrally at stake in the discussion
of epistemic injustice.
In this paper, I solve this problem by giving a new unified account of epistemic injustice that
can assert shared central features while also distinguishing between different types of cases.
Epistemic injustice should be understood as centrally about the capacity to participate in
inquiry, rather than centrally about testimony. In section one I show the significance of two
different approaches to epistemic injustice, what I call the “testimonial” and “participatory”
approaches.28 In section two I provide my own fully participatory account of epistemic
injustice. On my account, epistemic injustice wrongs epistemic subjects in their capacity as
participants in inquiry, disrespecting agents by denying them appropriate access, recognition,
or appraisal. In section three I assess this model, showing how my participatory approach
provides a better framework for understanding new cases, and address a possible objection.
3.1 Two Accounts of Epistemic Injustice
Fricker’s testimonial view, implicit in much of the literature, focuses on testimony and knowl-
edge possession to understand epistemic injustice(Fricker, 2007)(Fricker, 2003). The litera-
ture on epistemic injustice is ever growing, and the topic was discussed even before Fricker’s
2007 book coined the term.29 Fricker characterizes epistemic injustice as a wrong that occurs
in one’s “capacity as a knower”(Fricker, 2007, p.1).30 In many ways, this is the received view,
used by other philosophers in their own explorations of epistemic injustice(Kidd & Carel,
2017)(McKinnon, 2016).
28Hookway refers to his example as taking a “participant perspective”(Hookway, 2010).
29See Kristie Dotson’s article for a helpful overview(Dotson, 2011).
30Or in one’s “status as an epistemic subject”, which she seems to treat as synonymous(Fricker, 2017,
p.53).
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The most significant reason for needing an account of epistemic injustice is to identify, under-
stand, and address an important category of moral and epistemic wrongs in the world. The
two accounts I discuss offer different lenses on the same phenomenon. A testimonial account
emphasizes knowledge-possession, while my participatory account focuses on knowledge-
seeking. The differences are worth discussing because they characterize the phenomenon
differently. These two different lenses on epistemic injustice focus on different examples and
suggest different interventions. A good account will highlight what is ethically significant,
as well as highlight practical details that matter for intervention. Extensional accuracy is
also essential: a good account should include and exclude the right cases.
In several important ways, the testimonial and participatory accounts agree; I will not con-
test Fricker’s emphasis on discrimination – I agree that epistemic injustice is essentially
characterized by prejudicial actions towards individuals with marginalized social identities.
Both approaches to epistemic injustice emphasize two separate elements to the phenomenon:
a core wrong (a disrespect or dis-valuing of an epistemic subject) in addition to the follow-up
harmful consequences. Fricker and I share a commitment to eliminating epistemic injustice.31
The accounts also disagree in significant ways. Proposed interventions will differ between the
testimonial and participatory approaches. On a testimonial framework, it is vital to prevent
epistemic injustice by appropriately recognizing when others have knowledge. Fricker’s solu-
tions focus on properly adjusting one’s testimonial sensitivity(Fricker, 2007). A participatory
approach highlights a different avenue for promoting epistemic justice: promoting epistemic
participation. This participatory account is broader, including more cases as examples of
epistemic injustice. This approach broadens the realm of epistemic injustice, encompassing
more cases because there are epistemic injustices that are non-testimonial.
31I view my project as ameliorative, as Sally Haslanger uses the term, which is to say that the importance
of this philosophical work is deeply tied to political and ethical outcomes(Haslanger, 2005).
49
3.1.1 Testimonial Account
On the testimonial approach, epistemic injustice is prototypically embodied through dis-
counted testimony; the key feature on this account is one’s capacity to know. Specifically,
Fricker focuses on the act of testimony, asserting knowledge, highlighting how one’s capacity
as a “giver of knowledge” is central to what it means to be an epistemic subject(Fricker, 2007,
p.44). Fricker has argued that epistemic agents are distinctively wronged when they are not
respected in their capacities as knowers. The central scenario is when a listener judges that a
speaker has decreased credibility as a result of social-identity-based prejudice(Fricker, 2007).
Consider one of her key examples:
Marge: When her fiance´ Dickie goes missing, Marge Sherwood becomes increasingly sus-
picious that Tom Ripley has killed him. However, her suspicions are discounted and then
outright ignored by Dickie’s father, Herbert Greenleaf, who suggests that women’s intuition
cannot be trusted. Marge is correct, but her views are unfairly discounted by Herbert, caus-
ing Ripley to get away with the murder. At one point Herbert explicitly dismisses Marge
to her face, saying “Marge, there’s female intuition and then there are facts”(Fricker, 2007,
p.9)(Minghella et al., 1999)(Highsmith, 1955).
This action is an instance of testimonial injustice – it treats the speaker (Marge) as lacking
knowledge, and Fricker argues it is wrong because it dismisses one’s capacity for knowledge
as an epistemic subject. This approach treats the act of testimony as central to the phe-
nomenon: being dismissed as a reliable informant or knower is the prototypical instance of
being epistemically wronged. The capacity for knowledge is important not only epistemi-
cally, but is a core capacity of human agency as well. Failure to treat epistemic subjects as
knowers denies them in a capacity that is core to their humanity(Fricker, 2007, p.44). Marge
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is mistreated as an epistemic subject because she is not treated as an informant by Herbert.
Instead, prejudice contributes to Herbert’s unfair dismissal of her testimony.
Individuals can also be wronged on Fricker’s model when they suffer hermeneutical injustice,
when lacking the resources to make sense of their own experiences(Fricker, 2007). Although
Fricker’s framework includes both subtypes, testimonial injustice is the prototypical case.
Fricker argues that when understanding epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice is “the most
basic of all”(Fricker, 2010, p.174). Dismissal as an informant is fundamental. Analyzing this
wrong, Fricker draws upon work by Edward Craig who sets out to perform a conceptual
analysis of knowledge(Craig, 1990). Craig argues that the notion of knowledge (or proto-
knowledge) was first developed to help facilitate communities of agents sharing information.
Early epistemic communities needed to pool their shared information together. In order to
do so, a critical skill was to be able to tell when one’s peers were acting epistemically well
(or poorly) during testimony. Thus, our notion of knowledge developed as a way to flag
reliable informants. The most reliable informants have information that can be added to the
communal pool. This account bolsters Fricker’s argument that dismissal during testimony
is a fundamental way to misjudge another epistemic agent.
3.1.2 Non-Testimonial Account
On this framework, epistemic injustice is prototypically embodied through disrespecting an
agent’s capacity for participation in inquiry. Consider the following case, slightly modified
from Hookway(Hookway, 2010):
Bad Teacher: A bad teacher ignores or misconstrues questions from a student over the
course of a discussion as a result of a belief that the student cannot contribute anything
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valuable to the discussion. Specifically, the teacher is white and the student is black; the
teacher’s implicit racism drives her dismissal of the student.32
In Hookway’s words:
“...when the student raises a question which is not a request for information, and
is apparently intended as a contribution to continuing debate or discussion, then
the teacher makes a presumption of irrelevance and ignores the question or takes
things over and construes the question as a request for information that is loosely
related to the question asked”(Hookway, 2010, p.155).
Hookway argues that the student has suffered a wrong as an epistemic subject. Despite
the student’s efforts, the teacher interprets the questions and attempts to participate as
irrelevant and fails to see how they might contribute to the collective activity. 33 This is an
epistemic dismissal.
This case intuitively represents an epistemic injustice, but it is non-testimonial because the
student is not offering testimony. The student who has her question ignored is mistreated in
a way that seems intimately related to her standing as a capable epistemic subject. However,
it is not the student’s capacity to know that is disrespected, nor her role as an informant, so
it is difficult to understand this wrong through a testimonial lens.34 The case would need to
be analyzed in a way related to a testimonial wrong, or otherwise as a peripheral variant of
epistemic injustice. A testimony-based analysis seems to miss the key element of the case,
32Hookway’s case is based around prejudice against the student as a non-valuable contributor. I have
altered the case to be explicitly about race in order to better keep this element of the case consistent with
Fricker’s commitments, to better illustrate the relevant contrasts with her examples.
33When the bad teacher acts, she “fails to take the student’s questions seriously”(Hookway, 2010, p.155).
Hookway concludes that: “In this case, the student is not treated as a potential participant in discussion
but just as someone who can ask for and provide information”(Hookway, 2010, p.155).
34The student also does not suffer from a hermeneutical injustice.
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since the student may be seen as a capable knower by the teacher, but also not treated as a
person who can appropriately contribute to the discussion.
Hookway addresses this problematic case by suggesting that there are two different per-
spectives that one can take towards epistemic interactions, both of which are valid: an
“information perspective” and a “participant perspective”(Hookway, 2010). He interprets
Fricker as taking an “information” perspective in contrast to his ”participant” perspective
on the bad teacher case.35 Coming from a “participant perspective”, we think of the student
as “trying to participate in activities”(Hookway, 2010, p.155). The bad teacher fails to rec-
ognize that the student can contribute to the social process. Specifically, “In this case the
student is not treated as a potential participant in discussion”(Hookway, 2010, p.155).
The bad teacher case helpfully highlights shortfalls in Fricker’s theory by showing that a
capacity for knowledge is not the only thing that characterizes an epistemic subject. To
be treated well, individuals need to have a variety of epistemic capacities appropriately
recognized. In principle, participatory injustices can occur by questioning any of a number
of capacities that contribute to epistemic participation, including the ability of an agent to
give relevant contributions.36
Hookway’s dual perspective analysis sets up his account as a parallel perspective to Fricker’s.37
However, the bad teacher case supports a stronger position: that Fricker’s account is inad-
equate to fully explain the phenomenon of epistemic injustice because it leaves out cases
35On an “information” perspective, we think about the student “as a potential recipient or source of
information”(Hookway, 2010, p.156).
36Hookway says: “Our ability to contribute to collaborative inquiry depends upon our possession of
a whole range of such abilities”(Hookway, 2010, p.161). He also asserts that: “We can be victims of
epistemic injustice without making assertions and claims to knowledge, and without suffering from conceptual
impoverishment”(Hookway, 2010, p.152).
37In footnote 2, Hookway mentions: “... it may be best to interpret informational injustice as a kind of
participant injustice...”, but does not pursue the thought(Hookway, 2010, p.162).
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that seem emblematic of the phenomenon. I take Hookway’s complaint towards Fricker as a
starting point for a more fully developed account of epistemic injustice: one centered on the
act of participation rather than testimony. Rather than understanding epistemic injustice
as a denial of one’s capacity for testifying (and role as a knower and informant), an account
of epistemic injustice can focus on denying an agent’s capacity to participate in the social
activity of inquiry. Agents can be wronged in a variety of ways when they are marginalized
or excluded from this central epistemic activity due to prejudice.
3.2 A Participatory Account of Epistemic Injustice
Epistemic injustices can be understood as fundamentally about participation: the capacity
of an epistemic subject to make a contribution to the social act of inquiry. Individuals
can express agency in their process of knowledge-seeking. Justice focuses on facilitating
participation, in contrast to exclusion and marginalization.
Epistemic injustice occurs when subjects are disrespected as potential participants; this
injustice both disrespects agents and blocks their participation by denying either access,
recognition, or appraisal. Epistemic activities at their most basic level are characterized by
who is included or excluded: who is seen as a potential participant.38
On this framework, there are different (although similar) types of prejudicially-based block-
ages that prevent agents from freely acting in pursuit of epistemic goals. With this expansive
notion of participation, individuals first need to have access to basic resources and sites of
intellectual exchange. Once access is gained, individuals need a minimal level of recognition
38This contrasts with Fricker, who argues that “informing people of everyday things is in every way the
most basic of social epistemic practices”(Fricker, 2010, p.176).
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in order to participate in social exchanges that constitute inquiry. Even if individuals are
able to access epistemic activities, and are recognized, they can still be misjudged and denied
appropriate appraisal. Failure in any of these ways disregards an epistemic subject’s capacity
to participate and constitutes an epistemic injustice.39
3.2.1 Respecting The Capacity to Participate
An individual is a participant when engaging in the social act of inquiry. This participation
may have a variety of roles, including but not limited to: assertion, criticism, questioning,
and facilitating group communication. Inquiry requires cooperation from various agents in
pursuit of the truth.
Epistemic justice requires recognizing the capacity to participate in inquiry. This does
not entail that exclusion is never permissible: there are good reasons (moral or epistemic)
to exclude individuals even if they have a capacity to participate. Prejudice is never an
acceptable ground for such exclusion. Instead, individuals ought to be recognized for the
value that they have as potential participants.
Inquiry is a social act, one that requires different agents to cooperate. Recognizing a person
as a potential participant requires seeing the potential for cooperation. Cooperation is not
merely an instance of joint orientation and action, but requires a certain stance towards the
agent with whom one cooperates(Tuomela, 2011).
Raimo Tuomela argues that either weak or strong forms of cooperation involve certain be-
liefs and perceptions of one’s cooperator as such.40 For weak forms of cooperation, one
39These last two could both be understood as types of respect: I use the terms recognition and appraisal
to distinguish between them.
40He refers to two forms of cooperation as “I-mode” and “We-mode” cooperation(Tuomela, 2011).
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must understand that one’s cooperator shares goals and actions with oneself, and is acting
cooperatively in pursuit of these overlapping goals(Tuomela, 2011, p.67). In this case of
inquiry, these shared goals might be to gather information or deliberate about the truth of
a proposition. A stronger form of cooperation requires joint intention to act on behalf of a
group, in accordance with group reasons and norms(Tuomela, 2011, p.73).
To respect an individual’s capacity to participate, it is necessary to acknowledge the pos-
sibility that an agent could serve as a cooperator within the process of inquiry. This will
include not only recognizing that individuals possess relevant epistemic capacities (including
a capacity for knowledge, for reasoning, etc), but also a capacity to share epistemic goals
and intentions. Respecting an agent’s capacity to participate takes a stance towards an
epistemic subject that they will be able to contribute towards shared inquiry in ways that
share epistemic goals with other members of the social epistemic group.
Failing to recognize another agent as a potential source of cooperation denies their actual
status within an epistemic community. In instances of epistemic injustice, prejudice warps
an individual’s perception; falsely portraying the victim as one who is unable to contribute
or cooperate in the relevant ways. Individuals may be rejected in a number of ways, perhaps
as lacking the epistemic capacity to assert, criticize, ask questions, or make other contribu-
tions.41
The capacity of an epistemic agent to participate could also be described by referencing
agency. Individuals are disrespected when not treated as autonomous epistemic agents who
are able to direct and control their own epistemic activities. Alternatively, Gaile Pohlhaus
Jr. uses the term “subjectivity” and has criticized Fricker’s account (which focuses on
41Specifying all the various capacities that could be involved in inquiry falls beyond the scope of this paper,
but these are a few important candidates.
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objectification). Pohlhaus argues that objectification cannot explain the wrong that occurs,
and the primary wrong is one of constrained subjectivity: where agents have their ability
to act as epistemic subjects constrained(Pohlhaus Jr, 2014).42 People with constrained
subjectivity are seen as “other”, and this can more clearly account for what is going wrong
when agents like Marge are denied epistemic recognition and respect. Marge is seen as
“other” within the context of Herbert’s investigation. A participatory account highlights
these features. By understanding one’s “subjectivity” as the freedom to make a self-directed
contribution to the process of inquiry, we can see how any block to epistemic participation
functions to constrain subjectivity. Epistemic subjects are free when they can develop and
utilize their intellectual capacities in self-directed ways in pursuit of epistemic ends.
3.2.2 Failures of Epistemic Appraisal
Epistemic subjects can be wronged as participants when they are improperly appraised and
not give appropriate epistemic respect for their skills. This is a specific type of respect: the
act of appraising epistemic skills (which is what goes wrong when there is a credibility deficit).
This contrasts with two following categories I will address: failures of recognition and failures
of access. When agents are epistemically misappraised, their efforts and contributions will
be inaccurately seen as less valuable, and so less able to shape group progress.
On my framework, epistemic appraisal involves more than just acknowledging a capacity
for knowledge. When agents are misappraised in this way, during testimony, they suffer
the type of testimonial injustice that Fricker highlights. All epistemic subjects are due not
42She says: “I propose that the intrinsic epistemic harm of testimonial injustice is more aptly described in
terms of a subject/other relation rather than the subject/object relation proposed by Fricker”(Pohlhaus Jr,
2014, p.100). In the case of testimonial injustice, the victims are defined as a class of people who are
“other”, and their “sole purpose is to recognize the class of persons deemed fully as subjects”(Pohlhaus Jr,
2014, p.105).
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only respect for their capacity for knowledge, but also for their capacity to be epistemic
participants in inquiry as part of a community. For example, Hookway’s case highlighted
how asking questions is a significant epistemic activity(Hookway, 2010).
3.2.3 Failures of Epistemic Recognition
Epistemic subjects may also be blocked from participating when they are not recognized as
having basic epistemic standing. This misrecognition is also a kind of disrespect, but distinct
from the misappraisal discussed in the previous section. Before a speaker can be appraised,
she must first be granted the basic recognition that allows her to speak and her audience
to listen. A subject may be unable to inquire if denied recognition from others – consider
“the silent treatment” as a punishment. This misrecognition is distinct from the question
of whether individuals are misappraised and underestimated in terms of epistemic skill.
Recognition acknowledges epistemic standing, expertise, or an appropriate epistemic role.
Possessing epistemic standing makes certain sorts of epistemic activities are appropriate,
such as involvement in social practices. Recognizing a person treats her with respect as an
epistemic participant. Individuals in some cases are denied this basic recognition of status
prior to participating in exchanges involving appraisals of respect.43
In these cases, agents might not have their testimony downgraded, but they could be assessed
as being irrelevant. Thus, an understanding of epistemic injustice must include the ways
that individuals can be denied recognition even before they make a contribution. Hookway’s
Bad Teacher case is an example of this(Hookway, 2010). The student is not seen as less
intelligent; instead, she is perceived as already speaking in a way that is simply not relevant
for the social activity at hand. Rather than being seen as making a contribution to the
43Individuals can be misrecognized and misappraised at the same time.
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group discussion, she is seen as asking a clarificatory question, acting in a capacity as a
non-inquirer.
In other cases, individuals may be denied appropriate epistemic recognition when their
authority or expertise is not properly seen. When women are seen as less capable than
equally educated men, they fail to receive proper recognition. Consider the experiences of
Dr. Tamika Cross, a doctor whose medical authority was dismissed on an airline flight.
When flight attendants called for a doctor due to a medical emergency, they dismissed Dr.
Cross saying “Oh no sweetie, put your hand down, we are looking for actual physicians
or nurses...”(Wible, 2016). Prejudicial beliefs about who is a doctor likely resulted in Dr.
Cross’ dismissal.44 Dr. Cross in this situation is not viewed as epistemically relevant or given
recognition for her actual status as a medical professional. This is a wrong of misrecognition.
Consider another case:
Sexist Boss: A female employee always generates valuable contributions to her work team
but never gets acknowledged for them. Instead, her male boss takes her ideas to use later
and present as his own. He does this in part because of sexist beliefs that men need to move
up the business ladder, but women do not need to advance in business.
In this case, the woman clearly suffers an epistemic injustice. However, she is not misap-
praised: in fact, her male boss accurately recognized the quality and worth of her ideas.
Instead, she is being misrecognized and not treated as someone who deserves credit for her
ideas. Rather than being treated as an independent inquirer, she is seen as a mere tool for
advancing the epistemic goals of her boss. In this way, she is not treated as a true participant.
This is not a failed assessment of her credibility, but rather a denial of her social epistemic
standing. On his view, she is not an appropriate candidate for a certain epistemic role: that
44We do not know for sure what caused this interaction, but implicit bias seems likely.
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of generating ideas and getting social recognition for it. Individuals can be misrecognized in
a variety of ways, not all of which pertain to their capacity for knowledge.
Misrecognition is not only a serious wrong but also has devastating consequences. Recogniz-
ing an agent as a possible participant is a type of social perception, and occurs in a public
setting. For example, if I ignore you during a conversation, I am signaling to others around
us that you are not a participant in this type of inquiry. Over time this might shape how
others perceive you, and how you perceive yourself. This type of mistreatment might also in-
crease the chance that others dismiss or misappraise the subject, leading to a vicious cycle of
marginalization. Kristie Dotson has highlighted how experiences with epistemic oppression
can lead to self-silencing, where agents restrict their own testimony when predicting that
they will not be seen as credible(Dotson, 2011). Denying an epistemic subject recognition
denies them any minimal epistemic standing.
3.2.4 Failures of Epistemic Access
This form of epistemic injustice blocks agents from being positioned well-enough to have
access to basic resources or spaces that are necessary components of epistemic exchanges
and prevents agents from participating at all. Victims are wronged when they are misjudged
as not having the basic worth to be permitted to access epistemic resources or spaces, due
to prejudice. Without access to epistemic resources, epistemic subjects may not experience
misrecognition or misappraisal because they are effectively excluded.
Not all cases of denied access are cases of epistemic injustice, as some goods may be unevenly
distributed for a number of reasons. Only some cases will be discriminatory and distinctively
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epistemic. Victims are subject to epistemic injustice when their inability to access epistemic
resources is grounded in discrimination and prejudice tied to their social identity.
David Coady highlights some examples of this category when he discusses a distributive
notion of epistemic injustice(Coady, 2010). Individuals might lack access to the internet,
or to education, in ways that are systematically determined and reflect social status.45 An
unfair distribution of a good or resource that is fundamentally epistemic is an epistemic
injustice on his view(Coady, 2010).
A vivid example occurred recently in Detroit when students acting as plaintiffs in a lawsuit
were told they had no fundamental right to “access to literacy”(Jackman, 2018). Counter-
intuitively, the court ruled that while school must be provided, it need not ensure that
students who graduate are able to read. If students are being denied equal educational
resources in part because of their race, then this constitutes an epistemic injustice. Without
“access to literacy”, students will struggle to participate in socially significant epistemic
practices.
Epistemic injustices that deny access sometimes seem more egregious or obvious than the
testimonial injustice that Fricker describes. She sets up her account to specifically highlight
subtle and easily missed instances of epistemic injustice(Fricker, 2007). My participatory
account is broader than other accounts by including this category. However, instances of
denied access are instances of epistemic injustice and can be subtle. Victims who are unfairly
denied access do not have the opportunity to act freely in pursuit of epistemic ends, as a
result of prejudice. One example is the phenomenon of all-male panels, when all invited
45While Coady emphasizes a distributive approach, this denial of access can also be a form of marginal-
ization or discrimination when it occurs as a consequence of one’s membership in a marginalized social
group.
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speakers at an academic event are male46 This blocks women academics from attending
conferences where only men were invited, denying them access to spaces of inquiry. It also
perpetuates notions that women are not experts or are not worthwhile additions to academic
panels.
3.2.5 A Broader Account
This perspective on epistemic injustice is broader, and highlights connections among parts of
the literature that have previously been viewed as addressing separate phenomenon. For ex-
ample, Fricker’s two examples of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice no longer
look like completely different kinds of injustice. Hermeneutical injustice results from epis-
temic marginalization, which is the same mechanism at work in testimonial injustice.
This shows how wrongs like gaslighting, and other forms of epistemic manipulation, can be
forms of epistemic injustice; They can occur in light of one’s marginalized social identity,
and function to disrespect and undermine epistemic abilities.47 This lens on epistemic injus-
tice emphasizes the importance of self-directed epistemic agency. Actions that undermine
this capacity to act freely in pursuit of one’s epistemic ends are wrong. Intentional or unin-
tentional epistemic manipulations based on prejudice restrict the self-direction of epistemic
subjects, constraining their subjectivity. Epistemic subjects should have the ability to direct
their own lines of inquiry, free from unjust influences of prejudice.
46The “Gendered Conference Campaign” seeks to stop this behavior(Gendered Conference Campaign,
2019).
47Abramson has a helpful analysis of gaslighting(Abramson, 2014).
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3.3 Assessing the Participatory Account
I have presented an alternative framework for understanding epistemic injustice that does
not center upon references to testimony and assertion. This account has all the strengths of
a testimonial account and can include Fricker’s key examples. Marge is wronged in light of
not being seen as a participant in the project of solving Dickie’s disappearance. When she is
rejected, she is no longer seen as a potential cooperator, and she is blocked from contributing
to the process of inquiring into Dickie’s death. This example can still be analyzed without a
focus on testimony. It is also clear how Tom is disrespected, and not seen as a full participant
in the process of inquiring into what happened to Mayella Ewell.
While looking through the lens of participation, it is easier to see how various forms of
epistemic injustice are similar, in that they all wrong one in light of the capacity to participate
in inquiry. (In addition to blocking or undermining the ability to participate, there are three
different sub-mechanisms of blocked participation (access, recognition, appraisal).) This
lens suggests overcoming epistemic injustice by facilitating participation, for example by
cultivating inclusiveness in a group.
A participatory account is also able to capture and analyze a broader class of wrongs, beyond
Fricker’s account. One advantage for this account is that it can include epistemic injustices
done to subjects when they are not offering testimony (like the Bad Teacher case). This shows
that an individual’s epistemic status includes a wider variety of capacities, and emphasizes
the social context of inquiry. Most significantly, it shows how individuals can be treated
unjustly in ways that are not centered on the capacity to know. Testimony is not the key
to understanding epistemic injustice. A testimonial account misses out on other significant
ways that agents are unfairly constrained and wronged qua epistemic subjects.
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3.3.1 Explaining New Cases of Epistemic Injustice
My participatory framework can offer resources to make sense of new cases. Consider the
following:
Atwood Case: In The Handmaid’s Tale, the protagonist “Offred” faces a variety of restric-
tions upon her epistemic goals(Atwood, 1986). She is denied any exposure to the written
word, forbidden from reading or writing. However, she is still permitted to speak, albeit
under the implied threat of violence if she says the wrong thing. At one point in the book,
she is approached by tourists who ask her if she is happy. Her situation is so dire that Offred
is unable to risk saying anything of substance. “‘Yes, we are very happy’, I murmur. I have
to say something. What else can I say?”(Atwood, 1986, p.29).48
Offred is intuitively wronged in multiple ways and the victim of epistemic injustice. She is
denied appropriate treatment as an epistemic subject, who ought to be allowed to participate
in the pursuit of knowledge. She is treated morally and epistemically badly in light of her
gender. Additionally, the wrong targets her specifically in her status as an epistemic subject.
Testimonial accounts struggle to make sense of this case, as it does not fit with a traditional
understanding of testimonial injustice. It is not a case of testimonial injustice, and it is
unclear how to analyze the case in terms of testimony.49
The participatory account can provide insightful analysis of Offred’s situation, highlighting
at least two ways that Offred is wronged. First, she is wronged when she is unfairly denied
access to basic epistemic activities such as reading and writing. The epistemic wrongdoing
48In the TV series this moment is made even more dramatic, as Offred is asked the question in front of
an ambassador, explicitly asked to respond as a representative of her fellow handmaids(Miller, 2017).
49This is also not a case of hermeneutical injustice - where a victim lacks the epistemic resources to make
sense of a significant life experience.
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is so severe that she is denied even the barest access to knowledge-production practices. On
a participatory framework, we can see this as a denial of access: specifically, access to the
written word. She is not seen as valuable enough to be given epistemic resources. Second,
she is wronged when she is manipulated into lying about her own beliefs and knowledge of
her oppression. What is notable about this case is that Offred is still encouraged in this
instance to offer testimony, and her words still carry weight. However, danger pressures her
into lying, and later clearly feels upset at her inability to assert what she genuinely believes.
On the participatory model, we can see that Offred’s ability to act freely is being restricted:
she is being manipulated. In Atwood’s example, Offred is straightforwardly denied access to
large portions of the intellectual world when she is blocked from reading or writing. Offred’s
agency is also constrained in another, subtler way when she is pressured into lying about
her experiences. In this case she is manipulated into not acting as a participant: she cannot
freely direct her own inquiry, or even be recognized as capable of contributing the evidence
of her own experience: instead, she is treated as an epistemic tool of her superiors. At
the same time, her social recognition as an epistemic subject is warped. She is not seen as
someone with the ability to direct her own inquiry but instead is used by those around her
as a puppet to support their own political ends.
3.3.2 A Potential Problem
Some epistemic wrongs look non-participatory. In A Room of One’s Own, Virginia Woolf
argues that women must have a room of their own in order to write fiction. She makes this
claim in the midst of a broader story about the status of women in academia. In particular,
her discussion suggests that it is seen as not worth it to spend resources on the education of
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women. Considering the schools that are accessible to each gender, she considers on the one
hand “an unending stream of gold and silver”, but on the other hand “women working year
after year and finding it hard to get two thousand pounds together”(Woolf, 1929, p.9,18).
It is more common and culturally intuitive to spend wealth and resources on the epistemic
pursuits of men.
This lack of status not only marks women as outsiders but also limits their contributions in
the form of the written word(Woolf, 1929). Women in these cases are denied the necessities to
cultivate or express their ideas. This presents an example of an injustice rooted in gendered
prejudice in our society. Woolf also discusses the example of Shakespeare’s hypothetical
sister: she is just as gifted as him, but it is nevertheless impossible for her to become the
same sort of writer.50 Consider the real-world example of Benjamin Franklin’s sister: while
he was an author, inventor, and leader, his sister Jane spent her life raising 12 children in
relative poverty(Lepore, 2014). In either of these cases, it is clear that the sister is a victim
of an epistemic injustice. Her gender, as a social identity marker, results in prejudicial
treatment that wrongs her qua epistemic subject.
The solution for Woolf is to acknowledge needs that must be met in order to be academically
productive: “500 a year and a room of one’s own”(Woolf, 1929). To have a quiet place to
collect one’s thoughts, and the money to spend on artistic endeavors is necessary for any
important new ideas to be developed and shared publicly. Cultural expectations and norms
deny women many of the same opportunities for writing that are assumed to be appropriate
for men. This feeds and reinforces women’s lack of artistic or academic spaces. To specify
the case more precisely:
50This disproportionate treatment has existed throughout history: “It would have been impossi-
ble, completely and entirely, for any woman to have written the plays of Shakespeare in the time of
Shakespeare”(Woolf, 1929).
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Woolf Case: An unnamed woman is trying to write important works and share them with
the world. She is denied the time and space to think quietly by herself. The world seems
to say “What’s the good of your writing?” She faces this systematic lack of support, and
cannot think quietly by herself, because of her gender. As a result, she struggles to write,
and her ideas are not developed or shared(Woolf, 1929).
This scenario presents a challenge to the participatory view, as it emphasizes a victim’s need
for isolation, rather than social exchange. In contrast, a testimonial approach looks like it
can successfully explain the case. It seems as though the victim is unable to testify because
she is unable to collect her thoughts. Lacking space and resources, in this case, serves to
effectively prevent her testimony (in this case testimony in the form of written works). It is
hard to see how to assess this wrong as a participatory wrong.
Despite the fact that this case looks initially troubling, my participatory account can explain
this epistemic injustice. The sister in the Woolf case is wronged because she is mistreated
and disrespected in terms of her capacity to participate.
The Woolf case is an instance of misrecognition and blocked access. Both wrongs disrespect
the unnamed woman’s capacities to participate in inquiry, even though it is not a direct
exclusion. When the victim is denied a room of her own, she is being denied access to
the realm of inquiry. Without a way to collect her thoughts, she does not have essential
resources needed to make a contribution to academia. Collecting and sharing meaningful
thoughts takes a great deal of effort, and requires space to oneself. This blocked ability to
make a contribution is a way of disregarding the epistemic subject’s capacity to participate.
Woolf highlights how women are not seen as appropriate recipients of academic resources:
care, attention, and space(Woolf, 1929). Women are treated unfairly when their epistemic
development is seen as less important than men’s. They are not recognized as potentially
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valuable epistemic agents. The victim in the Woolf case suffers a sort of gendered injustice
that hinders her qua epistemic subject. Woolf is highlighting a subtle but important way
that gender still blocks access to the literary world.
My account, centered on epistemic participation, gives the best analysis of the cases from
Atwood and from Woolf. In both cases, the women are not merely dismissed as un-credible,
because in an important sense they are not recognized and given full access to intellectual
activities in the first place. Neither case is well understood through a lens of testimony.
What both cases share is the way that women are prevented from acting as inquirers in light
of their gender. While the mechanisms of exclusion differ, both cases wrong their victims by
blocking their capacity to participate in inquiry.
3.3.3 A Unified Account?
One problematic case remains for presenting a fully unified participatory account of epistemic
injustice: the case of individual epistemic development. This case is a thought experiment
based on Woolf’s case and then taken to an extreme. I examine this case because it seems
least likely to be related to participation, and so the strongest case against a participatory
account.
Secluded Sue: A woman (Sue) wants a room of her own, and quiet time to think about
the world. However, she has no desire to share any knowledge she gains with anyone else
(and will never share any of her knowledge). If she were to have access to this space, she
would gain the propositional knowledge p. However, she is unfairly denied these resources
because of her gender (and so does not gain the knowledge).51
51Case is adapted from examples in Woolf(Woolf, 1929)
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Intuitively, the case of the isolated thinker represents an instance of epistemic injustice. The
victim desires her own epistemic development and is unfairly denied the opportunity. It is
difficult to see how a participatory account can deal with such a case: Sue’s ability to actively
participate is not actually blocked, because our case stipulates that she will not share her
knowledge. This is intuitively an epistemic justice, and so a unified account must explain
why this is wrong, and be able to articulate in what way Sue is being treated epistemically
badly.
It is possible that there is no unified account of epistemic injustice. If the participatory
account cannot make sense of this case, then it is not comprehensive (being unable to cover
all intuitive cases). Fricker’s account, or one focused on testimony, can easily explain this
wrong. If this is the case, then while a participatory account is still valuable, it cannot
provide a unified analysis of epistemic injustice. While a testimonial approach captures a
category of wrongs, and the participatory approach captures a category of wrongs, neither
can successfully capture all cases. The lack of a unified account may not be that bad.
Dotson has argued that there should not be any single unified account of epistemic injustice,
because there is always “more to say”(Dotson, 2012, p.42). Shifting and overlapping partial
accounts offer a pluralistic view of the phenomenon. A lack of unification is still somewhat
unsatisfying because it seems there is not a central feature to all cases that are intuitively
epistemic injustice, raising worries about the category.
However, there are still resources for making sense of the Secluded Sue case. Sue is wronged
in her capacity as a participant in inquiry. This core capacity is disrespected, regardless of
whether her ability is in fact blocked. Although Sue’s ability is not blocked in the case above,
her capacity to participate is still disregarded. She is disrespected and treated as though she
is not a valuable participant.
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In this way, the participatory account can explain why this case is wrong, although it’s
explained from a very different perspective than a testimonial account. Subjects are wronged
whenever they are unfairly restricted from participating in inquiry – which includes knowing
as a component part. From this perspective, it is important to understand epistemic subjects
in light of the social framework of which they are a part. By explaining this case, the
participatory framework is able to remain fully unified, covering all the important cases of
epistemic injustice.
3.4 Conclusion
I have argued for a broader unified account of epistemic injustice as fundamentally about
the capacity to participate in inquiry. This is contrasted with the received view that charac-
terizes epistemic injustice as centering on one’s capacity to know or testify. I have presented
a participatory account of epistemic injustice, subdividing the phenomenon according to
different key mechanisms of exclusion; victims may face denied access, misrecognition, or
misappraisal. Epistemic subjects who are unfairly blocked from contributing to the process
of inquiry are victims of epistemic injustice. This new account places self-direction and
agency at the center of the phenomenon - epistemic subjects are treated justly when they
are unconstrained in their capacity as inquirers. It also highlights the context of inquiry as
central for the goal of epistemic justice.
This account shares many of the strengths of a testimonial approach and can explain key
cases from Fricker. A participatory account has better extensional adequacy: it is able to
include classic cases of epistemic injustice as well as cases that are left out on Fricker’s
account. Using this framework is advantageous for addressing the problem of epistemic
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injustice because it better highlights what is centrally important about the phenomenon
and illuminates the relationship between different subtypes of epistemic injustice. Using a
participatory account of epistemic injustice presents an important new perspective that can




Injustice with a Group Virtue
4.0.1 Introduction
Individuals whose epistemic skills are dismissed due to prejudice are distinctly wronged in
their status as epistemic subjects, and this wrong is referred to as an epistemic injustice(Fricker,
2003)(Kidd et al., 2017). For example, Dr. Tamika Cross was traveling by air when a pas-
senger suddenly needed assistance. In response to an announcement looking for doctors, she
raised her hand only to be told by a flight attendant “we are looking for actual doctors or
nurses”(Wible, 2016). In that instance, Dr. Cross was viewed not as a physician, but as a
black woman, and someone who does not look like a stereotypical doctor. In cases like this,
the victim suffers from an epistemic injustice: a moral and epistemic wrong that results in
a variety of harms not only for the victim but also for the wider community.
In this paper, I propose that the virtue of inclusion, understood as a group rather than
individual virtue, is the best remedy for epistemic injustice. Addressing epistemic injustice
is both an epistemic and a moral problem. Epistemic injustice can occur in a variety of
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ways; the most widely discussed case is that of testimonial injustice where a hearer un-
fairly discredits a speaker’s testimony due to prejudice(Fricker, 2007). Instances like this
epistemically and morally wrong their victim and represent a significant threat to justice
in our society. Different authors have proposed various virtues to cultivate in order to ad-
dress this problem, seeking to prevent prejudice from undermining interpersonal epistemic
practices. Miranda Fricker argues that cultivating a virtue of epistemic justice requires
having appropriately tuned testimonial sensitivities, while others argue in favor of trust or
open-mindedness(Fricker, 2003)(Marsh, 2011)(Kwong, 2015).
Understanding and addressing epistemic injustice requires articulating morally virtuous ways
of epistemically interacting with one another. While much has been written about the harms
of epistemic injustice, less has been written about how epistemic interactions can go morally
and epistemically well. In this paper I argue for the virtue of inclusion; this provides a
positive framework focused on an epistemic ideal rather than only focusing on a negative
account of how to resist the influence of prejudice. The emphasis on bias-resistance in the
literature means that inclusion has not been sufficiently considered as a potential solution
to epistemic injustice.
In this paper, I aim to: elucidate the virtue of inclusion, argue for its status as a group
virtue, and show how it is crucial for addressing the problem of epistemic injustice. I argue
that the quality of inclusion is best predicated upon groups, not individuals; the beneficial
effects emerge at the group level, and cultivating inclusion cannot be reduced to individual
virtues. Groups instantiate inclusive environments as a result of their structure, norms, and
individual constituents. In section one I argue that inclusion is a better solution to the
problem of epistemic injustice than existing proposals. In the next section, I review three
different senses of inclusion, clarifying the folk notion in order to pursue the virtuous notion
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more precisely. In section three I argue for understanding inclusion as a group virtue, rather
than an individual virtue. I close by discussing the benefits of seeking to cultivate inclusion
among social groups. Inclusion is an important virtue that groups should seek to cultivate,
as it promotes epistemic flourishing and can act as a preventative measure against epistemic
injustice.
4.1 Inclusion and Epistemic Justice
Ethicists and epistemologists have a vested interest in preventing and remedying instances
of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice wrongs a person qua epistemic subject(Fricker,
2007)(Kidd et al., 2017). While there are a wide variety of examples of epistemic injustices,
in all cases the victim is wronged as an epistemic subject because of prejudice. Two examples
helpfully illustrate the type of wrong that’s at stake.
Marge: Marge’s testimony is discounted because of her gender. When she
expresses her (true) belief that Tom Ripley has killed her partner Dickie, Her-
bert Greenleaf (Dickie’s father) dismisses her saying “Marge there’s female in-
tuition and then there are facts”. In this case, Marge suffers a testimonial
injustice(Fricker, 2007)(Highsmith, 1955)(Minghella et al., 1999).
Handmaid’s Tale: Offred is repeatedly denied access to basic epistemic re-
sources. She is forbidden from reading or writing of any kind, and from speaking
to others except under certain circumstances. Because of her gender, Offred
cannot access essential elements necessary for her to act as an inquirer(Atwood,
1986).
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In these examples of epistemic injustice, the victim is wronged, and prevented from fully
acting as an epistemic subject, because of prejudice. Epistemic injustice is a significant
moral and epistemic problem that needs to be addressed. Addressing epistemic injustice
requires a notion of epistemic justice - some type of ethical and epistemic concept that is
framed positively as worthy of pursuit. Pursuing epistemic justice requires articulating what
sorts of interactions can be considered morally and epistemically just. Inclusive interactions
(inclusive behaviors instantiated for the right reasons) offer one model of just epistemic
interactions. When individuals are included, they are not marginalized based on prejudice,
as in the examples above.
The virtue of inclusion offers a way to both prevent and remedy instances of epistemic
injustice. First, inclusion is preventative because inclusive groups facilitate an environment
where individuals have the resources to recognize their own flaws and implicit prejudice and
take steps to change. They also provide an environment where peers may intervene and
highlight to one another when mistakes are being made. Both of these things may reduce or
prevent epistemic injustices before they occur.
Inclusive environments also facilitate moral and epistemic goods even after epistemic injus-
tices have taken place. In a safe epistemic environment, victims of epistemic injustice can
point out that they have been treated wrongly, and expect the community to listen carefully
to their concerns. Inclusive epistemic environments provide ways of undoing some of the
harms done to individuals who are regularly victims of epistemic injustice.
In a more significant way, cultivating inclusive groups represents a way of counteracting the
core wrong at the heart of much epistemic injustice: that of exclusion and marginalization.
Individuals who are excluded and mistreated during social interactions because of prejudice
about their social identities suffer from marginalization, a form of oppression. They are
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excluded from social participation in a way that disrespects them, and represents a funda-
mental sort of misrecognition of their epistemic worth (or epistemic standing). Cultivating
inclusion corrects this wrong and is a way of showing the respect and recognition that has
otherwise been ignored. Inclusion instantiates epistemic environments that can be sites of
epistemic renewal and epistemic resistance.52 As such, it represents a significant tool in the
fight against oppression.
Focusing on epistemic inclusion emphasizes that epistemic justice is a social phenomenon,
rather than an individual virtue. This provides advantages over other proposed solutions to
the problem of epistemic injustice.
Individualized Epistemic Justice
Other philosophers have argued that agents must cultivate individual moral and epistemic
virtues in order to correct for the problem of epistemic injustice. These past proposals have
emphasized anti-prejudicial individual virtues.
Fricker suggests solving the problem in part by cultivating an individual virtue of testimo-
nial justice according to which individuals adjust their perceptions in order to correct for
the presence of implicit bias(Fricker, 2007). We live in a prejudiced society, so all of us
have implicit prejudices that will lead us to discount the testimony of members of certain
groups. Thus, we should all seek to look more closely at how we assess credibility and cul-
tivate an accurate testimonial sensitivity. The virtue of testimonial justice is an individual
virtue that effectively counters the impact of prejudice on one’s testimonial sensitivity and
credibility assessments. Individuals with this virtue can properly adjust for the prejudices in
52Medina especially emphasizes the importance of epistemic resistance(Medina, 2013).
76
their epistemic environment, to prevent the prejudices from impacting individual credibility
judgments. Individuals with this virtue will no longer commit testimonial injustices.
Gerald Marsh argues instead that apt trusting is the right virtue to cultivate. Rather than
focusing only on credibility assessments, his account expands to include all judgments of
trust. Individuals do not commit epistemic injustices when they appropriately trust those
around them (and so do not allow prejudices to shape ones judgments about who is trust-
worthy and who is not) Thus, a virtuous individual will trust appropriately, and the accurate
testimonial perception (that Fricker discusses) is a specialized subset of apt trusting(Marsh,
2011). “Apt trusting is that virtue possessed by those who trust reasonably, fairly, to the
appropriate extent and in the right circumstances, and for the right reasons”(Marsh, 2011).
Jack Kwong argues for open-mindedness as the best way to address the problem of epistemic
injustice(Kwong, 2015). Epistemic injustices are perpetrated by those who are close-minded,
and so a virtue of open-mindedness is the remedy. Wayne Riggs has argued that open-
mindedness is the best virtue for bias-reduction, saying: “nothing short of the kinds of
self-knowledge and self-monitoring that are constitutive of open mindedness will serve to
eliminate them”(Riggs, 2010, p.184).53 Open-mindedness represents an epistemic virtue
where an individual does not allow bias to cloud their consideration of new or unfamiliar
proposals. 54 Individuals fail to be open-minded when they lack key self-knowledge or fail to
implement it appropriately. Individuals who are open-minded are able to act epistemically
and morally well.
53Riggs discusses open-mindedness as a general epistemic virtue, while Kwong focuses specifically on
epistemic injustice.
54Riggs says: “So, it is through gaining self-knowledge, which one applies in the moment of challenge
through self-monitoring, that the open-minded person makes her awareness of her own cognitive fallibility
efficacious in her cognitive practice”(Riggs, 2010, p.183).
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4.1.1 Worries about Individual Virtues
There are reasons to worry about individualized notions of epistemic justice.
One worry is empirical: that dismissal and exclusion are best understood as social (not
individual) phenomena. Research suggests that individuals not only avoid those who exclude
them but also avoid anyone associated with excluders, in what is called the “Involuntary
Excluder Effect”(Critcher & Zayas, 2014). Other psychology research has shown not only
that individuals are highly sensitive to any form of social ostracism, but also that it is usually
perceived on a group level. As some researchers have summarized the issue: “Being excluded
by one means being excluded by all”(Chernyak & Zayas, 2010).
A closely related worry is that humans are poorly situated to notice and remedy our own
implicit tendencies. Benjamin Sherman has addressed the empirical literature on bias pre-
vention in the paper: “There’s no (testimonial) justice: Why pursuit of a virtue is not the
solution to epistemic injustice”(Sherman, 2016). Even when more objective information is
available, individuals are prone to ignore it in favor of their biased instincts. Individuals
are particularly blind to their own limitations. Sherman argues that the empirical evidence,
and failure of past bias-prevention interventions, indicates that individual anti-prejudicial
virtues are unattainable.
There is another concern about individual virtues and epistemic injustice that has not been
discussed: One individual is not able to achieve the targeted moral and epistemic benefits
of epistemic justice. A single inclusive (or fair or just) individual will be unable to prevent
epistemic injustices from occurring. A lone individual is unable to prevent other individuals,
or a group, from committing epistemic injustice. Proper epistemic treatment of others
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requires respect and recognition, rather than prejudiced dismissal; a single individual is also
not able to provide enough recognition to constitute epistemic justice.
Imagine a philosophy department with only one woman faculty member, and four men.
Imagine that one of the men harbors unconscious prejudices against women, and so discounts
her ideas and expertise during faculty meetings. This wrong is not undone, or even mediated,
by the presence of two other non-prejudicial men. One accepting person is not enough to
make someone feel safe if the rest of the environment is not accepting. An individual may
still not feel free to speak if she is worried that a third party may judge her or intervene
harshly. Even if she does feel safe, one conversation is not enough to facilitate personal
growth. Even the most inclusively-minded individual will fail to reliably achieve the benefits
of inclusion when surrounded by the wrong people. Epistemic justice requires repeated and
reliable exposure to an environment that is inclusive - something that is only possible when
a group as a whole is inclusive. Individuals need more than a single support in a group in
order to feel included.
The existing proposals to address epistemic injustice through individual virtues also do
nothing to address the long-term harms of epistemic injustice. Victims of epistemic injustice
are morally and epistemically harmed, in ways that persist even if they are later treated
justly. For example, Fricker’s intervention does not address lost-self-esteem for marginalized
individuals. Some supportive communities actively practice affirming one another’s ideas
- this would be a way to promote the growth of an individual epistemically. An inclusive
group creates a space that not only prevents epistemic injustices but also provides epistemic
resources for healing and growth after epistemic injustice.
79
Cultivating the virtue of inclusion is essential for our epistemic communities and in order
to pursue epistemic justice. In the next section, I spell out a clearer notion of inclusion, to
more specifically show how it can address epistemic injustice.
4.2 Understanding Inclusion
Developing inclusion as a virtue to counter epistemic injustice first requires understanding
the concept more precisely. The notion of inclusion is used in a wide variety of ways, both
inside and outside academia. In this section I separate three distinct usages, making their
definitions more precise.
In everyday usage, inclusion is usually highlighting morally praiseworthy features of groups,
individuals, or procedures.55 Shelley Burtt argues in favor of a robust inclusion as a key
element in a just and successful liberal state(Burtt, 2007). She focuses on how individuals
can cultivate virtues that not only benefit them individually but also promote civic values to
promote a flourishing community. For her, inclusion is a proper state of being for a liberal
community, one where everyone receives equal social consideration.56 Ideally, individuals will
be “welcomed and accommodated, cared for and socially integrated” into a way of life(Burtt,
2007, 558).
Intuitively, inclusion seems like a good candidate for a moral virtue, as an admirable way to
interact with others. It is rare to hear “inclusive” or “inclusion” used in a context where it
is a criticism. Epistemically speaking, inclusion reflects a willingness to listen and take the
55Being “open-minded” also has this quality of being nearly exclusively used as a compliment, but “trust-
ing” does not (as it is common to hear people talk about someone negatively for being too trusting).
56Her article especially emphasizes including those with disabilities, and how such inclusion is not suffi-
ciently emphasized using social contract theories.
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ideas and experiences of another person seriously, as well as to promote their participation
in epistemic activities. Inclusion is usually something that is not done by accident but rather
represents intentional action and activity on someone’s part.
One way to understand the wrong of epistemic injustice is as a kind of exclusion: individuals
are marginalized when treated as less than full epistemic subjects. When individuals are
dismissed by others due to prejudice, then they are being excluded from proper consideration
in a social process. The wrong inherent to epistemic exclusion can be seen in the way
that individuals are marginalized and restricted in their epistemic agency and capacity as
participants in inquiry.
Humans seem to be highly attuned to instances of social exclusion; individuals suffer psycho-
logical consequences even when excluded by a group they despise(Gonsalkorale & Williams,
2007). Experiences of exclusion can impact one’s self-identity, undermine self-confidence, and
even decrease emotional regulation(Buelow, Okdie, Brunell, & Trost, 2015)(Baumeister, De-
Wall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005)(Stenseng, Belsky, Skalicka, & Wichstrøm, 2015)(Twenge,
Catanese, & Baumeister, 2002)(Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). In an epistemic envi-
ronment, experiences of exclusion have the potential to impact one’s ability to function as
an epistemic agent; experiences might undermine one’s confidence and prevent action, or
inhibit the development of important epistemic abilities. Exclusion in the epistemic domain
has the potential to damage a victim’s epistemic abilities, which also leads to the harmful
consequence that inquiry will be less successful for the entire community.
Understanding epistemic injustice as an exclusion, it is intuitive that the corresponding
virtue is one of inclusion: drawing individuals into a shared social activity. Individuals who
are included are able to express their capacities as inquirers fully. Inclusion is also often tied
to democratic ideals. Our models of citizenship and civic decision-making revolve around
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equal participation from various agents in different life situations. A core democratic idea is
that the best political decisions will be those that are reached through group processes where
everyone can be involved. Inclusion may have further moral and political benefits beyond
the epistemic domain.57
To better understand inclusion, I will separate and specify three different notions from both
folk and academic uses. Separating out these elements helps to illuminate different features
of inclusion more clearly. Each one is more demanding than the previous; the three types
are: definitional inclusion, functional inclusion, and aspirational inclusion. I will argue that
understanding inclusion as a virtue that addresses epistemic injustice relies upon the third
aspirational notion.
4.2.1 Definitional Inclusion: Inclusion vs Exclusion
The most minimal or thin definition of inclusion is defined in opposition to exclusion. Groups
are inclusive when they do not exclude certain individuals, in this sense of intentionally
preventing certain individuals from participating. This notion of inclusion addresses explicit
barriers, usually codified in the expectations or practices of an organization. Individuals or
groups are exclusive when there is a conscious effort made to identify certain individuals and
separate them from the group by not allowing them in.
Individuals and groups are definitially inclusive when they do not exclude. For example,
women are allowed to become lawyers, but not priests: the Catholic church (but not the bar
association) explicitly excludes on the basis of gender. The judicial system is definitionally
inclusive: anyone with appropriate training and credentials may serve. Similarly, colleges
57In this paper I will focus only mainly on the impact inclusion can have on epistemic injustice.
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in the United States are now inclusive in ways that they were not in the past (when some
colleges explicitly excluded based upon gender and race).
Another example of this inclusion is the Boy Scouts of America organization. Recently they
announced they would be allowing girls to join their organization, and will now be known as
“Scouts, BSA”(Domonoske, 2018). Since there will not be any official gender-based exclusion,
they are now inclusive according to this notion of definitional inclusion.
A definitional sense of inclusion is often used when discussing the fairness of different groups
or organizations, as with the examples above. On this approach, the notion of inclusion
emphasizes access. To be inclusive is to allow an individual to have access to the activities
of the group. It is also a fairly minimal notion of inclusion. As long as there are no explicit
requirements that exclude, the group is inclusive. This is true regardless of the actual facts
about who gains access to the group. This thin level of inclusion can address some barriers
but is not sufficient to ensure that individuals are actually included or that the group is
equally accessible to people from different social groups. Even though the legal profession
is definitially inclusive, women make up only 35% of the legal profession and represent only
3.5% of all supreme court justices(Campisi, 2018)(A Current Glance at Women in the Law ,
2018).
Definitional inclusion represents a low threshold for inclusion and fails to capture significant
ways that individuals are still excluded. This notion of inclusion cannot prevent epistemic
marginalization in the ways necessary to prevent the moral harms of epistemic injustice. The
problem with emphasizing access is that it does not seem to capture all instances of exclusion
fully. People can be excluded “in practice” without facing any official barriers. Because there
is no intentional choice to exclude, companies and individuals count as inclusive according
to this first form of inclusion.
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A relative lack of representation can be a driving force for exclusion during group interactions.
Many decision-making groups still lack the presence of women, or anything close to equal
representation. Less representation can also mean even lower levels of participation within
a group. Researchers have shown that when women make up 20% of a group, they take
up 40% less “floor time” than a male participant(Karpowitz, Mendelberg, & Shaker, 2012)
So even granting access to some women will fail to provide them equal opportunities to
act as participants. Reducing this gap in participation requires a group with at least even
numbers of men and women(Karpowitz et al., 2012). This again shows that a definitional
type of inclusion is shallow, and does not fully capture what it could mean for a group to be
inclusive.
4.2.2 Functional Inclusion
Functional inclusion focuses on preventing exclusion by addressing any existing functional
barriers that block participation. This is a different and more demanding notion of inclusion,
focusing specifically on the goals of diversity. Various organizations, from college groups to
businesses work hard to claim that they are inclusive and diverse in contrast with other less
progressive or socially-minded organizations. Here the notion of inclusion is explicitly set up
as a solution to the under-representation of minority groups.
Inclusion in this sense means drawing in people to participate who represent a divergence
from the predicted or actual social makeup of a group.58 A business might be inclusive by
being especially accommodating to people with disabilities, or by implementing recruitment
efforts aimed at non-white applicants. For groups to be inclusive in this sense, they must seek
58Here I mean predicted in a descriptive sense: we can predict descriptively that a given CEO will be
male, while still thinking that such underrepresentation of women is problematic.
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to address non-explicit barriers and must be at least minimally successful at maintaining a
diverse population. Burtt says that in pursuing inclusion the first step requires “the presence
of those whose differences and disabilities mark them as in need of inclusion”(Burtt, 2007,
p.576). Not all excluded individuals are disabled, but this quote highlights that it is necessary
to have at least some individuals within an organization with differing needs in order to be
an inclusive group. To be functionally inclusive, an organization must succeed in at least
minimally including individuals who have faced (or currently face) functional obstacles to
equal participation.
This notion of inclusion also comes up within education: universities that seek to be inclusive
are ultimately interested in the students who end up successfully enrolled in or graduated
from the institution. Inclusion is achieved when individuals from marginalized backgrounds
are able to function as students and participate in the educational system successfully. A
school is inclusive if it reaches students of different ages, abilities, or backgrounds. Schools
might form organizations (black student alliance, LGBTQ* support groups) to help both
recruit and support specific populations of under-represented students. Even though such
students are not excluded by definition, they still face disadvantages and functional blocks
that restrict their ability to enroll in or succeed in a college setting (when compared to their
privileged peers).
In the classroom, some students need different levels of support for a variety of reasons.
In addition to resources around race, gender, and disability, most schools also offer writing
support and counseling services to help students who may be at a functional disadvantage.
These resources help to make classrooms an inclusive space. Using the previous definitional
notion of inclusion (focused on inclusion as access), schools are inclusive as long as they
simply ensure that features such as mental health or disability status are not treated as
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criteria during the application process. However, this second notion of inclusion emphasizes
functional difficulties and accommodation, setting a higher bar for inclusion. To truly create
an inclusive college community, some students need different resources. Providing this ac-
commodation allows them to succeed alongside their peers who may not require additional
help.
Inclusion in this sense requires noticing the different needs of that population of students and
giving them the tools necessary to participate on equal footing in the classroom. Inclusion
is defined as an active effort assist individuals who might otherwise face systemic barriers
towards participation. Inclusion is about understanding functional blocks, and addressing
them. Inclusion is not about avoiding exclusion (as in the previous section) but instead is
defined in reference to facilitating diversity.
The requirements of inclusion in this second sense are higher: people might be allowed to
participate, but that does not make a group “inclusive”. Instead, inclusion requires more
effort to remove other sorts of hidden barriers that might prevent some people from sharing
in group activities. When inclusion is focused on diversity, it requires making an effort to
understand and name the differences between different groups of people. Unlike the earlier
notion, it is not enough to ignore group differences and allow everyone to come in. This
notion looks at actual group make-up. Even if individuals have access, they are not included
if they are not able to participate and be successful. Functional inclusion requires noticing
and naming differences, in order to identify how individuals can better have their needs met.
Functional inclusion is not yet the most demanding notion of inclusion. It risks focusing on
whether participation is functionally possible, but not whether individuals from marginalized
groups are actually participating and thriving. This approach risks conflating the perfor-
mance of different individuals from the same marginalized groups (as long as a functional
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block is removed or lowered, there’s no further attention to individual needs). It does not
address any past history or trauma on the part of the individual, looking instead only at
group level functional blocks. On this notion of inclusion, something is inclusive once a func-
tional block is removed, which does not account for historical and carryover effects of prior
injustices. This approach also risks losing sight of equity; removing or lowering a barrier is
not the same as ensuring equal opportunities for participation. Truly promoting inclusion
requires taking time to understand different individual needs and to help ensure that each
different subject has the resources needed to be successful.
4.2.3 Aspirational Inclusion: Epistemic Flourishing
There is a third notion of inclusion that is more demanding than both of the previous two
notions. Rather than focusing on accessibility or accommodation, it emphasizes inclusion
as providing an environment that promotes the growth and well being of each individual -
what I call epistemic flourishing.59 This approach emphasizes maximizing the abilities of
each individual to act as an epistemic agent.
Activists and teachers have often spoken about “safe spaces” or “brave spaces as idealized
epistemic environments that promote learning and personal growth.60 These spaces embody
a third, aspirational, notion of inclusion as an ideally supportive epistemic environment.
(Note: supportive does not mean free from challenge.) An inclusive space is one where
diverse individuals can freely share their experiences, even ones of marginalization. In such
spaces, individuals have the freedom to discuss their opinions on important topics, without
59Burtt discusses the goal that each individual can “flourish as they are currently constituted” which nicely
captures the idea. While she is discussing the inclusion of individuals with disabilities within society, my
notion of inclusion is focused on the epistemic domain more broadly.
60Brave spaces is an alternative name proposed after criticism of the term “safe spaces”(Arao & Clemens,
2013).
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risking verbal attack or shaming. It is a space where the group can acknowledge the failures of
their government or community. Importantly, it is also a space where individuals can be held
accountable for their mistakes and ingrained biases. Such spaces are designed around a single
goal of facilitating and promoting individual growth. This is the most demanding notion of
inclusion; it also incorporates the elements of the previous two types of inclusion. In order
to be an aspirational inclusive space, considerations of access and functional accommodation
are prerequisites.
While individuals disagree on the exact term that’s appropriate for such spaces, most share
overlapping ideas about an ideal epistemic environment. In “safe spaces” there are new
opportunities for learning and personal development that are not present in other places.
One way to spell this out more precisely is that in safe spaces individuals are free from certain
sorts of threats or expectations. One account spells it out this way: “Classroom context C
is safe for agent S if S is reasonably unlikely to suffer any significant harm as a result of
her presence in C without being required to protect herself beyond what can reasonably
be expected of her”(Monypenny, 2018). This environment facilitates curiosity and inquiry
because individuals need not spend unreasonable resources on defending themselves (as some
level of safety is expected).
Personal growth is possible within an ideal environment (or a safe space) in part because
fewer resources need to be spent on assessing and protecting against risk to oneself. Safe
spaces have several key features that promote epistemic growth: they provide this protection,
they include a message of acceptance towards participants, and they grant permission to
address hidden aspects of society (such as experiences of oppression). Ideally, safe spaces
give a way for individuals to process and address experiences of marginalization. In an ideal
environment like this, every individual is welcomed to participate and to share their own
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idiosyncratic experiences regardless of how those experiences may diverge from expectations.
Additionally, all participants within an epistemic space can expect to be free from serious
emotional or psychological harms such as shaming. These features combine to create a
space where individuals are free to speak openly, even about difficult topics such as implicit
prejudices. This means that groups can discuss power dynamics and structural oppression
in new ways.
All these features combine to create a sort of “call-in” culture that can be used to help
educate individuals on their own privilege. Individuals can expect to face public responses if
they are acting in prejudiced ways - ideally, such feedback can be received and internalized
(rather than being seen as a threat). In safe spaces, every individual is able to speak about
their own experiences.
An aspirational notion of inclusion is more demanding because it requires continually improv-
ing the epistemic environment. This notion of inclusion offers a way to cultivate individual
flourishing, while recognizing that providing access and accommodation is not always enough
to be inclusive. Even an organization with a variety of accommodations (so one that is defi-
nitionally and functionally inclusive) might fail to be inclusive in this third sense. Individuals
could still fail to grow, unable to learn or takes the steps necessary to challenge themselves.
An aspirational notion of inclusion, or an emphasis on inclusion as flourishing, is more
demanding than the previous notions in part because it requires addressing hidden biases
and unconscious social norms. It also focuses on the sort of environment needed not only for
successful epistemic performance but for individual development and growth. It is not enough
that everyone is able to participate; everyone should also be able to improve themselves. Even
individuals who are already epistemically well-off could develop and become better. This
improvement must include a space that can facilitate healing from past wrongs.
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Groups are inclusive in this sense when they genuinely promote the epistemic growth of each
of their members. This notion of inclusion can address epistemic injustice and epistemic
marginalization in ways the other two notions of inclusion cannot.
4.3 Inclusion as a Group Virtue
Epistemic inclusion is important because it facilitates the participation of diverse individuals
in epistemic activities. Inclusive groups not only reduce the possibility of epistemic exclusion
but promote active participation. More specifically, inclusion is best understood as a virtue
of groups rather than individuals. The moral and epistemic benefits that it brings are
reliably generated through a social environment, rather than the behavior of an individual.
Virtue language typically focuses on individuals, and many epistemic interventions focus on
the impact of individual contributions. In contrast, inclusion should be considered a moral
achievement of groups rather than single persons. This aspect of inclusion becomes more
clear when thinking of the third form of inclusion (aspirational), rather than the previous
two forms; aiming towards epistemic flourishing requires certain sorts of social environments.
Individual good behavior is not sufficient to generate inclusion in the richest sense. For this
reason alone, inclusion cannot be understood as an individual virtue. Even speaking to an
ideal agent, someone who is maximally accepting, safe, and permissive, will not be enough
to ensure the intended conditions for personal growth.
A group virtue is predicated upon a social collection of individuals, rather than on a single
person. In the individual case, virtue usually requires a stable disposition whereby one
reliably acts correctly and for the right reasons. A group virtue must also include these
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two basic components. First, groups are inclusive when they reliably implement inclusive
environments. Second, this instantiation of inclusion must be as a result of norms and core
features of the group, rather than a mere accident.
This group virtue cannot be understood as a sum of individual virtues. Matthew Baddorf
spells out this principle of non-reductiveness this way: “(NR): Sometimes collective virtues
and vices do not supervene on any set of intrinsic properties of individuals; they are thus
not reducible to them”(Baddorf, 2018). Donald Beggs emphasizes this requirement by dis-
tinguishing between distributive group virtues (which arise from individual qualities) and
collective group virtues (which do not)(Beggs, 2003).
Inclusion is a collective or non-reductive virtue, where the virtue of the group cannot be
reduced to the features of each individual.61 A single rude individual can prevent a group
from being inclusive, or a group of biased individuals can function inclusively under certain
circumstances. The ascription of inclusion should be made at the group level. Inclusion
is best understood as a type of continuum concept: groups can be more or less inclusive
relative to each other. Even inclusive groups can be compared according to their degree or
nature of inclusion, just as we might comparatively discuss other virtues such as bravery.
Despite this, it will often be more intuitive to speak of groups as being inclusive or not, the
same way much virtue talk can become dichotomous.
For a group to be inclusive, it must reliably act in inclusive ways. Additionally, this cannot
be an accident but must flow from the features and values of the groups.62 One way to
spell this out is to look at the shared practices of the group, and how these social practices
implement the virtue of inclusion. More specifically, Beggs says that two main components
61This is also different than a structural or institutional virtue(Anderson, 2012).
62These same features are required for responsibilist notions of epistemic vice(Battaly, 2014).
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constitute group virtue: “... there are two sufficient conditions for group agency: certain
forms of solidarity, or certain practices or procedures of group decision making”(Beggs, 2003,
p.463).
Using this account of group virtue, inclusion requires individuals who relate to one another
in ways bound by certain practices that emphasize inclusion. In part, this means inclusion
is connected to the features and values shared and spread among the multiple individuals
that constitute the group. Determining whether a group is inclusive will depend on linking
the features of inclusion to values within the group (determined from structural features, or
explicit agreements of group purpose). Social norms within the group context will also have
a strong role in determining whether or not a group is inclusive.
Understanding inclusion as a group virtue requires taking a different sort of perspective
than thinking about being an inclusive individual. Looking at groups, one can ask: Are
marginalized or vulnerable individuals reliably included in inquiry? Are individuals treated
with recognition, respect, and given the resources they need to act freely as inquirers? Is
this disposition to include and encourage epistemic subjects based in the structure, norms,
and values of the group? The next section highlights some specific features of groups that
contribute to inclusion.
4.3.1 Inclusive Features of Groups
Two critical features of inclusion are 1) acceptance and 2) safety. Both of these are features
that depend upon social norms and are defined based upon the behavior or a group, and how
likely it is that an individual will be treated well within epistemic contexts. What makes
these conditions hold is facts about how the agents will interact with the group.
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A person is accepted (in the sense I am interested in) when she is able to speak about and
be taken seriously regarding any element of her own personal experience. This means that
her experience or expertise will not be dismissed, undermined, or mocked if she offers her
testimony. For such a claim to be true, it must be the case that a group will allow her to
speak, and will not trigger any self-silencing.63
An individual is safe if she can expect to avoid certain core harms. These harms are specif-
ically emotional or psychological harms that would undermine her notions of herself as an
agent. Specifically, a “safe space” provides a guard against feeling humiliated - when one
feels less than or incapable because of how they are portrayed to others.
Positive group norms prevent agents from being humiliated when in healthy epistemic com-
munities, in two ways. First, the presence of acceptance in the community affirms that
the agent is an appropriate participant. Second, there is a social norm (hopefully explicit)
against any social behavior designed to trigger feelings of humiliation.
Inclusive groups can also sometimes reduce the harms that may arise from one non-inclusive
person, or non-inclusive individuals who are not members of the group. Feelings of humilia-
tion get their force because the victim is aware of how she appears to the rest of the social
group. Alternatively, she may realize that the action was designed to make her feel humil-
iated, a recognition that she is socially excluded from the group. Both of these harms are
undercut if the majority of a social group does not endorse or support one person’s attempt
to humiliate; in these cases, the perpetrator is viewed as an outsider when violating the
norms of the group. Without the support of the rest of the group, the attempted instigator
may appear foolish or even embarrassed themselves for violating group norms. In this way,
63See Dotson for more on self-silencing and self-smothering(Dotson, 2011).
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everyone may still have a reasonable expectation of safety, even if it is not the case that
every individual’s every action is perfect.
4.3.2 Inclusion and Epistemic Injustice
Inclusion, understood as a group virtue, can not only prevent epistemic injustice, but can also
provide remediation and restoration. Individuals have a right to be treated in certain ways
by their epistemic communities (the social-epistemic groups of which they are a part). This
happens reliably when individuals are functioning within virtuously inclusive groups. When
the third notion of inclusion is instantiated in a group, it provides conditions that promote
epistemic flourishing. All three notions of inclusion can promote epistemic participation, but
only the third notion of inclusion is sufficient for fully addressing epistemic injustice.
When thinking about inclusion as access (or definitional inclusion), it is clear that providing
some epistemic tools is necessary for any type of inclusion to take place. In epistemic
contexts, access might be as simple as having the capacity to speak. However, providing
access to an epistemic community is not enough - individuals can still be treated epistemically
badly. Inclusion as a sort of functional accommodation requires thinking about who is
epistemically marginalized and making adjustments to individual and community behavior.
This means being aware of the disadvantages that people face, and making corrections.
The first two notions are insufficient to make sense of the ways individuals can be subtly
epistemically marginalized. Prejudiced social norms can function in subtle ways; these bad
epistemic habits may not directly reflect any intentional restriction of access or failure in
accommodation. For example: when speaking, women are interrupted more often than
men, with recent studies suggesting men are 33% more likely to interrupt a woman than
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a man(Torres, 2017)(Hancock & Rubin, 2015). Additionally, in mixed groups, men are
more likely to be called on and spend more time talking. These sorts of practices become
normative and expected. Research has shown that early exposure to biased expectations from
teachers can shape the expectations of students throughout their time in school(Chemaly,
2015)(Sadker & Zittleman, 2009).
Social norms also dictate what methods of communication are deemed as appropriate or
not. Consider the expectation that women should not get too angry when speaking. Men
and women are perceived differently when they are angry, where women are seen as more
emotional, men are likely to be conferred a higher status(Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). Dis-
advantages like this are not instances of definitional exclusion, do not seem amenable to
functional accommodation, and addressing them requires developing an environment that
will facilitate the epistemic agency of every individual.
The ideal for an inclusive epistemic community is the third notion: aspirational inclusion
promotes individual flourishing and growth. Inclusion is a morally significant virtue, one
that promotes both epistemic and moral goods. Inclusion can also prevent and provide
restitution for epistemic injustices. this shows that a great deal is required in order to treat
individuals epistemically well.
4.4 Cultivating the Virtue of Inclusion
One crucial upshot to treating inclusion as a group virtue is that it avoids some other
problems with individual solutions to epistemic injustice. It is difficult (or impossible) to
notice and correct for our own biases as individuals - suggesting it may not even be possible
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to curate individual anti-prejudicial virtues(Sherman, 2016). However, because inclusion is
defined as a group virtue, this need not be a problem. Attaining the virtue of inclusion now
looks more practically and psychologically feasible.
Understanding inclusion as a group virtue means that we need different strategies to cultivate
inclusion: individuals cannot merely reflect and cultivate individual habits. Individuals
cannot attain this virtue on their own; instead, different strategies should be used. For
example, the structural features of groups can have an impact on how inclusive they are. If
a group decides to use democratic methods to self-govern, that may make it more inclusive
in the long run when compared to a group with a single leader. It will take different skills
to cultivate inclusive groups rather than cultivating inclusive dispositions individually.
An advantage to approaching inclusion as a group virtue is that it becomes possible to look at
key features that would be left out of individual accounts of inclusion. This approach provides
a richer and more accurate picture of the nature of inclusion. This is interesting for a few
reasons. For example, the influence of social norms becomes clear at the group level, when
it may be obscured at the individual level. Prejudiced behavior can be better understood
by looking at social norms within an epistemic community. Social norms are prototypical
behavioral expectations that are shared for a given social group(Hogg & Reid, 2006). They
help to both shape an individuals perceptions and prescribe appropriate behavior. Thus,
they have a strong guiding influence on the actions of group members. Norms can help to
define group membership, and also contribute to each individuals self-identity.
Work to Change Group Norms When social norms function poorly, they serve to
marginalize some individuals and exclude them from the shared discourse. In this way,
prototypes of social behavior can foster and promote epistemic wrongs. An important way to
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correct this influence is to promote different sorts of epistemic social norms. Anti-prejudicial
social norms can function by either directly countering or undermining other problematic
norms. A good way to counter harmful norms is with newer healthier norms. Countering
prejudicial norms in some cases merely requires counter-norms that can shift expectations.
For example: forming a norm that it is not socially acceptable to interrupt women. This
norm will be successful when it shapes both perceptions and prescribed behavior. Groups
with this norm will perceive those who interrupt women as behaving badly, in ways counter
to the essence of the group. Such individuals might appropriately be chastised, or expected
to apologize. In this way, the norm over time will shift behavior of the group so that women
are not subject to this prejudiced treatment during discourse.
Another way to combat prejudicial norms is to cultivate inclusive norms that can serve to
undermine prejudiced behavior more generally. For example, groups with an inclusive climate
can see reduced interpersonal bias(Nishii, 2013). A group might have a norm to accept the
cultural or emotional context when an individual speaks, even if it is different from what
is usually expected during discussion. This would help to foster a welcoming environment.
Looking at psychological safety (a psychological construct of how safe an individual feels)
offers one way to understand this mechanism(Singh, Winkel, & Selvarajan, 2013).
Adjust Group Components While individual components do not instantiate the virtue,
it is possible to promote inclusion by adjusting group components to make the group more
prone toward inclusion. This can include structural features and individual dispositions
depending on the group.
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Individuals can take actions to change the structural features of groups. Before seeking to
attain a level of inclusion that focuses on individual flourishing, it is necessary that groups
provide at least access and accommodation to their members. Changing structural features
may be necessary in order to meet the criteria for these two less-demanding notions of
inclusion.
Good habits in personal epistemic relationships also promote group growth and development.
Individuals can develop inclusion-promoting traits, even though the necessary virtue is a
group property. There are some ways in which the inclusive tendencies of individuals are
still critically important. Individuals should try to be accepting and avoid shaming others -
these contribute to group-level characteristics of inclusion. This is a necessary prerequisite
for an inclusive group. For example, individuals can develop skills or disposition to articulate
epistemic norms and challenge norm-breakers. Another critical personal disposition is to be
receptive to feedback from others in the group.
Social Feedback Mechanisms It is important that epistemically just groups have feed-
back mechanisms (either formal or informal) to address behavior that violates norms. This
strategy promotes self-conscious realizations in others and in ourselves. In part, this means
pointing out when others make mistakes, and act in ways that are counter to the goals of
inclusion. This will be easier if there are explicit expectations, or social norms are expressed
explicitly by members of the group. Highlighting mistakes and departures from the norm
helps to not only encourage the norm itself but also provides an opportunity for reflection
for a given individual.
There are risks to mis-calibrated feedback mechanisms. There can be other subconscious
norms that dictate when criticism and correction are appropriate. It is important to cultivate
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norms that appropriately dictate when individuals in the group ought to be criticized or
socially punished for violating norms. Some work suggests that women and other people of
marginalized groups are punished (socially) more severely for violating norms, while white
men are only slightly penalized.64
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper I have provided a clarified notion of inclusion, highlighting its weaker counter-
parts, and sketching how it can be enacted in epistemically just social groups. I have argued
that inclusion is instantiated non-reductively in groups rather than individuals, and that it
is the best virtue to address the problem of epistemic injustice.
64For example, Kate Manne talks about gender and social perception(Manne, 2017).
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Chapter 5
The Pain of Being Overlooked: A
Case Study on Fibromyalgia and
Intersectional Epistemic Justice
5.0.1 Introduction
“I felt trapped between the condescending dismissal of the medical Establishment
and the predatory embrace of alternative medicine. I felt as if there was no one
I could trust.” - Leah65
Receiving a diagnosis of fibromyalgia is usually an arduous multi-year process for patients
who seek to understand and address the invisible illness impacting their lives. Throughout
this search, many patients are told that the pain they feel is not real, exaggerated, or
indicates the presence of a mental illness. Individuals with fibromyalgia experience a variety
of epistemic injustices, some of which have been neglected by the existing literature. Rather
65Leah Vincent wrote about her experiences with fibromyalgia after Lady Gaga came out publicly as
having the disorder(Vincent, 2017).
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than attending only to the problem of disbelief, I highlight other ways that patients with
fibromyalgia are epistemically wronged and treated unjustly. I review first-person testimony
from patients with fibromyalgia to show how they are uniquely vulnerable to a wider variety
of epistemic injustices. The case of fibromyalgia can more clearly illuminate the interactions
between different types of epistemic injustice, especially the social factors of gender and
illness. I present the notion of intersectional epistemic justice as a framework for philosophers
and bioethicists to better attend to these subtler forms of marginalization and exclusion.
Tom said: “I can’t even guess how many doctors I saw” when discussing his 25-year journey
to be diagnosed with fibromyalgia (an extreme case)(Real Fibromyalgia Patient Stories and
Tips , 2016). This paper expands on the previous literature by more deeply exploring the
ways that patients with fibromyalgia experience a complex variety of epistemic and moral
mistreatment throughout the process of diagnosis. People with fibromyalgia are frequently
ignored and dismissed when explaining their illness to others, whether it is their friends or
their doctor.
Receiving a diagnosis can involve outright dismissal, but it also involves a variety of other
epistemic injustices. Patients who endure this process are often left with lasting self-doubt,
frustration, or anger even after they are diagnosed. These epistemic injustices occur despite
what are often the best intentions of the medical community. Miscommunication, the tech-
nical and scientific subject matter, and the complex nature of the disease all make it more
difficult.
Fibromyalgia is one of the most common pain disorders in the United States(National Fi-
bromyalgia Association, 2018), affecting around 4 - 10 million people in the country, and cor-
respondingly two to six percent of the worldwide population(Prevalence, 2019)(Fibromyalgia,
2019). Despite its frequency, patients with fibromyalgia still struggle to receive the care
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and support that they need. The disorder predominantly (although not exclusively) impacts
women and is mostly invisible to outside observers(Prevalence, 2019)(Fibromyalgia, 2019). It
is often misdiagnosed, or not diagnosed, and the time to diagnoses is usually years(Diagnosis ,
2019)(Di Franco1 et al., 2011).
“I have heard an extensive list of reasons why I can’t be in as much pain as I
say” - Laura66
“My doctor recently told me that a lot of doctors, “dont treat fibromyalgia
because theres no cure” So Im just supposed to get worse and worse an no one
cares?” - Julie*67
Dismissal not only exacerbates a patient’s pain and makes treating an already enigmatic
disease even more difficult, but it also epistemically wrongs patients. This dismissal of
fibromyalgia patients is a problem: ethically, medically, and epistemically. It also represents
an epistemic injustice, a unique kind of moral and epistemic mistreatment that wrongs
victims in their status as epistemic subjects.
An epistemic injustice occurs when a person is treated unfairly, and wronged in their status
as an epistemic subject(Kidd et al., 2017). Victims of an epistemic injustice are treated
unfairly due to prejudice about their capacities as knowledge-seekers; this wrong is also a
moral wrong that treats them badly. Epistemic injustice not only unfairly wrongs victims
of prejudice, but also leads to harmful consequences for everyone within the community of
knowers because it disrupts healthy knowledge-seeking practices. The philosophy literature
66Laura described her experiences in the Harvard Health Blog(Kiesel, 2017).
67Not their actual name, taken from an online fibromyalgia community(Too accurate...make it stop!!:
Diagnosing Chronic Illness (meme), 2019).
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has primarily focused on how victims may be disbelieved (and so have their knowledge
denied) due to prejudice.
It is critical to accurately understand a patient’s testimony and experiences in order to begin
to address them. Patients with fibromyalgia are epistemically oppressed in a number of ways
that restrict and undermine their epistemic agency. Individuals with fibromyalgia deserve to
be treated as epistemic agents, which requires first acknowledging the ways in which their
epistemic agency is disrespected and undermined.
In section one, I give an overview of the unique medical context for patients with fibromyal-
gia, including recent research on “invalidation” as a measurable psychological construct.
Section two shows how the experiences of patients with fibromyalgia include a wide variety
of epistemic injustices. Section three outlines key commitments of intersectional feminism,
showing how this framework illuminates important aspects of the ways fibromyalgia patients
experience epistemic injustice. Section four concludes with some implications for seeking
epistemic injustice from a perspective informed by concerns of intersectionality.
5.1 A Fibromyalgia Diagnosis
Fibromyalgia is a disease characterized by widespread pain.68 Individuals affected by fi-
bromyalgia often experience a unique combination of other symptoms, including stiffness,
sleep problems, digestive problems, and headaches. While different individuals may ex-
perience different symptoms, widespread body pain is the most consistent and notable
68In contrast to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, which can include many similar symptoms but is characterized
primarily by fatigue.
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symptom(National Fibromyalgia Association, 2018). Fibromyalgia is a diagnosis of exclu-
sion, where individuals are diagnosed only when all other possible explanations for their
symptoms have been ruled out.
Fibromyalgia has no known cause or cure. Treatment for fibromyalgia includes lifestyle inter-
ventions and pain management strategies, along with medication. Treatment also includes
social factors such as reducing stress. Despite how common this disease is, it receives com-
parably less attention than other illnesses. This may be partially explained as a result of
trends within the medical community that seem to disproportionately focus medical research
on men, and to dismiss the pain of women(Fassler, 2015)(Health, 2018)(Dusenbery, 2018).
At its worst, fibromyalgia is debilitating and often restricts a patient’s ability to perform ev-
eryday tasks. Symptoms can change day to day, making it difficult to predict and diagnose
based upon a single snapshot of someone’s symptoms. As one person put it: “I was recently
denied disability (again). They acknowledge I have pain, but I should be able to perform
simple tasks. I guess I should record myself crying while I shower some days.”69
Treatment is also complicated by the co-morbidities that often accompany a fibromyalgia
diagnosis. Many patients experience other overlapping conditions such as irritable bowel
syndrome, lupus, and arthritis. Mental illnesses such as depression and anxiety are also com-
monly co-morbid with fibromyalgia. This relationship among these co-morbid illnesses is not
fully understood: it could be either that some illnesses make a fibromyalgia diagnosis more
likely, and it is likely that fibromyalgia increases the chances of other illnesses(Fibromyalgia,
2019).
69An anonymous user online, describing her struggles with seeking accommodation(Too accurate...make it
stop!!: Diagnosing Chronic Illness (meme), 2019).
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There is a general lack of knowledge among both patients and physicians regarding the causes,
mechanisms, and best treatments for fibromyalgia. Physicians often feel underprepared to
diagnose and treat fibromyalgia(Perrot, Choy, Petersel, Ginovker, & Kramer, 2012). This
disease is invisible, with no easily measurable components, and misunderstood by many in
the medical community, leading to patients who have their pain dismissed when seeking
treatment. This precarious state of affairs places patients who are already vulnerable into
a position where they may experience a variety of epistemic injustices. So many people
are not being seen, not being heard, and not getting the help they need in the face of a
devastating disease. Without patient feedback and cooperation, doctors cannot determine
when diagnosis is accurate or when treatment is successful.
5.1.1 Facing The Unknown: Diagnosis and Invalidation
Fibromyalgia is a relatively new diagnostic label, and only recently has there been a consensus
that the category is “real” or functions as a meaningful medical label. There is a history
of mistrust and miscommunication especially with fibromyalgia; for many years there was
controversy over whether fibromyalgia “existed” or was a “real disease” (or merely disjunctive
symptoms, or people making things up). It was not always seen as a valuable diagnostic
category, or as identifying a recognizable syndrome. When it was first introduced some in
the medical community viewed it as similar to “hysteria” - a medically uninformative label
that was used to classify women patients with complains that seemed to be mental health
concerns. It used to be perceived as either a fanciful category or simply a euphemism for
mental illness. It is now widely accepted as a meaningful medical category, although little
is known about the distinguishing mechanisms of the disorder(Bernstein, 2016). It remains
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a heterogeneous category, a diagnosis only given when all other possible assessments have
been ruled out.
The previous controversy means that there is still some social stigma and false notions
that fibromyalgia is a diagnosis given to satisfy those who are not really sick, but merely
complaining of pain. Patients with fibromyalgia have a hard time being taken seriously by
the medical establishment as a result of this history and as a result of the invisible nature
of many of their symptoms.70
While fibromyalgia is now widely acknowledged within the medical community, some patients
are still harmed by past or present perceptions that their disease is imaginary. Wanda says:
“After searching for answers and finding only more questions, anger was the only emotion I
could muster for the medical community and its poor standards of care”(Fibromyalgia: Real
Patient Testimonials , 2008). Some doctors may still (falsely) see fibromyalgia as not “real”.
Other doctors worry that fibromyalgia refers to an odd collection of symptoms, and many
wonder if it overlaps with chronic fatigue syndrome, or if there are significantly different
subtypes of fibromyalgia.
It has been difficult to define the nature of the disease, especially since there is still so little
knowledge about the cause or about the best treatment. Research continues, and in the
future may very well separate the category of fibromyalgia into more biologically similar
sub-types of disease(Luciano et al., 2016). Some doctors also believe that fibromyalgia and
chronic fatigue syndrome may be closely related, and ought to be treated similarly(Natelson,
2019).
70There has been an increase in discussion about this problem within medicine: a failure to address pain
when it is invisible to doctors, especially women’s pain(Fassler, 2015).
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Currently, this lack of knowledge seems to exacerbate the risk of miscommunication and
mistreatment in doctor-patient relationships.
Worries about fibromyalgia being imaginary are connected to gendered stereotypes and
stereotypes about those with mental illness. Many patients with fibromyalgia are women,
and their mistreatment is part of a broader pattern of women’s pain being dismissed(Chen
et al., 2008). A recent study found that adults watching identical videos will judge a finger
prick as less painful when told that the child crying is a girl rather than a boy. These cultural
stereotypes about pain contribute to the problem of treating fibromyalgia patients effectively.
These different factors combine to create a stereotype of the “complaining woman” as a typi-
cal fibromyalgia patient(Briones-Vozmediano, O¨hman, Goicolea, & Vives-Cases, 2018). This
can cause doctors to develop problematic heuristics making it all too easy to dismiss patients.
Measuring Invalidation
Recently the medical community has begun to study the medical consequences of stress
and dismissal on patients with fibromyalgia. Researchers developed an “invalidation illness
index” designed to roughly measure how much a patient has been exposed to experiences
of invalidation of their sickness(Ghavidel-Parsa et al., 2014)(Kool, van Middendorp, Boeije,
& Geenen, 2009). Invalidation is the name of a new psychological construct designed to
help make sense of this issue. The index measures experiences of invalidation through a
survey, separating two subtypes of invalidation: active “discounting” or a more passive lack
of “understanding”. Researchers surveyed patients about their experiences with others as
fibromyalgia patients, and categorized the experiences to understand how often patients were
receiving support or dismissal.
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Invalidation can be a source of stress, and stress and social positioning are significant risk
factors for many medical disorders(How stress affects your health, 2013)(Anxiety and physical
illness , 2018). Especially for pain disorders, additional stress can significantly exacerbate
symptoms. Experiencing epistemic mistreatment can contribute to stress. In this way,
epistemic wrongs interact with the biological components of illness. Experiencing additional
stress and alienation caused by an arduous diagnostic journey is in direct contrast to the
medical goals of treatment and healing. When patients lose trust for physicians, they stop
seeking future opinions, following medical directives, and often turn to other interventions.
With fibromyalgia specifically, researchers found that experiencing “invalidation” predicted
symptom severity(Ghavidel-Parsa et al., 2014). Symptom severity is correlated with dis-
counting from work environments. Discounting from medical professionals and the work
environment was also correlated with worse measures of mental health and social function-
ing. This shows how experiences of invalidation directly impact the health and quality of
life for patients with fibromyalgia.
This psychology research matches closely with concerns from bioethicists and philosophers
about epistemic injustice. What the researchers measured as “discounting” matches with
the notion of testimonial injustice: the experience where a subject is viewed with lowered
credibility. The studies affirm that in some ways epistemic injustice is a significant clinical
factor in the progression of fibromyalgia. This means that not only can epistemic injustice
derail the process of diagnosis, but it can also impact the severity of the disease.
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5.1.2 Existing Theories of Epistemic Injustice
Fibromyalgia is an important case study for bioethicists. It represents a difficult epistemic
situation with unknown medical factors, chronic pain, and extensive experiences of inval-
idation. It presents a complicated example of epistemic mistreatment. Current literature
on epistemic injustice focuses on knowledge, but cannot fully make sense of this problem
because when inquiring about fibromyalgia it is likely that no one yet has knowledge. There
are flaws in the current theories of epistemic injustice that overlook this vulnerable popu-
lation, and I will improve on these previous analyses. Current theorizing is built around
knowledge, where epistemic injustice is sometimes defined as a denial of one’s capacity as
a knower(Fricker, 2007)(Kidd et al., 2017). However, fibromyalgia represents an area where
neither the patient or doctor may have much knowledge, or be able to communicate their
beliefs clearly. As such, existing accounts of epistemic injustice miss out on important ways
that fibromyalgia patients are victims of epistemic injustice.
Epistemic injustices can target many different social identities. This represents an essential
case to understand and make sense of, so it is a good way to build a framework making sense
of intersectional epistemic justice. An intersectional approach to epistemic justice focuses
on contextualized ways that various social identities interact when an epistemic subject is
(or is not) respected as such.
5.1.3 Improving on Previous Analysis
Dismissal of a patient’s knowledge and experience is a kind of epistemic injustice. Previous
work has shown how illness can be considered a social identity according to which patients
experience epistemic injustice(Kidd & Carel, 2017). Ill patients may experience a wide
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variety of epistemic injustices, not just dismissed testimony. They are more broadly wronged
as inquirers.
Miranda Fricker has detailed how individuals can be wronged as knowers when their testi-
mony is discounted due to prejudice(Fricker, 2007).71 Other authors have added different
types of epistemic injustice(Hookway, 2010). Individuals are vulnerable to these injustices
in light of marginalized social identities.
Another key form of injustice is when individuals are unable to make sense of their own
meaningful experiences (because they lack resources due to prejudice): a hermeneutical
injustice(Fricker, 2007). Often, what is proposed for situations of hermeneutical injustice is
to provide better avenues for individuals to come together and create their own epistemic
tools and meanings. This act of generation can then be used to fill a hermeneutical gap.
With regards to testimonial injustice, the key advice is usually to re-train individuals to
ignore their prejudices or to do a better job trusting marginalized individuals (give a boosted
credibility)(Fricker, 2007)(Marsh, 2011).
Existing analyses provide insufficient and sometimes clumsy solutions to a problem that
involves a variety of intersecting injustices. Individuals do not experience single types of
epistemic injustice at a time, but encounter overlapping and intersecting mechanisms of
epistemic oppression. Interventions that do not recognize this context risk failure, or exacer-
bating one vulnerability while trying to fix another. Instead, effective solutions will consider
the way that different types of epistemic vulnerabilities interact with one another, often in
ways that compound the risk to a specific patient. Otherwise, interventions designed to be
protective might end up making the patient no better-off.
71Fricker argues that this is a prototypical and paradigmatic case of epistemic injustice(Fricker, 2007).
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5.2 Epistemic Vulnerability
Patients with fibromyalgia are vulnerable to possible epistemic injustice for a number of
reasons. In addition to being ill, and so more easily dismissed as irrational, they live with
a difficult and still mysterious disease. In addition, most patients interact with the medical
system as members of other already marginalized groups. These risk factors contribute
to the all-too-common experience of being dismissed, which measurably worsens patient
outcomes. Epistemic mistreatment is in many ways a core component of this disease -
epistemic mistreatment is linked to both medically worse outcomes (more misdiagnoses)
and to worsening symptoms. In this section, I parse through the intersecting vulnerabilities
that can lead to epistemic mistreatment for patients. Addressing the problem of epistemic
oppression requires an accurate understanding of its impact.
Patients experience various infringements on their epistemic agency. Epistemic injustice is
constituted by layered and interacting mechanisms. To address this problem, it is critical to
understand how different types of epistemic injustice relate. Patients can be wronged in a
variety of ways as “inquirers”, suffering from a broad range of epistemic injustices.
5.2.1 Illness and Discrimination
When unfairly disbelieved, patients may rightly feel disrespected, dismissed, and mistreated.
This epistemic and moral wrong is usually seen as applying to individuals due to identity-
based prejudices(Fricker, 2007). Havi Carel and Ian Kidd have argued that “illness” is
a social identity that makes one vulnerable to testimonial injustice(Carel & Kidd, 2014).
People who are ill may be perceived through a stereotypical lens and seen as incapable
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in ways that undermine their credibility with others(Reiheld, 2017). The social identity of
being ill thus represents a central vulnerability for individuals with fibromyalgia. Individuals
who are ill are subject to various types of wrongs and harms when they are globally seen as
unreliable in light of their social status.
These epistemic harms can also restrict the victim’s agency, and so may be seen as an
instantiation of epistemic oppression.72 In these cases, the ill patient is wronged as an
epistemic subject and is a victim of epistemic injustice(Kidd et al., 2017). Patients who are
dismissed not only suffer physically (when their illness remains untreated), but they are also
morally and epistemically wronged.
The type of epistemic injustice experienced by those who are ill is better understood using
a framework of oppression because it more clearly highlights the significance of various
elements overlapping. Different forms of epistemic injustice intersect with one another,
are profoundly shaped by the social identity of the victim, and cannot be understood in
an abstract, idealized model. Addressing this multi-faceted type of epistemic oppression
requires considering the specific context of a patient in order to see the various forces that
impact his or her experience.
5.2.2 Varied Epistemic Vulnerabilities
There are a wide variety of possible epistemic injustices to which patients with fibromyal-
gia are potentially vulnerable. To address the problem of epistemic injustice (or epistemic
oppression), it is necessary to understand the nuances of how different forms of epistemic
injustice function, and the ways they co-occur. When individuals are subject to the forces of
72Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. argues that a restricted subjectivity is the primary wrong in testimonial
injustice(Pohlhaus Jr, 2014).
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epistemic oppression, they will experience interacting vulnerabilities to a variety of injustices.
Taking an intersectional approach begins with contextualizing the forces of oppression as they
are actually experiences by marginalized individuals; this necessarily includes untangling the
ways that subtypes of epistemic injustice are experienced in overlapping non-separable ways.
While this section is not comprehensive, it does review several significant forms of epistemic
injustice. This will be an improvement on previous analyses that either only emphasize
a single approach, or discuss a single epistemic injustice in isolation from other forms of
epistemic oppression.
Testimonial Injustice
Testimonial injustice occurs when a speaker receives a discounted credibility assessment from
their listener during testimony due to a social identity prejudice(Fricker, 2007). This is one
of the most easily recognizable types of epistemic injustice. For example, if fibromyalgia
patients are denied appropriate medication when in pain because they are disbelieved (in
light of their social identity as “ill”, their gender, or other prejudice), they are suffering from
a kind of testimonial injustice. When individuals are treated this way, a variety of elements
are present: the victim is wronged, the wider epistemic community suffers from the loss of
knowledge, and the victim or listener may suffer secondary harms as a result. This wrong
takes place during assertion.
A medical example of this is when individuals are denied or under-prescribed pain medication
in the ER. Patients say “I need pain medicine”, and we can see based on doctor responses
how much the statements are seen as credible. Research has shown that black men (and
women) receive less pain medication than white men(Hoffman, Trawalter, Axt, & Oliver,
2016)(Fassler, 2015)(Hoffmann & Tarzian, 2001). Doctors are unconsciously acting as though
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the testimony that “I am in pain” is less credible when it comes from a black man. In this
case, the testimonial injustice suffered by some black men results in them receiving less pain
treatment than they need. This wrong dismisses a speaker’s knowledge. In fibromyalgia, it
dismisses knowledge of one’s own body and physical experiences.73
Distributive Epistemic Injustice
Individuals suffer from distributive injustices when epistemic goods are unevenly distributed
due to discrimination against members of a socially marginalized group(Coady, 2010). In-
dividuals can be epistemically mistreated by having a systematic lack of access to critical
epistemic resources(Coady, 2010). If certain individuals are denied their fair share of knowl-
edge or are overly likely to be exposed to lies, these also constitute injustices of an epistemic
form. 74
Another example of this in the medical field is the way that education on health care top-
ics is unevenly distributed. Non-white patients have lower rates of health literacy; this lack of
knowledge makes them less able to successfully interact with the medical community(America’s
Health Literacy: Why We Need Accessible Health Information, 2003). Education is also a
predictor of general health outcomes. So in this way, pre-existing inequality is directly
linked to different medical outcomes. For example, financial resources dictate whether one
can acquire certain epistemic tools and goods (through education or social networking).
73There are similar worries about dismissing women’s knowledge during pregnancy(Freeman, 2014).
74Fricker has argued that we ought to distinguish between epistemic injustices that are primarily discrim-
inatory (such as testimonial injustice) and those that are distributive. However, both types do seem to
constitute wrongs to an agent “qua epistemic subject”(Kidd et al., 2017).
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Epistemic Marginalization (Hermeneutical Injustice)
Epistemic marginalization occurs when individuals are unfairly excluded from group pro-
cesses, such as having a limited ability to participate, guide activities, or influence decision-
making.75 Fibromyalgia patients are excluded from the process of diagnostic inquiry. In this
case, individuals are unfairly treated as “other” and have limited power to influence group
epistemic processes.
“Id have thought after a 5-ish year break, things would be different. Nope, same
ole “you crazy” responses. And youre right- at this point.. I dont care what you
want to call it- I just want relief.” - Maria76
This kind of mistreatment is an injustice when it restricts an agent’s subjectivity because
of their membership in a marginalized group.77 In the case of fibromyalgia, patients may be
mistreated because of their social status as “ill”, their gender, their race, or their disability
status.78 In the quote above, Maria describes being treated as “crazy” rather than considered
as a patient in need of treatment to get relief; the assessment of her pain marginalizes her
when she is not portrayed as an appropriate recipient of medical attention.
Being subject to marginalization can also bring about the secondary effect of hermeneutical
injustice, where an agent is unable to make sense of some important aspect of her own
experience(Fricker, 2007). Victims of hermeneutical injustice are faced with this gap or
75I argue for this interpretation in my article, “What’s unjust about Epistemic Injustice?”
76Not their real name. This quote taken from an online fibromyalgia discussion community(Too accu-
rate...make it stop!!: Diagnosing Chronic Illness (meme), 2019).
77Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. has written more on the way that restricted subjectivity is an epistemic
wrong(Pohlhaus Jr, 2014).
78Not all patients with fibromyalgia will consider themselves disabled, and the severity of the disease
varies greatly from individual to individual. Also, fibromyalgia often co-occurs with other conditions that
may cause disability.
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inability to make sense of their experience because they lack some sort of epistemic tool
(language or concepts or framework). Individuals who suffer a hermeneutical injustice often
do so because they have experienced epistemic marginalization.
“Every Physician I had seen always ended up telling me that there was nothing
physically wrong (go ahead, read between those lines!). Thankfully, I found some
relief with a Chinese herbalist who used herbs and essential oils which helped me
to at least function daily; however, I never felt truly “well” and found myself
afraid to try anything but the safest formulas even under trained direction. I
had become afraid of making things worse and had no clear idea what was truly
wrong” - Dianne79
Dianne describes lacking medical resources and frameworks to make sense of her symptoms
after feeling excluded from considerations by doctors. The result in her case is a desire for
inaction, because she lacks a schema through which to assess possible treatments.
Another example of marginalization in the medical field is the way that there is a scarcity
of doctors of color(Why Are There So Few Black Women Doctors? , 2017). When most of
those with power in the medical establishment are white, then communities of color have
little ability to involve themselves directly with decision-making in the medical field.
This marginalization can lead patients to feel as though they are not welcome in the medical
community. Sometimes patients find other communities to replace the established medical
one, turning to online support. At times, however, this can also make them vulnerable to
predatory social influences, and they may become a target for schemes and disingenuous
79Taken from an online fibromyalgia discussion community(Fibromyalgia: Real Patient Testimonials,
2008).
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medical hoaxes. Avoiding these sorts of unhelpful solutions can be a further taxation on
vulnerable patients; as one person put it:
“I’m honestly tired of all that mumbo jumbo magic healing crap, I’ve unfollowed
several pages on Facebook for posting homeopathic, unfounded bullshit as cures
for fibro pain. I live in reality, sorry.” - Angela*80
Epistemic Mis-recognition
Victims of epistemic injustice can at times be dismissed entirely as having the standing to
speak up. (This is sometimes, but not always, a component of testimonial injustice). For
example, individuals have their epistemic standing disrespected when they are not treated
as a participant or a relevant contributing member in a social group. One patient says a
common reaction is: “More like theres nothing wrong with you just stop pretending and go
back to work crybaby”81 In these cases of mis-recognition, patients are not seen as possessing
the proper standing to be taken seriously as inquirers. People ought to have their epistemic
standing recognized.
A medical example of this could be how some patients are treated in a patronizing way,
such as having their questions ignored. Over time, this misrecognition shapes not only how
others view the victims, but also how they view themselves.82 This directly relates to the
next category.
80Not their actual name, an anonymous user in an online fibromyalgia discussion forum(The healing crystals
we actually need: (picture of crystals with googly eyes), 2019).
81Taken from an online discussion community(Too accurate...make it stop!!: Diagnosing Chronic Illness
(meme), 2019).
82See Kristie Dotson’s work on self-silencing(Dotson, 2011).
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Testimonial Smothering and Gaslighting
Individuals are victims of gaslighting when they are intentionally manipulated in ways that
cause them to doubt their own rational and epistemic capacities(Abramson, 2014). Testi-
monial smothering is a related phenomenon, where individuals intentionally restrict their
assertions because they predict that they will not be taken seriously(Dotson, 2011). In
both cases, individuals lose the ability to fully participate in epistemic exchanges through
the intentional or unintentional manipulation of others. When these worries are conscious,
patients may doubt their own beliefs or motivations.
“...My friend has been reckoning in a sustained way about her own fears about
coming across as melodramatic.”(Fassler, 2015)
In either case, a hostile epistemic environment leads (over time) to an agent who is less likely
to testify, or unable to testify regarding her own knowledge. This not only makes inquiry
more difficult but can also cause lasting damage to the victim’s sense of expertise and self.
“I tried that. I got really depressed and started believing the Dr rhetoric about
it all being in my head and not real. I started thinking I was crazy and started
with a psychiatrist and doing therapy. Spoiler alert Still just as sick as I was
before, only now I dont care if the pain is in my body or my brain. It hurts just
the same. ” - Angela*83
This epistemic wrong can leave long-lasting scars. For some patients, receiving a diagnosis
is transformative because it affirms that they are sick, and that they are reliably reporting
83Not their actual name, taken from an online fibromyalgia community(Too accurate...make it stop!!:
Diagnosing Chronic Illness (meme), 2019).
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their symptoms. In other cases, individuals may continue to self-smother around medical
professionals or anyone who may misunderstand their illness.
5.3 Intersectional Epistemic Justice
Preventing epistemic mistreatment, and seeking epistemic justice, is a question of how to re-
duce the negative impact of prejudice within our interpersonal interactions and our epistemic
communities. To do this, it is critical to acknowledge that individuals at risk of experiencing
epistemic injustices may already be at a material or psychological disadvantage relative to
members of privileged groups in society.
We can have a coherent framework for thinking about this problem and wrapping our heads
around this complexity by understanding it through the lens of intersectional feminism.
Calling for a focus on intersectional epistemic justice means looking more closely at the way
that different social identities impact how individuals are subject to epistemic injustice. Dif-
ferent categories of epistemic mistreatment can overlap and influence one another, providing
different contexts for different experiences of epistemic oppression.
5.3.1 Intersectional Feminism
Addressing oppression means seeing how it works. Fibromyalgia patients are experiencing
forces of epistemic oppression: overlapping instances of epistemic injustice that function
to undermine their effectiveness as epistemic subjects. Drawing on a model of epistemic
oppression, feminist insights on oppression can help to illuminate this problem in a new way.
119
Intersectional feminism maintains the commitment that the goals of feminism can only be
met by recognizing other forces of oppression. Oppressions such as racism and classism
intersect with the oppression experienced by women. Historically, this insight emerged out of
criticism that the feminist movement was overly focused on white middle-class women, rather
than seeking liberation for all women. Addressing feminist oppression requires understanding
the ways that other marginalized identities shape one’s experiences, and how different types
of oppression intersect. Liberation requires recognizing that combating any single type of
oppression is tied up with combating all forms of oppression(Crenshaw, 1990)(Mohanty,
1984)(Ortega, 2006).
Taking such an intersectional approach involves commitments to crucial observations about
the nature of oppression. I emphasize three key insights connected with an intersectional
approach.
First, intersectional approaches acknowledge that oppressions are interrelated and inter-
secting: it is not possible to address one form without considering the others. Bell hooks
says: “ We must understand that patriarchal domination shares an ideological foundation
with racism and other forms of group oppression, and that there is no hope that it can be
eradicated while these systems remain intact”(Hooks, 1989, p.22). Seeking freedom from
oppression requires acknowledging and addressing the ways that various forms of oppression
overlap in the lives of those who are marginalized.
Second, any given type of oppression functions differently when acting upon individuals with
different social identities. For example, women experience gendered oppression differently
depending on their race. The shifting ways in which oppression functions are not merely
additive: the experiences of black women cannot be understood by simply combining the
experiences of white women and black men. In an early feminist speech, Sojourner Truth
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argues: “Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best
place! And ain’t I a woman?”84 Societal restrictions on femininity will function differently
as a consequence of race. Thus, different individuals will be vulnerable to different forms
of oppression depending on their social identities. Addressing oppression requires acknowl-
edging that different individuals will experience the same forces of oppression manifested in
different ways.
These insights lead feminist philosophers to a third commitment: to resist overly idealized
theorizing about agents. Instead, individuals must be understood within the context of their
unique situation and their community(Grasswick, 2004). Theoretical work is grounded in
the overall goal of improving marginalized lives, what Sally Haslanger calls an ameliora-
tive approach(Haslanger, 2005). Intersectional feminism is grounded in action and activism.
Accurate intersectional theorizing must be grounded in real experiences, rather than abstrac-
tions about hypothetical women. Failure to consider the ways that women have a plurality
of experiences, and importantly different social contexts, “robs them of their historical and
political agency”(Mohanty, Russo, & Torres, 1991, p.72).
5.3.2 Intersectional Commitments in the Epistemic Domain
These three key features I have highlighted from intersectional feminism can be applied
within the epistemic domain, looking at how individuals are vulnerable to oppression as
epistemic subjects. In order to seek justice, we need a notion that can recognize how in-
justice is constituted by interacting and intersecting vulnerabilities, in a way that is highly
context-dependent. Recognizing these feature of epistemic injustice will promote effective
84There are historical disputes about the exact nature of the speech, due to conflicting records; this quote
is from the Gage version(Compare the Speeches, n.d.).
121
interventions: oppressions are interlinked, oppression functions relative to social identity,
and theorizing must be non-idealized.
First, feminist work recognizes that oppressions are interlinked. The different subtypes of
epistemic injustice influence one another, and addressing one requires considering all of them.
These epistemic risk factors interact with one another and compound in significant ways.
One of the most significant insights of intersectional feminism is that oppressions cannot be
considered in isolation, or in summative ways; Black women are oppressed in ways that differ
from the ways that white women and black men are oppressed(McAfee, 2018)(Crenshaw,
1990). In the case of fibromyalgia, individuals suffer from oppression due to illness status,
in addition to gender and race. Understanding and preventing epistemic mistreatment for
these patients requires looking at the factors together, rather than separately.
Second, oppressions function differently in relation to different individual’s social identity.
One’s context in society influences the mechanisms by which one is oppressed. Women in
western countries and women in eastern countries may both experience gendered oppression,
but their cultural contexts will shape their experiences. For fibromyalgia patients, the epis-
temic oppression they experience will be shaped by the countries and cultures they inhabit;
assumptions about health care and illness will shape the ways in which they are vulnerable
to mistreatment.
Third, feminist philosophy emphasizes the importance of theorizing that is grounded in ac-
tual lived experiences, rather than abstraction. Too much of historical epistemology has been
characterized by atomistic notions of agency that bear little resemblance to actual epistemic
subjects(Grasswick, 2016). It is important to recognize the ways in which individuals rely
upon one another within epistemic contexts(Grasswick, 2004). In the case of fibromyalgia,
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it is vital that philosophical theorizing remains grounded in the actual experiences of in-
dividuals. In this paper, I have drawn upon the first-hand testimony of individuals with
fibromyalgia to illustrate various experiences with epistemic injustice.
Failing to consider these features, and relying upon non-intersectional frameworks, risks mis-
understanding patient’s experiences of epistemic oppression. Non-intersectional frameworks
will overlook key features of the wrong and will fail to represent fully or to address the
complex epistemic problem at hand. As a result, victims will continue to be misunderstood,
and interventions are less likely to succeed.
Interlinked Oppressions and Interactions
Problems may arise when interventions target only one mechanism of epistemic oppression,
neglecting others. For example: why not just provide a “credibility boost”, or emphasize
the importance that doctors believe more fully when it comes to the testimony of some
vulnerable patients? If doctors can boost their credibility perceptions of women and people
of color, this will serve to protect against future instances of testimonial injustice. However,
this intervention does not address other forms of epistemic injustice, and so may fail to
provide relief to individuals struggling with stressful experiences of dismissal. Additionally,
consciously or intentionally inflating the credibility given to women or minority patients pulls
against a different sort of goal: that of inclusion. Treating women as subjects who need their
credibility to be artificially boosted, still sets them up as “other”, a separate group. It also
risks reinforcing sexist stereotypes that infantilize women and view them as hysterical.
Marginalized individuals are not treated as participants or cooperators in a social context.
If doctors automatically inflate their credence in the words of all minority patients, they are
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not treating them as an inquirer with whom one can cooperate. In a medical setting, coop-
erating with a goal of diagnosis also includes questioning one’s reasons, gathering evidence,
and considering and criticizing different potential explanations. If doctors are encouraged to
automatically believe patients in an attempt to boost credibility, this will further encourage
doctors to view patients as non-participants: this approach risks becoming strongly pater-
nalistic. In the case of fibromyalgia, it could lead to highly patronizing interactions, where
doctors view patients as sincere, and take them at their word on their experiences, but also
view them as radically disconnected from the medical reality and the process of choosing a
treatment. This happens when doctors view women with fibromyalgia as complainers, and
diagnose them with mental illnesses rather than addressing their chronic pain.
It may be helpful to provide space for vulnerable individuals to talk with one another in order
to generate new epistemic resources, filling in conceptual gaps in order to address issues of
hermeneutical injustice. While this is an effective way to address hermeneutical injustice,
it will not be effective without attending to other issues of epistemic mistreatment. For
example, if people are also subject to testimonial injustice, then new conceptual resources
will be unlikely to gain update, even if they are created.85 Individuals will still be at a
significant disadvantage if mainstream portions of the population do not have the ability or
willingness to use the critical epistemic tools. If patients are marginalized, then any new
conceptual resources will not be efficacious in changing popular understanding or decision-
making priorities within a group.
In trying to fix instances of testimonial injustice, it is important to look at whether agents
are often perceived as intelligible by those around them. Individuals who suffer from a large
number of hermeneutical gaps may over time appear to be ill-informed about their own
85This is another problem, one of willful hermeneutical ignorance(Pohlhaus Jr, 2012).
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experiences. This might contribute to prejudicial stereotypes driving instances of testimonial
injustice and can also lead to increased epistemic marginalization. Such marginalization can
deny patients the tools and spaces needed in order to make sense of their experiences.
Effective interventions need to understand the mechanisms of intersecting epistemic vulner-
abilities to avoid worsening one type of wrong while addressing another. Considering the
limitations and consequences of some interventions is an important first step.
Epistemic Oppression and Social Identity
The notion of epistemic injustice is necessarily tied to aspects of social identity. Epistemic
injustices, like the ones described above, are characterized by prejudice, and victims are
vulnerable in light of their social identities. As such, people experience epistemic injustice
differently due to their different constellation of social identities. Experiences of epistemic
injustice are multifaceted and interact with other wrongs. Individuals with marginalized
identities will be vulnerable to other forms of non-epistemic oppression that may impact
how they experience epistemic injustice.
Group status can be a pre-existing risk factor for patients with fibromyalgia. Understand-
ing how fibromyalgia patients are at risk for epistemic injustice first has to recognize that
patients do not exist outside of a community and context(Grasswick, 2004). Individuals
come to the doctor with pre-existing risk factors for experiencing epistemic mistreatment.
Additionally, individuals who belong to oppressed groups (and so are already at a higher
risk for testimonial injustice outside the medical sphere) are more likely to be diagnosed
with or struggle with, chronic pain(Anson, 2018). So: patients with fibromyalgia are often
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already facing an increased risk of epistemic mistreatment outside of the medical setting.
This compounds on top of the already existing risk of being dismissed by doctors 86
Additionally, individuals with chronic diseases or ones that are difficult to understand are
at risk of being marginalized by the medical community. It is difficult to understand the
variation and unpredictability of symptoms in chronic diseases, especially when so little is
known about them.
The impact of fibromyalgia falls disproportionately on members of society who are already
marginalized or oppressed. The first is the social categorization of the mentally ill. Patients
with fibromyalgia are three times more likely to have major depression than adults without
fibromyalgia. This is also a gendered issue: women are twice as likely to get fibromyalgia
as men(Fibromyalgia, 2019). While the links between these different identities are not yet
understood, it is important to see how most patients with fibromyalgia experience the illness
through the lens of multiple marginalized social identities. Non-white patients may struggle
to get the care that they need: “African Americans with chronic pain report lower quality
pain management, more disabling pain severity, and lower quality of life because of pain,
than whites”(Pain in America, n.d.).
These disadvantages are relevant for understanding and treating fibromyalgia, as well as
addressing the problem of epistemic injustice. Many proposed interventions require patients
to do significant epistemic and emotional work, despite their vulnerabilities; forcing patients
to do all the work risks emotional fatigue and epistemic exploitation. Some interventions may
also fail to consider other ways in which patients are marginalized, for example, interventions
that are financially costly or presume health insurance status. Finally, interventions need to
consider the psychological damage that may have already occurred: patients will struggle to
86We see similar patterns in chronic fatigue syndrome, a closely related disease.
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advocate for themselves if they have already been exposed to epistemic mistreatment that
causes them to self-smother and doubt their own experiences.
Differing Mechanisms of Testimonial Injustice Testimonial injustice also functions
differently in different subpopulations of individuals. People might be discredited and viewed
as not credible for a number of reasons. Individuals might seem unreliable, or insincere.
However, the mechanism by which their credibility is doubt will depend in part on existing
prejudiced stereotypes within a society. For example, a black man in pain might be more
likely to be judged as drug seeking, or insincere(Mossey, 2011). In this case, he may be
denied any pain medication. In contrast, a woman might be judged as hysterical: so not
insincere, but unreliable. Women are then more likely to be prescribed a sedative, rather
than pain medication(Calderone, 1990). Both patients face discounted credibility, but it is
expressed in different ways and through different mechanisms.
This difference is significant because some interventions on testimonial injustice will function
differently in the two cases. Imagine that doctors are taught to respect patients as a source
of cooperation within the diagnostic process (an intervention to reduce epistemic marginal-
ization). This would encourage them to see the patients as sincerely trying to seek the same
outcome as the doctors. This could help them to not assume insincerity in black men, and
so to prescribe more pain medication. However, it might have no effect on the doctor’s
interactions with women, if they already see them as sincere. Instead, they might shift to a
patronizing mode (we are working together; it is just that you are not very capable). Taking
this approach would result in women still being subject to epistemic mistreatment. This




A critical element in non-ideal theorizing is recognizing that people may come into the
medical system with existing harms done to them. They may already feel excluded and
dismissed. Simply seeking not to wrong them further, may not be sufficient to promote
genuine interactions, or epistemic justice.
Positive Feedback Loops Different types of epistemic mistreatment reinforce one an-
other. An experience of one type of epistemic injustice may trigger a positive feedback
loop: where each injustice makes another injustice increasingly likely. Individuals who suffer
from repeated instances of testimonial injustice may start to suffer from troubling secondary
effects. They may start to doubt themselves, and the reality of what they know. This
can undermine their confidence. They may choose to restrict their own testimony, self-
smothering(Dotson, 2011).
These experiences have an impact on the problem of hermeneutical injustice: individuals
who lack confidence in their own perceptions or choose not to speak, will have a much more
difficult time generating new epistemic resources to fill a hermeneutical gap. This makes
ongoing experiences of epistemic injustice increasingly difficult for an agent to address. So
when looking at fixing the problem of a hermeneutical gap, it is important to understand
whether patients are vulnerable to testimonial injustice.
In cases like this, it is not enough to seek to prevent epistemic mistreatment. Medical
intervention is about healing, and ideally, that means taking actions that are restorative in
light of past mistreatment. It may not be enough to place the burden on women to argue
with doctors about their pain and self-advocate, when many may be tempted to self-silence
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after extensive experience with epistemic dismissal. Less has been written on this topic, but
individuals who have suffered from epistemic mistreatment in a medical context need access
to restorative justice, and ways to rebuild a healthy notion of self and relationship with their
doctor or medical community.
This is as important as preventing future epistemic injustice.
5.3.3 Seeking Solutions
It is important when talking about solutions to epistemic injustice to move beyond the
merely theoretical into applied cases. Frequently, discussions of epistemic injustice in the
philosophy literature take place by looking at extremely detailed fictional cases. However,
there are also important truths to be gleaned from studying the mechanisms of epistemic
injustice in real-world contexts. In order to combat epistemic injustice in the actual world,
it is important to consider specific applied cases, not just philosophical ones.
For this topic, I am avoiding overly idealized theorizing by starting from the real experiences
of patients with fibromyalgia. Interventions need to be temporally grounded and to recognize
the historical context in which they are situated (including other experiences of oppression).
“There’s a stigma about fibromyalgia. People are afraid it’s all in their heads.
But it’s not.” Valerie87
Individuals who need to be protected from epistemic mistreatment may already have in-
ternalized harms as a result of past mistreatment. Intersectional epistemic justice requires
acknowledging this harm, and working towards a goal of restoration not merely prevention
87Taken from an online community(Real Fibromyalgia Patient Stories and Tips, 2016).
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of future wrongs. Intersectional interventions will be more successful than interventions that
exclusively focus on a single mechanism of epistemic injustice.
For patients with fibromyalgia, addressing epistemic injustice must take a multi-pronged
approach. To combat epistemic marginalization, patients need inclusion in the medical
system. This might look like providing spaces (physical or conceptual) where patients can
participate in defining and problem-solving their own experiences of illness. This will also
make progress towards solving problems of hermeneutical injustice. Patients need access to
conceptual tools that can help them construct a meaningful framework to make sense of
their experiences.
These interventions will mean little unless they are also accompanied by better education
for doctors, and trust building, so that patients can have confidence that their words and
testimony will be treated as sources of knowledge. Interventions might also need to involve
systemic assurances: that if epistemic injustice occurs, patients have ways to seek restitution
and healing.
Taking an intersectional approach allows us to find better solutions to reach and support
patients. Taking an intersectional approach means recognizing the various and intersecting
wrongs that impact patients, and approaching these wrongs in an informed way.
First, we can do a better job of recognizing the epistemic situation of patients. In many
cases, patients are already marginalized. They may already be self-silencing and recoiling
from experiences of injustice. Seeing their actual epistemic context means realizing when
patients may be facing a great deal of stress in their lives if they are not taken seriously,
or why patterns of shyness or aggression may be adaptive responses to a hostile epistemic
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environment. It may take flexibility, empathy, humor, and patience to engage with patients
who may have good reasons to be epistemically defensive.
Good interventions will recognize when there are hermeneutical problems in the background.
It will not work to try and change credibility perceptions if there are larger problems with
communication between doctors and patients. Everyone may need to become more comfort-
able with varied methods of communication. Patients may need a wider variety of tools in
order to make sense of their experiences and to communicate them clearly to medical staff.
Epistemic progress will require everyone in a community to be willing to cultivate a wider
variety of epistemic skills and tools.
5.4 Conclusion
There are some interesting implications for epistemologists out of this case study. Philoso-
phers writing on epistemic injustice have separated a variety of subtypes of epistemic injus-
tice, although writers disagree about their relationship. For actual victims, these types of
epistemic injustice are experienced in overlapping and interacting ways.
The highly contextualized nature of epistemic injustice means that effectively addressing any
one form of injustice requires considerations of the others. Previous insights from feminism
have shown that we cannot understand gendered oppression in a vacuum, or in purely ab-
stract terms. The same insights apply to epistemic oppression. Other forms of oppression
dictate how people experience epistemic oppression. Broad approaches may not work; we
need a contextualized understanding of how epistemic oppression functions based on social
identity and historical context.
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Solving the problem of epistemic injustice requires looking deeper than mere credibility
adjustments: people experience epistemic injustice in a variety of ways. I have shown this
by more closely examining the epistemic situations of patients with fibromyalgia. Protecting
patients from epistemic injustice requires thinking about the context of each patient and
considering how different forms of epistemic injustice interact. Taking this intersectional
approach facilitates seeking justice on many fronts at once. Intersectional epistemic justice
requires communities of inquirers who can take feedback from one another to break cycles of
compounding harm. It means giving room for patients to recover, and to grow, as inquirers.
132
References
Abramson, K. (2014). Turning up the lights on gaslighting. Philosophical Perspectives ,
28 (1), 1–30.
America’s health literacy: Why we need accessible health information. (2003). Retrieved
from https://health.gov/communication/literacy/issuebrief/#health
Anderson, E. (2012). Epistemic justice as a virtue of social institutions. Social epistemology ,
26 (2), 163–173.
Anson, P. (2018, September). Cdc: 50 million americans have chronic pain. Retrieved
from https://www.painnewsnetwork.org/stories/2018/9/13/cdc-50-million-americans
-have-chronic-pain
Anxiety and physical illness. (2018, May). Retrieved from https://www.health.harvard.edu/
staying-healthy/anxiety and physical illness
Arao, B., & Clemens, K. (2013). From safe spaces to brave spaces. The art of effective
facilitation: Reflections from social justice educators , 135–150.
Atwood, M. (1986). The handmaid’s tale (Vol. 301). Everyman’s Library Classics.
Baddorf, M. (2018). A theory of collective virtue. Social Ontology Conference Presentation.
Battaly, H. (2014). Varieties of epistemic vice. The ethics of belief , 51–76.
Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Ciarocco, N. J., & Twenge, J. M. (2005). Social exclusion
impairs self-regulation. Journal of personality and social psychology , 88 (4), 589.
Beggs, D. (2003). The idea of group moral virtue. Journal of Social Philosophy , 34 (3),
457–474.
Bernstein, J. (2016). Not the last word: fibromyalgia is real. Clinical Orthopaedics and
Related Research®, 474 (2), 304–309.
Brescoll, V. L., & Uhlmann, E. L. (2008). Can an angry woman get ahead? status conferral,
gender, and expression of emotion in the workplace. Psychological science, 19 (3),
268–275.
Briones-Vozmediano, E., O¨hman, A., Goicolea, I., & Vives-Cases, C. (2018). the complain-
ing women: health professionals perceptions on patients with fibromyalgia in spain.
Disability and rehabilitation, 40 (14), 1679–1685.
Buelow, M. T., Okdie, B. M., Brunell, A. B., & Trost, Z. (2015). Stuck in a moment and you
cannot get out of it: The lingering effects of ostracism on cognition and satisfaction of
basic needs. Personality and Individual Differences , 76 , 39–43.
133
Burtt, S. (2007). Is inclusion a civic virtue?: Cosmopolitanism, disability, and the liberal
state. Social Theory and Practice, 33 (4), 557–578.
Calderone, K. L. (1990). The influence of gender on the frequency of pain and sedative
medication administered to postoperative patients. Sex Roles , 23 (11-12), 713–725.
Campisi, B., Jessica; Griggs. (2018, September). Of the 113 supreme court justices in us
history, all but 6 have been white men. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/
07/09/politics/supreme-court-justice-minorities-trnd/index.html
Card, C. (1991). Rape as a terrorist institution. In Violence, terrorism, and justice (pp.
296–319). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2014). Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophial analysis.
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy , 17 (4), 529–540.
Chemaly, S. (2015, February). All teachers should be trained to overcome their hidden biases.
Retrieved from http://time.com/3705454/teachers-biases-girls-education/
Chen, E. H., Shofer, F. S., Dean, A. J., Hollander, J. E., Baxt, W. G., Robey, J. L., . . .
Mills, A. M. (2008). Gender disparity in analgesic treatment of emergency department
patients with acute abdominal pain. Academic Emergency Medicine, 15 (5), 414–418.
Chernyak, N., & Zayas, V. (2010). Being excluded by one means being excluded by all:
Perceiving exclusion from inclusive others during one-person social exclusion. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology , 46 (3), 582–585.
Coady, D. (2010). Two concepts of epistemic injustice. Episteme, 7 (02), 101–113.
Coady, D. (2017). Epistemic injustice as distributive injustice. In The routledge handbook
of epistemic injustice (p. 61-68). Taylor & Francis.
Compare the speeches. (n.d., 2019). Retrieved from https://www.thesojournertruthproject
.com/
Congdon, M. (2017). What’s wrong with epistemic injustice? harm, vice, objectification,
misrecognition. In The routledge handbook of epistemic injustice (p. 243-253). Taylor
& Francis.
Cooper, A. J. (1988). A voice from the south. Oxford University Press.
Craig, E. (1990). Knowledge and the state of nature: An essay in conceptual synthesis.
Crenshaw, K. (1990). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence
against women of color. Stan. L. Rev., 43 , 1241.
Critcher, C. R., & Zayas, V. (2014). The involuntary excluder effect: Those included by an
excluder are seen as exclusive themselves. Journal of personality and social psychology ,
134
107 (3), 454.
Cudd, A. E. (2006). Analyzing oppression. Oxford University Press.
A current glance at women in the law. (2018, January). Retrieved from
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/a-current
-glance-at-women-in-the-law-jan-2018.pdf
Darwall, S. L. (1977). Two kinds of respect. Ethics , 88 (1), 36–49.
Davis, E. (2016). Typecasts, tokens, and spokespersons: A case for credibility excess as
testimonial injustice. Hypatia, 31 (3), 485–501.
Deutsch, M. (2006). A framework for thinking about oppression and its change. Social
Justice Research, 19 (1), 7–41.
Diagnosis. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.fmcpaware.org/diagnosis.html
Di Franco1, M., Iannuccelli1, C., Bazzichi, L., Atzeni, F., Consensi, A., Salaffi, F., . . . others
(2011). Misdiagnosis in fibromyalgia: a multicentre study. Clin Exp Rheumatol , 29 (69),
S104–S108.
Domonoske, C. (2018, May). Boy scouts changing name to ‘scouts bsa’ as girls welcomed
into program. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/02/
607678097/boy-scouts-changing-name-to-scouts-bsa-as-girls-welcomed-into-program
Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing. Hypatia,
26 (2), 236–257.
Dotson, K. (2012). A cautionary tale: On limiting epistemic oppression. Frontiers: A
Journal of Women Studies , 33 (1), 24–47.
Dotson, K. (2014). Conceptualizing epistemic oppression. Social Epistemology , 28 (2), 115–
138.
Dusenbery, M. (2018, August). The surprising reason we lack so much knowledge about
women’s health. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/08/24/the
-surprising-reason-we-lack-so-much-knowledge-about-womens-health/#3dd1fd04298f
Fassler, J. (2015, October). How doctors take women’s pain less seriously. Re-
trieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/emergency-room
-wait-times-sexism/410515/
Fibromyalgia. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/arthritis/basics/fibromyalgia
.htm
Fibromyalgia: Real patient testimonials. (2008). Retrieved from http://www
.healthcommunities.com/fibromyalgia/patient-testimonials.shtml
135
Forst, R. (2007). Radical justice: On iris marion young’s critique of the “distributive
paradigm”. Constellations , 14 (2), 260–265.
Fraser, N. (1995). Recognition or redistribution? a critical reading of iris young’s justice
and the politics of difference. Journal of Political Philosophy , 3 (2), 166–180.
Freeman, L. (2014). Confronting diminished epistemic privilege and epistemic injustice in
pregnancy by challenging a panoptics of the womb. In The journal of medicine and
philosophy: A forum for bioethics and philosophy of medicine (Vol. 40, pp. 44–68).
Fricker, M. (2003). Epistemic justice and a role for virtue in the politics of knowing.
Metaphilosophy , 34 (1-2), 154–173.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University
Press.
Fricker, M. (2010). Replies to alcoff, goldberg, and hookway on epistemic injustice. Episteme,
7 (02), 164–178.
Fricker, M. (2013). Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom? Synthese, 190 (7),
1317–1332.
Fricker, M. (2017). Evolving concepts of epistemic injustice. In The routledge handbook of
epistemic injustice (p. 53-60). Taylor & Francis.
Frye, M. (2000). Oppression. In A. Minas (Ed.), Gender basics: Feminist perspectives on
women and men (2nd ed., p. 10-16). Wadsworth.
Gendered conference campaign. (2019). Retrieved from https://feministphilosophers
.wordpress.com/gendered-conference-campaign/
Ghavidel-Parsa, B., Amir Maafi, A., Aarabi, Y., Haghdoost, A., Khojamli, M., Montazeri,
A., . . . Bidari, A. (2014). Correlation of invalidation with symptom severity and health
status in fibromyalgia. Rheumatology , 54 (3), 482–486.
Gonsalkorale, K., & Williams, K. D. (2007). The kkk won’t let me play: Ostracism even by
a despised outgroup hurts. European Journal of Social Psychology , 37 (6), 1176–1186.
Grasswick, H. (2004). Individuals-in-communities: The search for a feminist model of
epistemic subjects. Hypatia, 19 (3), 85–120.
Grasswick, H. (2016). Feminist social epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
Hancock, A. B., & Rubin, B. A. (2015). Influence of communication partners gender on
language. Journal of Language and Social Psychology , 34 (1), 46–64.
136
Haslanger, S. (2005). What are we talking about? the semantics and politics of social kinds.
Hypatia, 20 (4), 10–26.
Haslanger, S., Tuana, N., & O’Connor, P. (2017). Topics in feminism. In The stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy (chap. Topics in Feminsm).
The healing crystals we actually need: (picture of crystals with googly eyes). (2019). Retrieved
from https://www.reddit.com/r/Fibromyalgia/comments/at9yvf/the healing crystals
we actually need/
Health, E. (2018, May). Do clinical trials have a sex problem? Re-
trieved from https://endpoints.elysiumhealth.com/why-women-are-underrepresented
-in-clinical-trials-398c9e0735a
Highsmith, P. (1955). The talented mr. ripley. Coward-McCann.
Hoffman, K. M., Trawalter, S., Axt, J. R., & Oliver, M. N. (2016). Racial bias in pain
assessment and treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological differ-
ences between blacks and whites. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ,
113 (16), 4296–4301.
Hoffmann, D. E., & Tarzian, A. J. (2001). The girl who cried pain: a bias against women in
the treatment of pain. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , 28 (4 suppl), 13–27.
Hogg, M. A., & Reid, S. A. (2006). Social identity, self-categorization, and the communica-
tion of group norms. Communication theory , 16 (1), 7–30.
Hooks, B. (1989). Talking back: Thinking feminist, thinking black. South End Press.
Hookway, C. (2010). Some varieties of epistemic injustice: Reflections on fricker. Episteme,
7 (02), 151–163.
How stress affects your health. (2013). Retrieved from https://www.apa.org/helpcenter/
stress
Jackman, M. (2018, July). U.s. court: Detroit students have no right to access to literacy.
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/GZLjhN
Jones, E. E., Carter-Sowell, A. R., Kelly, J. R., & Williams, K. D. (2009). I’m out of
the loop’: Ostracism through information exclusion. Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations , 12 (2), 157–174.
Karpowitz, C. F., Mendelberg, T., & Shaker, L. (2012). Gender inequality in deliberative
participation. American Political Science Review , 106 (3), 533–547.
Kelp, C. (2011). What’s the point of “knowledge” anyway? Episteme, 8 (1), 53–66.
137
Kidd, I. J., & Carel, H. (2017). Epistemic injustice and illness. Journal of applied philosophy ,
34 (2), 172–190.
Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., & Pohlhaus, G. (2017). The routledge handbook of epistemic injustice.
Routledge.
Kiesel, L. (2017, April). Chronic pain: The “invisible” disability. Retrieved from https://
www.health.harvard.edu/blog/chronic-pain-the-invisible-disability-2017042811360
Kool, M. B., van Middendorp, H., Boeije, H. R., & Geenen, R. (2009). Understanding the lack
of understanding: invalidation from the perspective of the patient with fibromyalgia.
Arthritis Care & Research, 61 (12), 1650–1656.
Kwong, J. (2015). Epistemic injustice and open-mindedness. Hypatia, 30 (2), 337–351.
Lee, H. (1960). To kill a mockingbird. Grand Central Publishing.
Lepore, J. (2014). Book of ages: The life and opinions of jane franklin. Vintage.
Lorde, A. (1984). Sister outsider: Essays and speeches (trumansburg, ny. The Crossing
Press , 44 , 111.
Luciano, J. V., Forero, C. G., Cerda`-Lafont, M., Pen˜arrubia-Mar´ıa, M. T., Ferna´ndez-Vergel,
R., Cuesta-Vargas, A. I., . . . others (2016). Functional status, quality of life, and costs
associated with fibromyalgia subgroups. The Clinical journal of pain, 32 (10), 829–840.
Manne, K. (2017). Down girl: The logic of misogyny. Oxford University Press.
Marsh, G. (2011). Trust, testimony, and prejudice in the credibility economy. Hypatia,
26 (2), 280–293.
McAfee, N. (2018). Feminist philosophy. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of
philosophy (Fall 2018 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/feminist-philosophy/.
McKinnon, R. (2016). Epistemic injustice. Philosophy Compass , 11 (8), 437–446.
Medina, J. (2011). The relevance of credibility excess in a proportional view of epistemic in-
justice: Differential epistemic authority and the social imaginary. Social Epistemology ,
25 (1), 15–35.
Medina, J. (2013). The epistemology of resistance: Gender and racial oppression, epistemic
injustice, and the social imagination. Oxford University Press.
Miller, B. (2017). The handmaid’s tale (tv series). Premeired on Hulu.
Minghella, A., Damon, M., Paltrow, G., Law, J., Blanchett, C., Hoffman, P. S., . . . High-
smith, P. (1999). The talented mr. ripley. Paramount Pictures.
138
Mohanty, C. T. (1984). Under western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses.
Boundary 2 , 333–358.
Mohanty, C. T., Russo, A., & Torres, L. (1991). Third world women and the politics of
feminism (Vol. 632). Indiana University Press.
Monypenny, A. (2018). What is safe about ‘safe spaces’? Conference Poster.
Mossey, J. M. (2011). Defining racial and ethnic disparities in pain management. Clinical
Orthopaedics and Related Research®, 469 (7), 1859–1870.
Natelson, B. H. (2019). Myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyal-
gia: Definitions, similarities, and differences. Clinical therapeutics .
National fibromyalgia association. (2018). Website. Retrieved from http://www.fmaware
.org/
Nishii, L. H. (2013). The benefits of climate for inclusion for gender-diverse groups. Academy
of Management Journal , 56 (6), 1754–1774.
Ortega, M. (2006). Being lovingly, knowingly ignorant: White feminism and women of color.
Hypatia, 21 (3), 56–74.
Pain in america. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://painconsortium.nih.gov/sites/default/files/
NINDS-Pain-Infographic 508C.pdf
Perrot, S., Choy, E., Petersel, D., Ginovker, A., & Kramer, E. (2012). Survey of physician
experiences and perceptions about the diagnosis and treatment of fibromyalgia. BMC
health services research, 12 (1), 356.
Pohlhaus Jr, G. (2012). Relational knowing and epistemic injustice: Toward a theory of
willful hermeneutical ignorance. Hypatia, 27 (4), 715–735.
Pohlhaus Jr, G. (2014). Discerning the primary epistemic harm in cases of testimonial
injustice. Social Epistemology , 28 (2), 99–114.
Prevalence. (2019). Online. Retrieved from https://www.fmcpaware.org/fibromyalgia/
prevalence.html
Quast, L. (2017). Ending gender bias begins with ‘office housework’. Retrieved from https://
goo.gl/xzFkcw
Real fibromyalgia patient stories and tips. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.fibrocenter
.com/fibromyalgia-stories-tips#LaReeia
Reiheld, A. (2017, November). What you dont know can hurt you: Epistemic




Riggs, W. (2010). Open-mindedness. Metaphilosophy , 41 (1-2), 172–188.
Rogers, R. (2019). Taking notes isn’t “women’s work:” what to do when you’re the default
admin. Retrieved from https://www.themuse.com/advice/taking-notes-isnt-womens
-work-what-to-do-when-youre-the-default-admin
Sadker, D., & Zittleman, K. R. (2009). Still failing at fairness: How gender bias cheats girls
and boys in school and what we can do about it. Simon and Schuster.
Sherman, B. R. (2016). There’s no (testimonial) justice: Why pursuit of a virtue is not the
solution to epistemic injustice. Social Epistemology , 30 (3), 229–250.
Singh, B., Winkel, D. E., & Selvarajan, T. (2013). Managing diversity at work: Does
psychological safety hold the key to racial differences in employee performance? Journal
of Occupational and Organizational Psychology , 86 (2), 242–263.
Slote, M. (2002). Justice as a virtue. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.
Stenseng, F., Belsky, J., Skalicka, V., & Wichstrøm, L. (2015). Social exclusion predicts
impaired self-regulation: a 2-year longitudinal panel study including the transition
from preschool to school. Journal of personality , 83 (2), 212–220.
Too accurate...make it stop!!: Diagnosing chronic illness (meme). (2019). Online. Retrieved
from https://www.reddit.com/r/Fibromyalgia/comments/a8clwm/too accurate make
it stop/
Torres, M. (2017, March). Women keep getting interrupted in meetings. here’s how to
stop it. Retrieved from https://www.theladders.com/career-advice/finally-good-advice
-women-can-handle-getting-interrupted-meetings
Tuomela, R. (2011). Cooperation as joint action. Analyse & Kritik , 33 (1), 65–86.
Twenge, J. M., Catanese, K. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Social exclusion causes
self-defeating behavior. Journal of personality and social psychology , 83 (3), 606.
Vincent, L. (2017, September). online. Retrieved from https://www.thecut.com/2017/09/
me-lady-gaga-and-the-doctors-that-failed-us-both.html
Wanderer, J. (2017). Varieties of testimonial injustice. In The routledge handbook of epistemic
injustice (p. 27-40). Taylor & Francis.
Why are there so few black women doctors? (2017, February). Retrieved from https://
tonic.vice.com/en us/article/xy5edz/why-are-there-so-few-black-women-doctors
Wible, P. (2016). Her story went viral. but she is not the only black doctor ignored in an
airplane emergency. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/YizyHW
140
Williams, K. D., Cheung, C. K., & Choi, W. (2000). Cyberostracism: effects of being ignored
over the internet. Journal of personality and social psychology , 79 (5), 748.
Woolf, V. (1929). A room of ones own. New York , 47.
Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton University Press.
141
